Micheletti has no intention of leaving the stage

As we noted in the previous post, Roberto Micheletti has now been given an extra-constitutional lifetime appointment as congress member. This brings with it a shiny gold medal, as well as income, without the strain of actually being elected. What else it brings remains to be seen.

Not in question now, though, is whether Micheletti will recede from view in order to allow international powers to legitimate the Porfirio Lobo government. Indeed, Micheletti thinks perhaps he should speak to the congress on January 25.

As it turns out, he has a lot to say.

An article published today by Proceso Digital reporting remarks Micheletti made on Canal 10 quotes him as accusing Oscar Arias of being "disrespectful" of Honduras:

each time that he speaks it is to offend my country, it seems that he has a complex to believe that we are a slavish nation where anyone that wants can order us around; we Hondurans are not his slaves

Micheletti reportedly said.

Micheletti assured the listening public that he would not even ask for a special leave of absence for the period of the inauguration, as that, he says, would violate the constitution:

I am not going to step aside, nor am I going to ask permission to step aside temporarily, that is not possible because that would be to violate the constitution, I will do what I have announced previously, I will watch the passage of power from the Casa de Gobierno and in the moment in which Porfirio Lobo is imposed as president, I will get up and go to my house with my family.

Micheletti said that he intends to participate in the first session of the new congress on January 25: there I will give my report on the situation of the country because it is a constitutional duty.

Micheletti also explained that it was Jose Miguel Insulza's fault that things got chilly with the OAS:

he committed to respect the will of the Hondurans, he promised that this matter (the political crisis) was going to be resolved by the Hondurans and he would support that, but when he returned with the chancellors to the country, he came simply to try to impose the idea that we should return Zelaya to power, and that we could not accept because it was a falsehood that he had told us in our private meeting

Lobo Sosa should be gratified to hear that Micheletti does support his intention to renew international relations because in Micheletti's opinion "we should support it and respect it because the space of Honduras has to be opened to the world".

Not that Micheletti has in mind the same thing you or I might imagine. He is talking about economic ties with China, and other potential sources of employment. Apparently, something has caused the economic situation to deteriorate over the last six months. So Pepe has his work cut out for him.

Micheletti was happy to give a shout out to his friends in need:

He said that on the level of countries he is gratified with the aid given during the crisis by nations like Taiwan, Japan and the same United States, which did not stop aiding the nation in the projects already underway. Despite the restrictions given by their governments, the cooperation in projects under execution never stopped and for this he had to thank them, he noted.

Indeed. No sanctions here, folks, move along, nothing to see...

And of course, he thanked the governments of Colombia and Panama, "who when we resorted to ask their advice never denied us, they were an important support and I thank Panama and its president for the petition made in the OAS so that our country can return to that regional venue".

And finally, Micheletti is willing to kiss and make up with the US:

they have committed many errors, but the US people deserve our affection and respect. The clauses for which they take away visas, I don't meet those requirements, and if they determine that some day they are going to return it to me, congratulations, because I have not committed any crime nor am I delinquent.

Such a gentle nature. So wronged, and yet so forgiving.

Homework for Lobo Sosa

Porifirio Lobo Sosa returned from San Jose, Costa Rica, yesterday after meeting with Presidents Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, and Ricardo Martinelli of Panama, and immediately cancelled his planned trip to the Dominican Republic to lobby its president, Leonel Fernandez, for support.

He came back with homework, assigned by Arias, Martinelli, and Clinton, homework which will help make it more palatable for these three politicians to recognize him as president of Honduras in January, though they claim to speak for all international governments. The three of them made it clear to Lobo Sosa that he needed to accomplish all his homework for the international community to recognize him, but in return, they agreed to lobby for him.

First, he must see to the compliance with all of the steps of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. This includes the establishment of a government of national unity and reconciliation and the establishment of a truth commission.

Second, there needs to be a general amnesty for events of June 28 and later, an amnesty for political offenses, not criminal ones. This is something that was part of the original San Jose Accord, but both Zelaya and Micheletti felt was unnecessary and thus left out of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.

Third, that Roberto Micheletti needs to step down now; that it will be hard to get international governments to recognize Lobo Sosa if he takes office from Micheletti.

Arias and Martinelli told him that the government of national unity and reconciliation needs to be formed now, and that the truth commission needs to be formed in the first quarter of 2010. They made it clear that international aid will be conditioned on compliance. Lobo Sosa said on his return:

"We need to resolve this situation because, if not, what will happen is that there is approximately $2,000 million dollars which we won't have acess to, at least not in the first months of next year."

Arias, Clinton, Martinelli lobbying for Lobo Sosa

Oscar Arias confirmed yesterday that he got a phone call from Hillary Clinton concerning the need to get Porfirio Lobo Sosa recognized, and that he, in collaboration with Ricardo Martinelli, would be using technology to gather support for Lobo Sosa.

After a two hour meeting yesterday, Arias and Martinelli told Lobo Sosa they would do whatever is necessary to get the international community to recognize Lobo Sosa as president on January 27, 2010.

Could There Have Been a Different Outcome?

While the US may still have hopes of reviving the corpse, the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord seems to be quite dead. The Frente de Resistencia has declared a boycott of the national elections scheduled for November 29, even if somehow President Zelaya were restored in the next 18 days, and in truth, it is hard to see how anyone can claim elections under the current conditions will be free, fair, and transparent-- the conditions the US originally set for recognition, although with recent statements it is clear that the only US "condition" for recognition is that a semblance of elections be carried out.

So the question occurs to us: was this inevitable? leave aside the criticism of the waffling, muddied messages, and speaking silences of the US State Department that always came just when it seemed the de facto regime was getting clear on what was necessary for the international community to be satisfied. Was there ever any solution to this crisis, once the coup architects started on their Plan A without any Plan B?

In retrospect, we think that a key mistake was ever negotiating with Roberto Micheletti. Not that anyone could have quite realized at the time how intransigent he would be personally: that kind of unpredictable personality is a risk in any negotiation. But because doing so not only gave him and the regime that he consolidated undue legitimacy, elevating them to the equivalent of the constitutional President and his cabinet; it also allowed Micheletti to consolidate executive power within Honduras.

Am I suggesting the international community should simply have given Honduras an immediate cold shoulder? hardly. But if we ask ourselves, on June 29, who in the Honduran government still exercised power with a constitutional mandate, then we can identify the Congress and yes, even the corrupt and unjust Supreme Court as branches of the government with which the international community could have initiated more productive dialogue, as these bodies have something to lose, while Roberto Micheletti, once he cast his lot with the coup architects, could not reverse course.

At the time, of course, international representatives did refuse to talk to the de facto regime's new head. This was one of the things the Micheletti regime complained about. But instead of continuing to isolate the illegally installed executive officers; instead of opening and sustaining a dialogue with the Congress, which we now know includes a substantial group against the coup, and a majority we suspect wishes the coup never happened; the US pushed for a mediated dialogue directly between Micheletti and Zelaya.

Remember that the original San Jose dialogue forced the legally elected President to accept negotiating directly with an unconstitutional usurper? It was that moment that gave Micheletti authority. Not the military intervention on June 28, that was by all accounts initiated by a cabal of business interests spear-headed by political masters not currently holding elected office.

The ringleaders of the coup, people like Carlos Flores Facussé, former president and current business leader, are by definition pragmatists. If, at the beginning of the international intervention, Micheletti-- who we have seen reveal himself as an honest ideologue (however misguided we find his ideological positions to be)-- had been isolated, discussions had taken place with Congress, and back-channel communication with the pragmatists in the cabal was carried out, no legitimacy would have been conferred on the usurping executive officers, and a wider array of interests could have been encouraged to consider what they stood to lose.

Once Micheletti was treated as Zelaya's equal, the course of negotiations was almost certainly headed for deadlock. Worse: the first draft of the San Jose Accord gave the Micheletti executive branch too much credence. Inserted in that document, which emerged as the basis for the Tegucigalpa Accord, were items that presumed the guilt of President Zelaya in matters that were (still are in fact) live subjects of legal proceedings in Honduras. So the spin given the San Jose Accord, even in its unsigned state, in Honduras was that Oscar Arias recognized that Zelaya was trying to change the constitution to stay in power.

What if, instead, negotiations had taken place with the Honduran Congress? it was Congress, after all, that made Micheletti de facto executive; it was Congress that accepted a forged resignation letter; it was Congress that issued a Decree removing Zelaya from office without citing any constitutional basis for that action. Congress, as an institution, has lost more from the coup than the presidency, as an institution. And all of the members of Congress were duly elected by the Honduran people; they represent a significant variety of positions; and they have something lasting to lose if the elections of 2009 are not recognized.

Micheletti, having achieved his long-term goal of exercising executive authority (although he will never have the title "President" legally), cannot run for President in the future, under the Constitution he claims to be defending. He of course can return to Congress and run and, given the nature of Honduran politics, count on staying in Congress as long as he wants; but he probably won't find enthusiastic welcome from other politicians there who will not want to be tainted by association. (Think of the way Elvin Santos, the presidential candidate from Micheletti's own Liberal Party, has tried to distance himself; now multiply it by 64.)

So Micheletti literally has everything to lose in negotiating, and nothing to gain; and thus rhetorically has nothing to lose by, as he has, continually perverting, subverting, or simply rejecting any negotiated settlement.

Just a side note about Voice of America spin

My academic writing is calling, and before I get there I have an update to post on the Aaron Schock Library of Congress Law Library report.

But since the little things also matter, I wanted to briefly point to an odd language game in a VOA story about the gassing of the Brazilian Embassy:

The international community has refused to recognize the interim government and has called for Mr. Zelaya to be reinstated with limited power until a presidential election is held.

Well, no. The international community (OAS, EU, UN) has called for Zelaya to be reinstated. Period. And until the end of of his term, which is in January 2010, not "until a presidential election is held".

The "limited power" thing? that is part of the Oscar Arias-negotiated, US State Department-inspired, San Jose Accord. It is one of the many unpalatable things about the San Jose Accord that President Zelaya should not have had to accept, but which he in fact did, despite the fact that the "limited power" business basically accepts the counter-factual claims of the de facto regime that Zelaya has evil intentions. (This theme has now, as the November election nears, changed into insinuations that Zelaya plans to "disrupt" elections-- but that gets us back to the astonishing Representative Aaron Schock, and on to the real post for the day.)

Do we have a right to demand that US-sponsored media, like US-sponsored research services, get the details right?

Talks Hit A Speedbump

Oscar Arias announced today that he had no intention of going to Honduras to negotiate a solution to the political crisis any time soon. He said he spoke with President Jimmy Carter, and he wasn't inclined to go either. Arias said that the OAS ministers needed to do the preparatory work before it would be worthwhile for him to come to Honduras. Roberto Micheletti had announced last evening that Oscar Arias and Juan Carlos Varela, Panamanian Vice President, would come to negotiate, and that he preferred to negotiate with them before the arrival of the OAS delegation.

In other news, the OAS announced that there was no date yet for their group of Ministers to visit Honduras. Oscar Arias told the Associated Press that the de facto government told the OAS that they would not be welcome any time before next week. José Miguel Insulza said "We'll come in the next few days," but he indicated there were difficulties. "The communications are terrible, there are no flights, and the roads closed," Insulza indicated. He also noted that he hoped that the preperatory group could arrive either today or tomorrow to prepare for the mission.

UPDATE 4:00 PM PDT: Oscar Arias, in an interview with Telesur, said that the intransigence of Roberto Micheletti on the issue of returning power to Manuel Zelaya, is the obstacle that is keeping there from being any advances in the negotiations for a solution to the crisis in Honduas. "There is no possibility that they will admit the restitution of Zelaya before the elections (of November)."

Arias further said that the Micheletti government is blocking the arrival of the OAS foreign ministers. He said the OAS was told that the ministers would not be allowed to enter the country.

An Interview with President Zelaya

La Jornada de Mexico has the first published coverage available on the internet from the recent interview with Zelaya at the Brazilian embassy.

Possibly the biggest news item in the press interview is Zelaya's statement that OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza will travel to Honduras to mediate face-to-face talks.

Yo he regresado con el fin de buscar un arreglo pacífico de frente, para que el diálogo sea en mi propia tierra y en mi propio pueblo.

I have returned with the purpose of seeking a peaceful arrangement face to face, so that the dialogue will be in my own country and among my own people

Las fuerzas armadas deben apuntar sus rifles a los enemigos del pueblo y no contra el pueblo

The Armed Forces should point their rifles at the enemies of the people and not against the people

While the US State Department may have preferred him to stay out of Honduras and wait for non-existent progress in the moribund Arias mediated "negotiations", Zelaya makes an important claim here: even the worst coup apologists have had to admit his expulsion from the country was a constitutional violation.

The Supreme Court order for his detention June 28 actually was based on a claim he was a flight risk. Pro-coup apologists delight in claiming that President Zelaya cannot return because he would be arrested on both this order and a trumped-up list of 18 "charges" since the de facto regime was installed. But this ignores his actual desire to return to the country, where he would have the right to due legal process and to fight the charges against him, which many constitutional law professors have argued are procedurally and factually flawed. As noted here, the Supreme Court had not yet arrived at the point of trying, much less convicting, Zelaya, and while there were administrative charges that could be argued to have some basis, representing these administrative issues as the basis of charges of "treason" was overwrought.

The amnesty provision in the San Jose Accord is as much, or more, about protecting the coup architects from prosecution.

With Zelaya back in the country, negotiations could proceed without the baggage of that proposal, which gave away so much to the coup regime that it hardly made sense for Zelaya to agree to it. His presence in national territory allows for the participation of civil society in ensuring that there are negotiations; it raises the pressure on the Armed Forces, which desperately wants not to be smeared by their participation in the coup; and it may open a way for the factions within the coup and de facto regime that have tried to open up some breathing room to move more decisively away from Micheletti.

"No chance Zelaya will be allowed to return": Ortez Colindres

Micheletti's notorious former Foreign Minister, Enrique Ortez Colindres, told BBC Mundo today that Micheletti's request to Arias for someone such as Enrique Iglesias to come and talk to all social sectors in Honduras is not meant to lead to an acceptance of the San Jose Accord.

Ortez Colindres said that the purpose of these conversations is only for Iglesias to hear from many distinct groups (presumably, he hopes, voicing a single pro-coup message):

It isn't the conversations that will provide an exit for the people, rather, the elections in November

(No son las conversaciones que las van a darle una salida al pueblo, sino las elecciones de noviembre)

Instead, he says, the purpose of calling for the dialog is to get the de facto regime's point of view listened to by "prestigious people" (personas de prestigio).

According to Ortez Colindres:

There is not even a minimal chance that Zelaya will come back to Honduras, there is no possibility for an arrangement of this type

(No hay la más minima posibilidad de que Zelaya regrese a Honduras, no hay ninguna posibilidad de arreglo en este sentido)

More from Micheletti: Playing out the clock?

Spain's El Economista is out ahead of the Micheletti-Arias story, and their reporting suggests we should view this latest move as perhaps a new way to slow things down, remain in power, and appear to be addressing international concerns.

Their story says Micheletti asked Oscar Arias

to send a commission to undertake an internal dialogue of reconciliation.

The story cites a press release, unsigned but attributed to the Executive branch, as saying

This dialogue, this actual communication, should include all the parties of civil society: churches, trade societies, student groups, business associations, media, labor unions, universities.

While such broad participation would be nice-- and ironically, precisely this kind of participatory democracy is what the Zelaya government was doing that got people in Micheletti's cabal so worried-- it is also a daunting order to imagine such a dialogue being accomplished before Zelaya is restored.

Micheletti is quoted as "explaining" in the press release that

the results of the San Jose dialogue will be articulated and promulgated by all those elements of civil society, so that they should be encouraged and inspired to initiate this dialogue today, immediately.

Wonder why all these civil sectors now have to pick up after the de facto regime that was so anxious to keep their opinions about government from being recorded?

While saying that the San Jose framework is "the best route to achieve consensus in Honduras" Micheletti reportedly added

Our citizens need to endorse and widen the dialogue of San Jose with a dialogue in Honduras, that is to say, a dialogue among our own people.

This from the man who suspended rights of free speech and freedom of assembly.

Not to say that the Spanish newspaper accepted this press release without some degree of due skepticism. They note that Micheletti actually rejected the San Jose accord when he denied the central point calling for the restoral of President Zelaya. But, they continue, he agreed to "analyze" the rest of the aspects of the San Jose Accord. Which is how the Micheletti regime has been able to claim, on the one hand, that it is Zelaya's team that has broken off negotiations, while actually failing to consider the one, unalterable fact of any internationally-recognized solution: President Zelaya must be restored to his office.

Finally, as the article notes, having claimed he could not speak for the other branches of government, Micheletti is now stuck with the outcomes of deliberations by those other bodies. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has rejected the call to move the November elections forward to October, because-- as I long have noted-- this is unconstitutional.

And the Congress has apparently limited its discussion to the question of amnesty for political crimes, forming a commission that reportedly has written a report, which has yet to be shared openly, but that all news coverage suggests will reject this as well, congress members having been encouraged to believe that political payback against the Zelaya government was now completely assured.

So, maybe Micheletti has actually accepted the San Jose Accords, including restoral of Zelaya as President. But it looks like it doesn't matter one bit if he does-- and cynically, one could argue that all he is doing is playing out the clock in a different way.

Micheletti Accepts the San Jose Accords??!!

So reports Ginger Thompson of the New York Times 36 minutes ago

But the kicker is, he says he is not the source of the intransigence, and he needs help convincing others in the Honduran regime to accept the fact that they have to back down. So Micheletti called Arias to ask for help, seeking others to convince those holding out, he says.

Do we believe this? for me, it underlines a problem with trying to mediate between a real elected government (Zelaya) and a regime that seized power extra-constitutionally. It has never been clear who could commit the Micheletti regime. Now, it would appear, one part of the answer is: not Micheletti, who reportedly

asked Mr. Arias to consider sending a prominent international political figure to help him stem the fierce opposition.

One of those mentioned as a possible envoy was Enrique V. Iglesias, the former head of the Inter-American Development Bank and current secretary general of the Ibero-American Cooperation Secretariat, which was created in 2005 to increase cooperation between Spain, Portugal and Latin America.

“Today is an important day,” said one of the officials who spoke about Mr. Micheletti’s call to Mr. Arias. “President Arias essentially has Mr. Micheletti calling to say he thinks the San José Accord is a good framework, but that to make the accord work, he needs help building political support inside the country.”

Second point: why does Micheletti think it is a good accord? well, perhaps because the accord accepts as beginning postulates all the accusations made against President Zelaya. And perhaps because, instead of restoring the Zelaya government, it allows a negotiation in which those who seized power maintain toeholds for the next several months. Knowing the havoc being wreaked in at least one ministry by the ill-qualified person allowed to pretend to run it, this latter point makes any agreement under the San Jose Accord seem like a Pyrrhic victory.

The San Jose Accord: A Translation and Commentary

San Jose Accord
for national reconciliation
and the strengthening of democracy in Honduras

We, Honduran brothers, disciples of peace, liberty, and democracy of our country; conscious of the historic responsibility with which our circumstances have invested us; profoundly convinced of the power of our union and the force of our consensual will; under the aid of our Constitution and the laws of our Republic and the full validity of the State of Law; reaffirm before the people of Honduras, before our mediator, Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez, and through him, before all the international community, our unbreakable commitment to the reconciliation of our people, that should be one and indivisible.

The recent events that have disturbed Honduras require of us maturity and humility, and in that spirit we have agreed to sign the following Accord.

1. Of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation

To reach reconciliation and fortify democracy, we agree to a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, integrated by representatives of the diverse political parties, recognized for their abilities, honorability, suitability, and willingness to engage in dialogue, who will occupy the distinct Secretariats and sub-Secretariats of State, in conformity with Article 246 and following of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

In view of the fact that prior to the 28th of June, the Executive Power had not sent for consideration by the National Congress the Plan for the General Budget of Income and Expenditures, in conformity with that established in Article 205, point 32, of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, this Government of Unity and National Reconciliation will respect and function on the basis of the General Budget recently approved by the National Congress for the fiscal year 2009.

2. On Amnesty for Political Offenses

To achiever reconciliation and fortify democracy, we ask the National Congress to declare a general amnesty, exclusively for political offenses committed by reason of this conflict, before and after June 28, 2009, and until the signing of the Accord, according to the terms of Article 205, point 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and the special legislation in force that regulates this material. The amnesty should, as well, guarantee with clarity the conditions of security and liberty of the persons that remain under its protection.

In the same way, we commit to not initiate nor continue legal acts about the acts prior to July 1, 2009 that derive from the present conflict, for a period of six months. The incompletion of any of the commitments contained in this Accord, proved and declared by the Commission of Verification to which Point 7 refers, will nullify the effects of this moratorium for the transgressor or transgressors.

3. On the Renunciation of Convening a National Constitutional Assembly or Reform of the Constitution in the Unreformable

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we reiterate our respect for the Constitution and the laws of our country, abstaining from calling for the convening of a National Constitutional Assembly, in direct or indirect ways, and renouncing as well the promotion or support of any popular poll with the goal of reforming the Constitution to permit presidential re-election, modify the form of Government, or contravene any of the unreformable articles of our Magna Carta.

In particular, we will not carry out public declarations nor exercise any type of influence inconsistent with Articles 5, 239, 373 and 274 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, and we reject energetically all demonstrations contrary to the spirit of the said articles and of the Special Law that Regulates the Referendum and the Plebiscite.

4. On Moving Up the General Elections and the Transfer of Government

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we urge the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to consider advancing the national elections convened for the 29 of November, 2009, to the 28 of October; and the consequent advancing of the electoral campaign from September 1, 2009 to August 1, 2009. We reiterate that, in keeping with Articles 44 and 51 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, the vote is universal, obligatory, equal, direct, free and secret, and that it corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, with full autonomy and independence, to supervise and execute all that is related with the electoral acts and processes.

As well, we carry out a call to the Honduran people that they participate peacefully in the next general elections and avoid all type of demonstrations that oppose the elections or their result, or promote insurrection, antijudicial conduct, civil disobedience or other acts that could produce violent confrontations or transgressions of the law.

With the goal of demonstrating the transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process, we urge the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to authorize and accredit the presence of international missions from now to the declaration of the results of the general elections, as well as during the transfer of powers that will take place, in conformity with Article 237 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, on the 27th of January, 2010.

5. On the Armed Forces

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we endorse our will to abide in all its extremes to Article 272 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, in conformity with which the Armed Forces remain at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal from one month before the general elections, for the purpose of guaranteeing the free exercise of suffrage, the custody, transport, and guarding of electoral materials and all the other aspects of security of the process. We reaffirm the professional, apolitical, obedient, and non-deliberative character of the Honduran Armed Forces. In equal form, we recognize the professionalism of the National Police, whose rotation should be strictly subject to that which its special legislation prescribes.

6. On the Return of the Powers of State to their Integration Prior to the 28th of June

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we ask the National Congress that, for the goal of recovering the integration and legitimate conformation of the powers constituted the 28th of June of 2009, in the proceeding they return the situation of the Executive Power, Legislative Power, Judicial Power and Supreme Electoral Tribunal to their state prior to June 28, for having been in conformity according to Articles 202, 205, points 9 and 11, and 236 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras. The preceding implies the return of Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales to the Presidency of the Republic until the conclusion of the present governmental period, the 27th of January, 2010.

7. On the Commission of Verification and the Truth Commission

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we arrange the creation of a Commission of Verification of the undertakings made in this Accord, and those that are derived from it, presided over by the OAS, and persons that it considers suitable among national and international figures. The Commission of Verification will be charged to attest to the strict compliance of all the points of this Accord, and will receive for this the full cooperation of the Honduran public institutions.

With the goal of clarifying the deeds that occurred before and after the 28th of June of 2009, a Truth Commission will also be created that will identify the acts that let to the present situation, and provide to the Honduran people elements that will avoid that these deeds will be repeated in the future. The work of the Truth Commission will be fundamental in the recovery of confidence of the Honduran people in its Constitution and in its Government. To assure the impartiality in the execution of this task, we designate as leader of the Truth Commission the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights.

8. On the Normalization of the Relations of the Republic of Honduras with the International Community

On promising to faithfully fulfill the obligations assumed in the present Accord, we respectfully ask the immediate revocation of those means or sanctions adopted at a bilateral or multilateral level, that in any manner affect the reinsertion and full participation of the Republic of Honduras in the international community, and its access to all the forms of cooperation.

We make a call to the international community that it shall reactivate as soon as possible the active projects of cooperation with the Republic of Honduras, and continue with the negotiation of future ones. In particular, we urge that, on request of the competent authorities, the international cooperation that will be necessary and opportune for the Commission of Verification and the Truth Commission will be made effective to assure the faithful fulfillment and follow-through of the obligations acquired in this Accord.

9. On the Entry into Effectiveness of the Accord of San Jose

All the obligations assumed take up formal and total effectiveness from the same moment as its signing.

10. Final Dispositions

Any difference in interpretation or application of the present Accord will be submitted to the Commission of Verification, which will determine, in keeping with that set in the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and in the effective legislation, and through an authentic interpretation of the present Accord, the solution that corresponds.

Taking into account that the present Accord is the product of understanding and fraternity among Hondurans, we strongly request that the international community respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Honduras, and fully observe the principle consecrated in the United Nations Charter of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

11. Calendar of Fulfillment of the Accords

Given the immediate entry into effectiveness of this Accord from the date of its signing, and with the goal of clarifying the dates for fulfillment and follow-through of the obligations acquired to gain national reconciliation, we agree to the following calendar of fulfillment:

22 July, 2009

1. Signing and entry into effectiveness of the Accord of San Jose

24 July, 2009

1. Return of Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales to the Presidency of the Republic of Honduras
2. Formation of the Commission of Verification

27 July, 2009

1. Formation of the Government of Union and National Reconciliation
2. Formation of the Truth Commission

27 January, 2010

1. Transition of government.

12. Final Declaration

In the name of the reconciliation that has summoned us to the table of dialogue, we commit to executing the present Accord, and that which derives from it, in good faith. We know that humanity expects from Honduras a demonstration of unity and of peace, to which we are obligated by our conscience and our history. Together, we shall know to demonstrate our valor and crown with olive branches the face of our democracy, so that future generations will see what we were capable of doing for our homeland.


The preceding translation, omitting only the signature and witness names (since the Accord has yet to be signed), illustrates considerable evolution from the original 7-point plan Oscar Arias presented to the representatives of President Zelaya and the de facto regime. Comparing the two, the San Jose Accord shows an almost complete absorption of proposals made by the Micheletti regime, including things that might be considered "interference in internal affairs", such as the requirement that the budget passed by Congress while the de facto regime has been in power should remain in place for the rest of President Zelaya's term.

As noted here previously, and exploited by the de facto regime in its press conference on Thursday, many of the points of this plan presume the truth of accusations made against President Zelaya, for example, expanding the original statement of renunciation of the "cuarta urna" consultation to explicitly identify changing the unreformable articles of the constitution as not permitted. Even the "Truth Commission" is a substantiation of the de facto regime's views, calling for exploring the events that led up to the present "situation"-- not the coup on June 28-- as if there could be any justification of the coup.

Even the call for amnesty is constructed in such a way as to disadvantage President Zelaya. First, it is only temporary: in six months presumably the members of the de facto regime, who will still be in Congress as there are no term limits there, will be free to pursue political charges. But they also would be free right away to initiate prosecution for charges they claim are not political-- such as the outrageous claims of drug-trafficking promoted by the "genius" of the de facto regime, Ortez Colindres.

Most shocking, instead of a forthright call for the restoration of President Zelaya at the outset, as in the previous plan, this document integrates that in the 7th point-- and then only as a consequence of a call to return all the government branches to their original status (something not extending to the Cabinet of the President, meaning that the Executive Power in actuality would not be restored).

Examining this version, it is a wonder the Zelaya negotiators accepted it; and it makes it clear just how fair it was for Rixxi Moncada to declare the Micheletti negotiators intransigent, since here they obtain far more than they should ever have gained in return for a largely symbolic restitution of President Zelaya. What Arias offered the Micheletti team was control of the government for the next six months, early elections, locking in the hastily passed budget that means the Zelaya government cannot carry on its initiatives, a forum to continue politically motivated investigations of Zelaya for what his opponents assert were his intentions, and full resumption of their own positions as re-electable members of Congress.

My Cental American colleagues with whom I discussed Arias' original plan last week described even the original as not really a product of mediation, noting rumors that a US senator had brought Arias a draft. They already felt that this version, which was not fully public at the time, went too far in presuming the offenses Zelaya was accused of were real, and requiring him to renounce them, while demoting from its more prominent place the insistence that Zelaya is the constitutional president and his restoration is non-negotiable. I wonder what they are saying now about the actual wording of the critical point concerning his restitution, which entirely abandons the firmness of the constitutional basis for his restoration-- a basis which does not exist for the proposal to let those responsible for the coup, currently occupying positions in the de facto regime and abusing them to engage in purges of government civil servants, return to their former congressional posts.

Who Really Rejected the Arias Plan

Here in the real world of Costa Rica, I watched, live, as the Micheletti negotiating team in Tegucigalpa obfuscated what the final proposed "San Jose Accord" was, and misrepresented what parts of it meant.

How do I know they were lying? because earlier, I had watched the Zelaya team's statement as well as that of Arias.

What I heard the Micheletti team say was that President Zelaya could not return to office under any proposal, clearly a rejection of a non-negotiable element of the plan.

So why does the LA Times headline their article "Zelaya rejects mediator's new Honduras proposal"?

This is the position the Micheletti team wanted to place President Zelaya in. It is what their press conference claimed had happened, and the LA Times article is datelined Tegucigalpa. So, effectively, the LA Times is doing propaganda work for the de facto regime.

In a discussion among a group of Central American scholars, the consensus was that the Arias mediation was flawed from the outset. First, they note that Arias was compromised by being tapped by Hillary Clinton, thus was not an independent agent. Second, as also noted in editorials by Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, treating Micheletti as if he had an equal right to bargain gave him a degree of legitimacy he did not merit. Tonight, in the press conference by the Micheletti group, that decision came home to roost as they cited various proposed points in Arias' plan, and argued that these points proved that Oscar Arias agreed with their views of Zelaya's actions before the coup.

Meanwhile, the Micheletti negotiators at the last moment stated that they had no authority to agree to anything, and while not giving a clear yes or no, stated they would go back to Honduras and consult virtually every branch of the de facto government about individual points. This is a transparent delaying tactic, especially since they simultaneously reiterated that there was no way they could agree to Zelaya's returning as president, because, they claim, he left the country already as a private citizen. So to let him return as president would, the Micheletti crowd argued, be installing a president who was not elected.

These are not the positions of anyone who actually was negotiating anything. What these negotiations have been about, transparently, is holding on in the belief that eventually the world community would lose interest and perhaps, if the de facto regime makes it to election day, they can pass off a president elected in a country where basic civil liberties have been suspended as legitimate.

The scholars I spent the evening with noted that Arias also made the mistake of getting involved in "negotiating" issues that are strictly internal-- such as including a requirement that the budget passed by the de facto regime would be left stand for the remainder of Zelaya's presidency. This was a red herring thrown in by the Micheletti crowd, and adding it to the plan simply showed them that Arias would include anything they wanted. And then they held a press conference and used him rhetorically as a prop.

As Rixi Moncada, spokesperson for the Zelaya government, actually said: the Arias mediation has failed. It was, she said, a fracaso-- which can politely be translated as failure.

But I prefer the more colorful "flop".

And so was the LA Times coverage.

Cracks in the Micheletti Faction: Carlos Flores to Oscar Arias

A Honduran colleague sends the following news, also being published in other Spanish-language news media. I translate the entire note I received, including the explanations of who's who by my trusted correspondent.

Felix Molina is a correspondent of the Jesuit radio station, Radio Progreso. Yesterday he made known the fax that the ex-president, Carlos Flores, sent to Arias. Flores has been singled out as the ideologue behind the coup and represents the interests of the oligarchy. He, since the editorial in La Tribuna last week, has been unbinding himself from and denying any participation in the coup. President Arias made known that Flores sent this fax.

The counter-proposal of Micheletti is being interpreted by some as the posture of a wing of the Nacionalist Party that participated in the coup and that has two negotiators of recognized Nationalist affiliation, the spurious Chancellor Lopez Contreras, and Vilma Morales. Corrales also is close to the Nationalists, although he belongs to the Christian Democrat party. The analysis of Molina this afternoon is that the posture of the Nationalists is weighing more in the negotiations.



From: Felix Molina



The proposal of Flores to Arias



Last night the Liberal ex-president Carlos Flores sent to Oscar Arias the following text, as suggestions for the final declaration from San Jose, in contradiction of the negative of the Micheletti delegation, which rejected the return of Zelaya to power.

SUGGESTIONS

Both parties commit to guaranteeing the physical safety of the other in any scenario.

Both parties commit, for a term of six months, to a moratorium in taking any legal action against the other for actions carried out before the 1st of July, 2009.

Both parties commit to retake their oaths to the Constitution and Laws of Honduras, as well as to submit to the authority granted to governmental institutions by the Constitution.

Both parties express their remorse for the loss of confidence of the people of Honduras in the Constitution and the Government occasioned by the recent events and swear that they will exert themselves in reconstructing this confidence through transparency.

Both parties commit to the trustworthy fulfillment of the present calendar for the general elections of this November and swear to permit the preparations to proceed free of any interference or manipulation.

Both parties commit to not incur any attempt to suspend, alter, or carry out any consultation at a national level in reference to the Constitution of the Republic for a term of one year.

Both parties welcome the OAS for the formation of a temporary commission that will provide technical consulting about the implementation of this accord and the preparations for the general elections.

Both parties agree to establish a Truth Commission with well-defined goals, whose members will be chosen and accepted by all the interested parties.

Under these solemn conditions, both parties commit to the restoration in a peaceful manner of President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales for the period of the remainder of his term.

Both parties, together, will formally meet, as soon as possible, with the National Congress and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Honduras to review, explain, and gain consensus of the Legislative Power and the Judicial Power to the agreed upon conditions.

Both parties agree to jointly order the Armed Forces and the National Police (the security forces) to desist and avoid arbitrary arrests, and any violation of the liberty of the person, the liberty of expression, the liberty of movement, and any other democratic liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic.

The Armed Forces and Police obligated to fulfill their constitutional functions and pass to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The present authorities guarantee stability in their commands.

Both parties will abstain from promoting or encouraging demonstrations against the electoral process or that promote insurrection, civil disobedience, illegal conduct or anything that would lead to violence or violation of the Law.

Respect the budget approved in Congress.

Verification of the accords with wide representation.

The Micheletti "counter-proposal": A rant

Micheletti's negotiators today rejected the Arias plan, despite the fact that it addressed the supposed reasons for the constitutional and military coup d'etat, despite the fact that President Zelaya agreed to Arias' terms, which many commentators supportive of the constitutional government feel demanded too much and placed Zelaya in the position of repudiating his supporters. At the same time, the Micheletti group offered their own counter-proposal, which can be downloaded in PDF from El Heraldo, one of the pro-Micheletti Honduran newspapers.

What do these "negotiators" with no legal right to negotiate, and only the raw exercise of repressive power and world-wide reluctance to increase the suffering of the Honduran people propping them up, have to offer as an alternative?

Presented as a letter to Oscar Arias, the main body of their proposal can be translated as follows, with my notes after:

We recognize that the return to Honduras of the citizen petitioner José Manuel Zelaya Rosales with all constitutional and international guarantees is an important point of a global accord that would determine the situations that would need to be addressed for the effectiveness of our Constitution and the Democracy in the framework of a State of law.

Our position is inspired by the figure of one single Republic and not in the image of a divided State and society.

First, the return to Honduras of the petitioner Sr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales with the necessary guarantees so that he can exercise his right to due process before the competent legal bodies of the Judicial Power.

Second, the entrenchment of democratic order and respect for the separation of Powers, for which a Government of unity and reconciliation would be formed, composed of members of the political parties and social sectors, in accordance with the requirements of capacity, merit, suitability and ethics that will defend national sovereignty and combat drug trafficking.

Third, the guarantee of the effective validity of the State of Law and the rejection of corruption and of impunity, assuring equally respect for the professionalism of the National Police, whose rotation should be subject strictly to that which its special legislation prescribes.

Consistent with the preceding, the integrity of public funds should be preserved and those that have been abstracted and used illegally should be returned.

With this same aim the budget recently approved by the National Congress should be respected.

Fourth, the constitution of a truth commission so that the Honduran people and the international community can identify all the actions, deeds that are evident and notorious that led to the present situation, in the period before the 28th of June, on that date, and after the same.

Fifth, the possibility of moving up the national elections already convened, in accordance with that which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ordains and in consultation with the presidential candidates.

Sixth, the placement of the Armed Forces and the National Police under the command of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal four months before the elections, with the effects of guaranteeing transparency, liberty, and normalcy of the electoral process which is a high priority of national security, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and the Law of Elections and Political Organizations.

The professionalism and functions of the Armed Forces should be respected and assured that they conform to what the Constitution of the Republic expressly sets out, and any rotation should stick strictly to the fulfillment of what is established in the Constitutive Law of the Armed Forces.

Seventh, the integration of a commission of verification composed of distinguished Hondurans that will watch over the fulfillment of these accords and report periodically on them to the Honduran people and the international community.

The agreements that we arrive at will constitutionally require being submitted for the consideration of the Judicial Power, Legislative Power, Supreme Electoral Tribunal and other competent public entities.

All parties will promise to respect the accords and avoid submitting the same to public commentaries.

Luckily, I am not a party to these accords, so I can and will submit them to public commentary:

The only news here is that they admit they made a mistake by denying President Zelaya his right to remain in Honduras. However, by describing him repeatedly as "citizen petitioner" they refuse to acknowledge he remains the consitutional president of the country. This requires them to replace Arias Item 1 with something else, and what a something it is! President Zelaya can return to be tried in Honduran courts, and there is no mention of any amnesty of any kind.

The second paragraph of their preamble may seem like a non-sequitur, in a document full of non-sequiturs, but it exemplifies the real problem here: they insist there is a single Honduran State and society, denying to the world the evidence that many Hondurans do not approve of the events of June 28 and that the de facto regime has created and is worsening divides within the country, notably between poor and rich; indigenous, african-descendant, and other parts of Honduran society; people whose Honduranness is being questioned and who are being subjected to persecution for their descent or presumed identity as Nicaraguans; people with political opinions at different points on a spectrum from right to left.

The second of their numbered points-- after returning President Zelaya to probable arrest and trial-- takes the proposal for a unity and reconciliation government and turns it inside out, adding a series of empty requirements that no doubt would be used to veto many of those who should be restored to their offices in any such government, such as the cabinet ministers of the Zelaya government whose last months of work were interrupted. But the truly amazing thing is proposing to write into the accord a pledge to "combat drug trafficking". What that phrase, along with the preceding "defend national sovereignty" clause, is about is advancing a claim that President Zelaya is complicit in drug trafficking with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, most openly and famously advanced by the Micheletti regime's Enrique Ortez in interviews with the AP on June 30.

(That's the same Enrique Ortez who eventually apologized for racist remarks about US President Barack Obama, remarks never accurately translated by English-language media, which used the term "little black man" for what should have been glossed as "n----r" and more specifically, in one of Ortez' many quotes belittling Obama, "sugar-plantation n----r".)

(And yes, I really cannot bring myself to type the N-word: if you have to see it spelled out check www.quotha.com.)

In other words, this document is not a counter-proposal for Arias: it is a propaganda piece aimed at the already over-propagandized Honduran public.

Item three of this proposal makes this abundantly clear, as none of the things mentioned would mean a thing outside Honduras; inside, they are the points for which a drumbeat of propaganda has existed for the past year: insinuations that the Zelaya government is corrupt, that the increase in the number of National Police under the Zelaya government-- which on the one hand can be seen as an employment initiative, and on the other, as addressing Zelaya's campaign pledge to try to bring crime under control-- was political, that public funds were being used to pay people to demonstrate or organize for Zelaya's initiatives. And of course, if the budget Congress just passed (while the de facto regime held power) could not be revisited, then nothing but the will of the de facto regime would be done; and as a showdown with then-head of Congress Micheletti was a large part of the reason there was no budget yet for the fiscal year that began in October 2008, this is a major gain for the Micheletti regime's and its clients.

(Item three of the Micheletti proposal, remember, replaces the call for amnesty for political offenses in the Arias proposal.)

Need I go on? Yes, I must. This incoherent document simply begs for analysis and, I am afraid, incites me to ridicule.

In item four, Arias' requirement that President Zelaya renounce the ballot question concerning constitutional reform disappears. Apparently, despite previous claims, that doesn't matter anymore. In its place: a "truth commission" to explore events that led to the present situation, before the June 28 coup. This congeals one of the whinier claims of the Micheletti faction: the world is being unfair, because they are fixated on a tiny little military intervention in constitutional succession, when the bad meany President Zelaya spent months resisting the attempts of Congress to stop him from talking to the people... Well, let me be fair here. (Can I be fair here? Do I want to be fair here? I think not but still, can I be less snotty...) The coup participants seem shocked that the world doesn't want to hear "their side", why they think they were justified in a military intervention in a consitutional democracy. They think if they have a hearing, world opinion will shift; if only the pesky Armed Forces hadn't expatriated Zelaya and gotten the world all riled up, they say, we could have explained that Zelaya was fomenting "mob rule". Surely politicians everywhere will support the right of the power elite not to ask the opinions of the people or have them demonstrate outside Congress and make us uncomfortable. (Watch for more signs of irritation from the Armed Forces, who do not appear to appreciate being thrown under the bus and already are clearly leaking documents like the June 26 letter from Micheletti scheduling the Armed Forces action for June 28.)

Well, there. Turns out I cannot be un-snotty on this one. Sorry for all those I just offended and know that I am not news media and yes, these are my opinions and no, they are not Fox News "fair and balanced".

Item five of this delusional document suggests agreement with Arias, but look what happened: everywhere else too much specificity, laughable specificity, is added to a broader framework: here, specificity is subtracted. Move the elections up to when? Moving the elections will favor the big parties and the current power elite. So the sooner the better for the Micheletti regime, for whom being in office is less important than having the right folks in office. And oh, by the way, while Micheletti presumably cannot try yet-again to achieve his dream of election to the Presidency, in which he has failed every time electorally, he can run again for Congress and regain his power there.

Item six blows the cover of the concealed issue of timing of moved-up elections: put the Armed Forces under TSE power four months in advance of elections. Which are now in late November. Which means: put the Armed Forces under the control of the TSE now, covering moved-up elections held as soon as possible, with as little time as possible for opposition party campaigning.

And why add the National Police to the Arias proposal? the National Police have no constitutional role in elections, and notice how this proposal separates the citation of constitutional role, limiting comment to the Armed Forces. Vaguely gesturing to security needs covers up the real agenda here: the regime doesn't trust that the National Police will remain loyal to them. It fears the Police, it thinks the expansion of the Police was a step to create a private army. I must admit it: until now, I could not believe the authoritarian regime really believed its propaganda about Zelaya. But these guys are seriously afraid that Zelaya and the Police Force-- which remains tiny in comparison with the Armed Forces-- will take the country over by force. Presumably, aided by the "mob", that offensive term used for the people organizing and demonstrating their political will. And Nicaraguans fighting in Honduras for Hugo Chavez. And Cuban doctors and teachers-- oh wait, they expelled them. Never mind.

Almost done: Item seven: the verification commission, without any international participation whatsoever, and certainly, without acknowledging the right of the OAS to monitor compliance with hemispheric accords. Take that, international community. Who needs you?

This isn't a counter-proposal; it is literally a sign of the degree of delusion and separation from international opinion on the loose in Tegucigalpa. God help Honduras.

The Seven Points of the Arias Plan: A translation with commentary

Based on the Spanish version published today in El Heraldo of Honduras (original text repeated at end of my translation):

1. The legitimate restitution of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales as President of the Republic, an office in which he will remain until the end of the constitutional period for which he was elected, and that concludes the 27th of January of next year, the date on which he will transfer power to the candidate designated freely and democratically by the people, in elections supervised and recognized by the international community.

2. The formation of a government of unity and national reconciliation, composed of representatives of the principal political parties.

3. The declaration of a general amnesty exclusively for all those political crimes committed in the event of this conflict, before and after the past 28th of June.

4. The express renunciation by President Zelaya, and his government, of the intention of placing a "fourth ballot-box" in the next elections, or to carry out any popular poll not expressly authorized by the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

5. Moving up the national elections of the 29th of November to the last Sunday in October, and moving up the electoral campaign from the first days of September to the first days of August.

6. The transfer of the command of the Armed Forces from the Executive Power to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, one month before the elections, to guarantee transparency and normality of suffrage, in conformity with the terms of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

7. The integration of a commission of verification composed by distinguished Hondurans and members of international organizations, in particular, by representations of the OAS, that will oversee the fulfillment of these accords and supervise the correct return to constitutional order.

Notes: Item 2 calls for the unity government to be composed of representatives of the principal parties. This is odd, because this conflict was not inter-party, but intra-Liberal party. Left undefined: which of the parties are "principle"? "Partidos politicos" can have no other meaning, and does not imply integration of the de facto regime per se.

Item 3 extends amnesty only for political crimes. Does this leave in place the trumped-up charges being manufactured against Zelaya and his cabinet ministers, for example, for drug-running?

Item 5: moving up the campaign will require legislative action, but probably is seen as a way to assure the people that the Zelaya government is a caretaker and to shift attention to the policies that a new government will undertake. Nonetheless, minority parties note that the acceleration of the calendar works against them and in favor of parties with more resources for publicity.

Item 6: by consitution, the Armed Forces guarantee freedom of the polls. This was the center of conflict between President Zelaya and the command of the Armed Forces when he fired the chief of the Armed Forces for refusing to play that role for the public poll June 28. The Supreme Tribunal of Elections, which is not the same as the Supreme Court, oversees the outcome of elections; so this is intended to ensure that the people believe the ballots are not tampered with (one of the corrosive rumors of the anti-cuarta urna campaign) and that President Zelaya cannot insert a fourth ballot somehow.

Item 7: the nod to the OAS in essence is a reprimand to the de facto regime for its vote to leave OAS. The call for distinguished Hondurans to be part of the oversight commission is heartening, if any remain who have not been drawn into, and thus tainted by, the current crisis.



Propuesta del presidente de Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, para solución a crisis de Honduras

1.- La legítima restitución de José Manuel Zelaya Rosales en la Presidencia de la República, cargo en que permanecerá hasta el fin del período constitucional por el cual fue electo, y que concluye el 27 de enero del próximo año, fecha en que entregará el poder al candidato designado libre y democráticamente por el pueblo, en elecciones supervisadas y reconocidas por la comunidad internacional.

2.- La conformación de un gobierno de unidad y reconciliación nacional, compuesto por representantes de los principales partidos políticos.

3.- La declaración de una amnistía general exclusivamente para todos los delitos políticos cometidos con ocasión de este conflicto, antes y después del 28 de junio pasado.

4.- La renuncia expresa del presidente Zelaya, y de su gobierno, de la pretensión de colocar una “cuarta urna” en las próximas elecciones, o realizar cualquier consulta popular no autorizada expresamente por la Constitución de la República de Honduras

5.- El adelantamiento de las elecciones nacionales del 29 de noviembre al último domingo de octubre, y el adelantamiento de la campaña electoral de los primeros días de septiembre a los primeros días de agosto.

6.- El traslado del comando de las fuerzas armadas del poder ejecutivo al Tribunal Supremo Electoral, un mes antes de las elecciones, para efectos de garantizar la transparencia y normalidad del sufragio, conforme con los términos de la Constitución de la República de Honduras.

7.- La integración de una comisión de verificación compuesta por hondureños notables y miembros de organismos internacionales, en especial por representantes de la Organización de Estados Americanos, que vigile el cumplimiento de estos acuerdos y supervise el correcto retorno al orden constitucional.




No "Terms Reached": Oscar Arias Just Hopes for a "Reconciliation Government"

An article published July 16 in the New York Times illustrates why people need to be cautious in relying on the English-language media in this crisis. Headlined "Some Terms Reached in Honduras Dispute", it seemed to indicate a major breakthrough. But as at least one blogger seriously following the conflict notes, this seems to contradict the implications of news reports of President Zelaya's intentions and actions. What gives?

Follow back to the original source, and you find a broadcast on Costa Rica's Radio Monumental reported in an article in the Costa Rican newspaper, La Nacion. That article says Oscar Arias will propose a reconciliation government, not that the proposal has been accepted. Why the difference?

In the Spanish original, the verbs are in the subjunctive mode, a grammatical tense English-speakers find notoriously difficult to master. It looks like in the process of translation, Arias' statements of proposals and hopes became certainties. More realistic coverage notes that the two sides remain entrenched, stating that both Zelaya and Micheletti already rejected the "reconciliation cabinet" proposal.

Here is my translation of the original key paragraph (and the actual text for those who want to second guess me). The most important declarative statement from Arias is actually at the end, when he suggests the positions of the two sides have been softening. At first glance that seems a hard point to defend, given that both sides have pre-emptively and publicly rejected Arias' proposal; but at least they are still sending someone to San Jose to talk. Maybe "softening" has to be redefined here.

Arias will propose to the delegations of Zelaya and Micheletti, the integration of a "unity cabinet" with members of both parties in key ministries.

He will also place under discussion the concession of "political amnesty" to people on both sides of the conflict.

To provide follow-through to these accords or verify their accomplishment, Arias will suggest that the OAS serves as guarantor, or failing that, a commission of distinguished Hondurans would be named.

According to Arias, the initial positions "have been softening" so that he hopes to encounter more flexibility for an agreement.



Arias les propondrá a las delegaciones de Zelaya y Micheletti, la integración de un “gabinete de unidad” con miembros de ambas partes en ministerios claves.

También pondrá en discusión conceder “amnistía política” a personas de ambos lados del conflicto.

Para darle seguimiento a estos acuerdos o verificar su cumplimiento, Arias sugirió que la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) sirva de garante, o en defecto, se nombre una comisión de notables hondureños.

Según Arias, las posiciones iniciales “se han ido ablandando” por lo que espera encontrar más flexibilidad para un arreglo.