"Disappointing" vote by Congress "broke" Accord

The Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord committed both the faction of Roberto Micheletti and the legally elected president of Honduras, José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, to a series of steps that, as has been noted at length here and elsewhere, was fatally flawed by the lack of a sufficiently clear timeline and an undefined mechanism for the formation of the expected "unity" government.

The US government, after it committed itself to recognizing the outcome of the election whether or not Zelaya was restored by the proposed vote in the Honduran Congress, has been held awkwardly to the transparent fiction that the Accord never was intended to imply a vote on Zelaya's restitution had to take place before the elections.

So immediately after the election, the Honduran Congress chose, for whatever reason, not to vote on a straight motion whether or not to restore President Zelaya, but rather, decided to turn the clock back to June 28 and re-enact the passage of the decree through which they claimed to install Roberto Micheletti as replacement president.

Where does that leave things?

Speaking for the US, Arturo Valenzuela said

We're disappointed by this decision since the United States had hoped that Congress would have approved [Zelaya's] return.

He also, remarkably, reiterated that the US continues

to accept President Zelaya as the democratically elected and legitimate leader of Honduras

and that

the status quo remains unacceptable.

In response to questioning after Valenzuela's statement, unnamed Senior Administration Officials expanded on this theme, noting that the November 29 voting

we have always felt, was an important step to the solution of the problems of Honduras, but not a sufficient one, because the restoration of the democratic and constitutional order had to go by additional measures... [emphasis added]

These "additional measures" explicitly included

this vote that the Congress was supposed to take on the restoration of Zelaya...[emphasis added]

Translation: the US expected a different vote than the one they got. What kind of vote? well, I am glad you asked:

That's why we were disappointed. And the fact that the Congress, in fact, did not vote President Zelaya back into office...

And about the unacceptable status quo, the same unnamed officials said

the absence of democratic and constitutional order is the unacceptable status quo

and

we continue to accept President Zelaya as the democratically elected president of Honduras.

For his part, Ricardo Lagos, the former Chilean president who had the bad experience of being part of the all-too-briefly functional "verification" commission, went further. As reported in El Universal of Venezuela, speaking on CNN En Español Lagos said

the refusal of the Honduran Congress to restore the overthrown president Manuel Zelaya "breaks" the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord and will make international recognition "more difficult"

Lagos puts the blame for the breaking of the accord squarely on the de facto regime and the Honduran Congress:

The decision "finishes breaking the accord between the (interim) government and Zelaya..it began to be broken [when] one of the parties thought that he could constitute [the unity government]" in a unilateral form...in reference to the regime of Roberto Micheletti.

Most important, in this interview, Lagos said that

in his reading, the vote on the part of Congress about the situation of Zelaya foressen in the Tegucigalpa Accord carried "implicitly" an "elegant form to restore" the overthrown official.

Or to put it another way: Lagos, like most readers, thought the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord called for a vote on restoring Zelaya as a way to give Congress a face-saving means to redress their original actions.

So, the US and Lagos are in harmony and both consider what the Congress did an unfortunate, even disappointing, waste of the opportunity provided in the Accord. Right?

Well, not so fast. The US manages to add yet another twist to its already contorted position. Valenzuela added to the remarks quoted above the qualification that

the decision taken by Congress, which it carried out in an open and transparent manner, was in accordance with its mandate in Article 5 of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.

Let us pause to think about the implications here.

The US does not recognize the coup of June 28 as legitimate, and continues to consider Manuel Zelaya the only legitimate president of Honduras (while looking wistfully ahead to the end of January and a new inauguration as their new solution).

Yet the framework now transparently identifiable as forged by the US-- despite the thin veil of Costa Rican mediation cast over it by the use of Oscar Arias as a conduit-- has had one real result: it gave the Honduran legislature a chance to reaffirm the very same unconstitutional actions whose outcoes the US says it still does not recognize.

Quite a powerful tool, that Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord: it apparently cleanses constitutional rupture and makes it something the international community has to accept-- because it was transparent.

But then, so were the events of June 28. They were transparently a coup d'etat.

Yet, the US argues that the exact same decree that was illegitimate on June 28 is legitimate in December because it was enacted in response to the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.

What a powerful thing that Accord turned out to be: it supercedes the Constitution of Honduras and whitewashes a universally condemned coup.

Congress deliberates on repeating the coup

The Partido Nacionalista had determined to meet today and reach a uniform position on the restoral of constitutional order.

While La Prensa reports that debate is ongoing, and that the head of Congress, Jose Saavedra, says it could continue until Friday, a first hint of the likely vote came when the Nacionalista delegation introduced a motion to deny restoration of President Zelaya. Reportedly, according to La Tribuna's Minuto a Minuto, 33 members of the Liberal party joined the Nacionalistas to vote to accept the motion for debate.

As previously promised, the reports received by Congress are now unsealed and all are opposed to the return to the constitutional order that existed before June 28.

Let us pause before the debate concludes and recall two things:

there is no legal basis under Honduran law for what was done June 28. The legal code requires the presumption of innocence; the rights of due process have not been honored; no legal verdict on charges against President Zelaya could validly be reached without due process; and no verdict resulting in his conviction of a crime has been reached. So the Congress is debating whether to commit a crime, or rather, recommit the crimes they committed on June 28. They do not and did not have authority to remove the President from office and replace him.

Second: the sole reason they are debating committing these crimes again is because a US-brokered, US-proxy-mediated agreement invited Congress to substitute an unconstitutional vote for an unconstitutional vote.

On recognition and Brazil

As the vote count continues, with the official report of the final count now delayed until December 29, the question of recognition of the election faces those countries that said they would not do so, as well as those that said they would.

The US continues to express its position in the murkiest of language.

Brazil, in contrast, is crystal clear, yet today we see others suggesting a softening of the Brazilian position.

The stated Brazilian position remains that voting this Sunday was conducted under conditions that make it impossible to recognize the results, and that the restoral of the constitutional government illegally overthrown June 28 is non-negotiable.

So where are commentators seing room to negotiate the non-negotiable? in the suggestion that perhaps Zelaya can be forced into a nominal restoral just long enough to participate in the inauguration of Pepe Lobo.

Coverage of what Lula actually said at the Iberoamerican Summit doesn't support that interpretation: in fact, he restated that Brazil will not recognize the elections in Honduras or talk to the winner.

For this, it is best to look at original Portugese reporting. So here, I translate Lula's direct quotes from the Portugese.

Rejecting the attempt by Oscar Arias to put pressure on him by comparing recognizing the Honduran elections to recognizing those of Iran, Lula says:

Iran's president participated in the elections and won 62% of the votes, the Constitution was not violated. It is different from a person who committed a coup d'etat repudiated by all countries, by the OAS, which placed conditions set by the very same President of Costa Rica, which was the return to power of President Zelaya.

Show romanization

The coup worked cynically, convened elections for which it did not have a right. [They could have done things with greater normalcy, returned the president, called elections. The return to normality in Honduras all we want. The rest is this:]* You can not make concessions to a coup.

It is a matter of common sense, a matter of principle, we can not condone the politics of vandalism in Latin America.

*[material in brackets was not included in the source cited above, but was contained in the fuller version of these remarks published by Brazil's O Globo]

Commenting specifically on the situation of President Zelaya, Lula said he hoped Honduras would take the decision that would allow Zelaya to return to normalcy, adding

The best thing would be Zelaya back home, but you must have constitutional guarantees, of the government, of the OAS, and this has to happen rapidly.
[emphasis added]

Other analysts may try to spin Lula's remarks by taking note of the following comment while ignoring the rest of the statements, reported above:

This citizen [Pepe Lobo] has the right to take the steps he deems necessary. If something new happens, let's see, we'll wait. The problem now is much more of Honduras than of Brazil...

What does this mean?

First, Lula is clearly trying to keep separate Pepe Lobo and the authors of the coup d'etat. The election is illegitimate because it was convened by the coup government, which had no legal right to oversee this (and which cannot actually guarantee a free and fair election). But he is not condemning Lobo for participating in the election.

Second, by pointedly calling Lobo a "citizen" (which is the form of address the de facto regime uses in its references to President Zelaya, as a continual refusal to recognize his continued constitutional status) Lula is explicitly refusing to recognize him as president-elect. Lobo can do what he thinks necessary, he says, but we will wait. We'll see.

The problem is Honduras' problem because, as Lula's earlier statements make clear, unless there is rapid action to restore President Zelaya, he is not changing his position. To quote his response to questions at the Iberamerican summit:

Não, não, não, não. Peremptoriamente, não.

[No, no, no, no. Absolutely, no.]

In longer accounts of his comments in Brazilian media, Lula is very clear:

I can not decide now for what may happen next month or in two, three or four months

he said, asked specifically about "new things" that might affect his position,

But for now, the Brazilian position is not to accept the electoral process

Pretty clear, right?

Yet otherwise reliable commentators have suggested a modification, based on a statement attributed to Lula by Reuters UK:

Show romaniza

If something new happens, we can discuss it. For now, the (Brazilian) position is not to accept the electoral process in Honduras. A new thing (we could discuss) is for Zelaya to take over for the inauguration of the new president.

I could not find the original of this in Portugese, even in the longest interviews on the topic I have found reproduced, in which Lula emphatically reiterates that recognizing this election opens the door to future coups in Latin America. It should come right after the statements I reproduce and translate above.

I don't doubt Lula said this, or something close to it, perhaps in response to questioning. But it would seem like such a major change of position would have been featured in some of the original Portugese-language reporting.

And it is interesting that Reuters UK (now reproduced by the New York Times) left out all the rest of Lula's remarks that I translated above, in which he emphatically and repeatedly rejected recognition and called for the restoral of President Zelaya. And there is more in the same vein that I don't have time to collate and translate-- and you, dear reader, probably wouldn't have the patience to review.

What precisely Lula might have meant by Zelaya taking over for the inauguration of the new president is the question, one that for me requires the original language quote. A one-word error in translation could have changed a statement from "take over until the inauguration of the new president" ["for" is de; "until" is até, so this is an easy transcription error from spoken Portugege]. Calling for Zelaya to take over until the inauguration-- e.g. for the rest of his original term-- would be consistent with all the rest of the quotes from, supposedly, the very same interview.

Indeed, given that Lula is in this passage clarifying what might be a "new thing" that would change Brazil's firm position, I suspent whatever statement Reuters is translating followed closely from where he said "If something new happens, let's see, we'll wait". The implication there is clear: something "new" would be movement in Honduras to restore the President to office.

Watch for the storyline now to become some sort of brief restoration. But don't believe everything you read.

Shoddy reporting or more lies from the VOA?

A story posted today on the Voice of America website manages to perpetuate two major falsehoods in the space of just twelve paragraphs, and also fails to accurately represent the split between countries committed to recognizing tomorrow's vote and those that have publically declared they will not do so. Not a very good scorecard: 3 major problems in 12 paragraphs: barely 75% correct.

First, the story claims that

Both Mr. Lobo and Mr. Santos support Mr. Zelaya's removal from power

Yet both Elvin Santos and Pepe Lobo have maintained a (largely unconvincing) claim not to have supported the coup. Lobo has, in campaigning, been quoted as saying once elected he will reach out to Zelaya.

Then, even worse, the story says

Both candidates also signed a pledge to respect the outcome of the vote and honor the constitutional ban on running for re-election. Mr. Zelaya was removed from office after pushing for a referendum to reconsider the ban.

To echo Greg Weeks, what would it take to get the media to stop repeating this inaccurate claim?

So, two outright incorrect statements. Then comes the misleading or incomplete report on recognition:

Brazil and Argentina have said they will not recognize the election because doing so would legitimize the coup. Costa Rica and Peru have suggested they are ready to recognize the vote.

Hmm. Now, who is missing from the list of countries that have said they will recognize the vote? I don't mean the US-- the previous paragraph says this has "divided Latin America", thus leaving the US position to one side. But what about the original statement by Panama's president Martinelli that has been widely trumpeted up till now?

And of course, the mention of Brazil and Argentina leaves out the explicit statement of Guatemala that it also will not recognize the election.

Is there something that links Panama and Guatemala (other than that they are Central American) that justifies not including them?

And of course, the entire Rio Group is on record as being opposed to the election. Do they have to come out, one by one, to be counted?

Reporting like this is inevitable, it seems. But it seems especially regrettable that it is coming from the VOA, which describes itself as

a multimedia international broadcasting service funded by the U.S. Government through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

and is widely recognized as speaking for the government.

Pre-election update

As the days count down to Sunday's vote in Honduras, there are four things we suggest people should be watching.

First: setting expectations

In a recent post, Boz has tried to project what he feels are the levels of turnout that would give clear signals either of success of the boycott, or of clear support for the claim that elections will allow moving on. Looking at recent election cycles, he says

There should be about 2.25 million total votes and about 2.1 million valid votes in 2009 if raw number trends continue as they have for the past decade.

So, Boz sets his expectations for clear-cut success of the boycott as a valid vote of 1.5 million or less; and for the de facto regime to claim no effect on the election, turnout of 2.4 million votes. I won't repeat his arguments; go read them for yourself; the main thing to take away here is that he is saying a turnout of 25% of the eligible voters will be clearly lower than expected, and a turnout of 50% of eligible voters would allow the de facto regime to claim legitimacy.

(For the record, turnout in 2005 was 55% according to the numbers Boz is relying on. So he is projecting a 5% drop would have happened this year no matter what-- which we would remind readers is an index of disaffection with the Honduran political system, the fundamental problem that these elections will not solve, and may well exacerbate.)

Boz makes the argument that in addition to not coming to vote, it is possible to protest an election by casting a

blank or null ballot, which will reduce valid votes.

So, the gap between the number of valid votes and total votes this time around might include protest blank or null ballots-- except for the fact that Honduran press reports efforts to discourage null votes before they are placed in the ballot box.

An article in La Tribuna, on which RNS commented previously, appeared under the headline "TSE expects to reduce null votes":

The authorities of the TSE intend a drastic reduction of null votes by orienting the electors how they should exercise their suffrage... The TSE expects to reduce a great percentage of the null vote or the lack of voters, for which it is important to develop step by step each one of the activities that permit the Honduran to freely vote.

So, one confounding issue for interpreting the number of invalid votes (the difference between votes cast and valid votes) as evidence of voter boycotting is that there is a more deliberate attempt to reduce inadvertent null votes this year than previously.


Second: spinning declarations of potential recognition

The biggest prize for the de facto regime has been, of course, the regrettable decision by the US not only to say they might recognize the elections, but the subsequent increasingly strident claims that this election will somehow solve the whole crisis (and thus everyone else should get on board). Yet, as the New York Times correctly observes, the US has not officially declared an unconditional intention to recognize the election, saying "American officials have implied that the Obama administration will support the outcome".

Lesser prizes, Panama, Peru, probably Colombia, and today, Costa Rica, are consistently reported in Honduran pro-coup media as unconditional, even though these also have included the caution that recognition will depend on the election being "transparent". Mexico, widely expected to trend with this group, has actually been careful

The number of countries stating even more clearly that they will not recognize the Sunday vote outcome is of course much larger than this handful of pro-election countries, although sometimes, reporting obscures the actual extent of disapproval of the election.

In addition to the explicit announcements of Brazil, Argentina, and Guatemala against the election, the 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries making up the Rio Group and those of ALBA are on record against the coup-sponsored elections.

The position of Spain, influential in the EU, refusing to recognize the election is not prominently mentioned in most English-language press coverage, although Bloomberg does so in its story.

While not an official governmental view, it is worth noting as well the recent call of a group of MPs in Great Britain against recognition as well.

Broad rejection of the elections by the nations of the Americas should surely outweigh the endorsement of it by the US and a few pragmatic allies. And the voices heard from Europe are also voices of concern, not support for this dead end masquerading as a way out.


Third: overtures of conciliation

These are already coming from many directions. Honduran law professor Leo Valladares is quoted as saying

"Look, the negotiation between Zelaya and Micheletti was going nowhere ... Maybe, by changing the faces of the government, tensions will begin to subside and the new government . . . could be more conciliatory. Whoever wins cannot turn a deaf ear to the demands of the resistance."

Pepe Lobo, considered the likely recipient of the majority of votes on Sunday and almost ordained as the next president, seems to agree, being quoted as saying:

"Our mission is not just to win elections but to produce a change beginning with the reconciliation and unity of Hondurans"

and even more daringly, suggesting

that if he wins, he would include Zelaya in a national reconciliation talks and suggested that the ousted leader would be able to leave his refuge inside the Brazilian Embassy without fear of arrest. ...

"They have to get him out. If not, how?" said Lobo...

"What I know is that if we want peace for Honduras, we have to bring him into the dialogue."

Fourth: Finally, press coverage that admits the election is the culmination of the coup

The mainstream press is catching up with reality, a little bit too late, and a whole lot too little.

For example, read the LA Times story headlined "Honduras upcoming vote a boon to de facto rulers". It acknowledges that recognizing the election hands a victory to the authors of the coup d'etat of June 28, quoting Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society:

"The U.S. needed a way out,... But what we've done is allow a coup to stand. And I fear this will erode regional consensus about the defense of democracy. . . . The U.S. has lost its moral authority to push back"

The New York Times quotes even more blunt commentary about the damage done to US influence in Latin America, noting the view of many Latin Americans that "recognizing the election will essentially legitimize a coup in a region that has been consolidating its democracies":

“The United States will become isolated — that is very bad for the United States and its relationship with Latin America,” the Brazilian foreign policy adviser, Marco Aurélio Garcia, said ... very important countries — the majority in terms of population and political weight — won’t recognize” the results of the election.

Even harsher criticism of US policy blunders comes from other directions.

Consider this statement by Robert White, the former Carter Administration ambassador to El Salvador :

The clumsy handling of this issue when they had the backing of the entire hemisphere is simply an embarrassment.

Or this one, by Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group

“It makes it look like coups are a viable way out, and that is a terrible message for the region”

Conclusion:

This is the legacy of Sunday's electoral exercise:

We are left trying to figure out how low participation has to be to be interpreted as a sign of electoral protest, ignoring plummeting participation election after election which should long ago have been seen as electoral protest.

We are left with the spectacle of a US that declared a multilateral foreign policy in Trinidad and Tobago openly leading a tiny minority of countries of the Americas committed to recognizing the elections, alienating governments that see it putting the "stamp of approval" on the coup.

Which, remember, is taking place under the supervision of the armed forces, who have stockpiled plenty of tear gas for the election, prompting Amnesty International to express concerns about just how fair and open this election really can be:

There's an environment of fear and intimidation in Honduras ...We have seen an increased level of harassment against those who are seen as opposed to the de facto authorities.

Far from "starting from zero", as President Obama suggested, the situation in Honduras on Monday will stay precisely where it is-- with added sources of conflict provided by what will without a doubt be disputes about the Sunday vote.

MIsguided readers speak...

and sometimes, the comments they make require a more formal response. This is one of those times.

Someone calling himself "Patrick" has taken the time today, between 2:53 and 5:17 PM, to comment on three recent posts: One reflecting the incredulity of reporters in an Ian Kelly press conference; one on the continuing saga of the report not yet received from the Honduran Supreme Court; and one on the positions of Brazil and Argentina on elections. We assume he is catching up on his reading; and he did not like what he read.

Here's what he had to say, with increasing terseness and we think it is fair to intuit, emotion, first about our pointing out that reporters found Ian Kelly's press briefing unsatisfactory:

I listened to Shannon in Spanish and it was very clear that the elections and the restoration of Zelaya are two different issues per the accord that the Zelaya camp signed. How can you call this incredulous when only a handful of Hondurans want Zelaya back in office. What does Zelaya bring to the elections? He left his liberal party and the party that supports him is lucky to get 2% of the vote. Zelaya broke the accord, just as he has broken every previous agreement from when he was in office. Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy. Zelaya spent more taxpayer money on his horse than he did on any needy person.

Next, he commented on our first Supreme Court post of the day:

Why should the courts rush, Congress is not in session as is normal before an election. Zelaya is in a state of limbo due to his ill planned entry into Honduras. He tried to make it to the United Nations building and when he saw the police there to arrest him he knocked on the Brazilian embassy door and became an uninvited guest. Now he is going to spend the next twenty years there being president.

Finally, Patrick provides his response to the announcement that Brazil and Argentina will not recognize the November 29 elections:

Honduras follows the U.S. through thick and thin. Argentina is a questionable government.

We adopted moderation of comments from the beginning to avoid the common internet disease of violent discourse. We routinely reject the comments that froth at the mouth and accuse Zelaya (and often, us) of being communists spreading dictatorship around the world. Those are clearly adding nothing to debate.

But then there are comments by people like Patrick, who appears to be speaking as a Honduran ("Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy") but as one of the Hondurans who suffer the consequences of the drumbeat of negative press coverage that spread outright lies and vague insinuations about the president for more than a year before the coup ("Zelaya spent more taxpayer money on his horse than he did on any needy person").

Patrick is, in our view, more likely to be misinformed than to actually be a committed supporter of the destruction of the rule of law and constitutional order, and while we suspect it is very unlikely that he is willing to listen to more context than the Honduran press has served up, we continue to try to respond to him, and others like him.

But it is very hard because wrapped into comments like these are a world of assumptions that normally cannot be unraveled in the length of a responding comment. And responding to one comment after another, submitted in reply to a variety of posts, but in fact not dealing with their real content-- simply spreading out over that space an aggrieved narrative-- hardly gets to the heart of things.

Patrick is angry with us because we are not accepting the pro-coup propaganda. He wants us, and people like us, to simply accept his counter-to-reality claims and leave Honduras alone. He is echoing in tone, if not directly in words, the frightening declarations that Roberto Micheletti made when the OAS voted to suspend Honduras' membership, that rejected the world community and suggested Honduras forge on alone-- out of touch with the present, out of touch with reality.

But we want Patrick, and people like him, to pay attention to the actual facts. So, here for the record is a deconstruction and fact-checking of his comments:

I listened to Shannon in Spanish and it was very clear that the elections and the restoration of Zelaya are two different issues per the accord that the Zelaya camp signed.

First remember that this is a comment on our blog posting about Ian Kelly's press briefing. Not about Thomas Shannon's unfortunate Spanish-language interview, in which he gave the de facto regime new hope by stating prematurely that now that the Tegucigalpa Accord was signed, the US would recognize the Honduran elections no matter what.

The Tegucigalpa Accord is, as President Zelaya noted in his eloquent letter to President Obama, a single accord, with twelve points. So there can be no partial completion of that Accord. International recognition of elections is thus dependent on the good-faith completion of the other points of the Accord. This is the error that Thomas Shannon committed, in my view: he ssumed that the de facto regime would follow through on the requirement for there to be a vote in the Congress on the restoral of President Zelaya. While, as he said at the time, President Zelaya took the risk that the Congress would vote against him, a vote before the elections, ideally before the deadline to form the government of unity and reconciliation, would have kept the accord as a whole on target. Why did that not happen? well, Patrick has another point to make here:

Why should the courts rush, Congress is not in session as is normal before an election

The Honduran Congress was not in session on October 30, the deadline for the Tegucigalpa Accord to be delivered for its consideration. But that was because Roberto Micheletti had dismissed it before the normal end of the session. More important: the head of the executive branch has the authority to call Congress for an extraordinary session, so Roberto Micheletti could have convened Congress for that purpose. His refusal to do so blocked the consideration of the Accord by the Congress.

Thus when Partrick says

Zelaya broke the accord

this is simply not true.

Micheletti's unilateral attempt to establish a reconciliation and unity government was criticized and rejected by the OAS, the government of Spain, by Oscar Arias, and by Ricardo Lagos of the Verification Commission, to name just a few. This, along with the failure of the de facto regime to persuade the Congress to act, or (more forthrightly) to convene Congress in a special session, is what "broke the accord". Of course, if Patrick does not read the one paper in Honduras with more balanced coverage (Tiempo), or listen to the free radio stations, he cannot be blamed for thinking the opposite is true: the coup-supporting press echoed Roberto Micheletti's claim that Zelaya was obligated to provide Micheletti names for a "unity" cabinet that Micheletti would then get to select, for a government he would head himself. But this interpretation of what the Accord called for has been rejected by the verification commission and the international community. Even the US has not endorsed it.

Based on his certainty that what the biased media have told him is right, Patrick, and misguided people like him, also believe that President Zelaya is unpopular and that few Hondurans support him and the positions he represents:

How can you call this incredulous when only a handful of Hondurans want Zelaya back in office.

In reality, repeated polls have shown otherwise. Most recently, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner found that Hondurans disapproved of the removal of the President from office on June 28 by a margin of 60% to 38%. 67% of respondents rated the job performance of President Zelaya as excellent or good, as opposed to 31% rating his job performance bad or poor. In contrast, by a margin of 72% to 27%, respondents did not approve of Micheletti staying on as President.

Earlier in October, polling by Consultants in Investigation of Markets and Public Opinion found 52% of Hondurans disapproved of the coup d'etat. 51% wanted President Zelaya restored (versus 33% opposed). President Zelaya and First Lady Xiomara Castro de Zelaya were ranked the two most favorably judged political figures in the country.

CID Gallup poll data from shortly after the coup also indicated that more people disapproved of the coup than supported it; and that President Zelaya enjoyed more support than Roberto Micheletti.

So really, no: it is not just a handful of people who are opposed to the coup, who want the elected government restored, and who actually approve of President Zelaya's actions in office.

Patrick offers some strange arguments against the need to restore the elected President before the November 29 elections that again are based on propaganda positions of the de facto regime:

What does Zelaya bring to the elections? He left his liberal party and the party that supports him is lucky to get 2% of the vote.

What restoral of the elected government, headed by President Zelaya, brings to the elections is simply legitimacy.

This comment suggests that the reason for restoring the President has something to do with campaigning. This confusion seems actually to be shared, at times, by Ian Kelly of the US State Department, so again, who can blame poor Patrick? So note well: President Zelaya is not on the ballot, and never would have been; Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party is running, and always was, away from the President who he served as Vice President.

While President Zelaya has not been reported, in any medium I have seen, to have "left his liberal party", he has called for its reformation, and that call is supported by a number of Liberal Party congress members. As for "the party that supports him": presumably a reference to the UD, this ignores the fact that reform-minded congress members and local politicians from Liberal and PINU parties join the non-partisan Frente de Resistencia in rejecting the legitimacy of the present electoral process because the constitutional order has not been restored. How big a constituency is this? that is the great unknown that might become more knowable if alternative means to estimate the number boycotting the election are feasible.

Meanwhile, for Patrick, as for other commentators who want the whole thing to be over by holding an election (apparently including the US Department of State) it is an inconvenient fact that more world governments have announced that they absolutely will not recognize the election than have announced categorically that they will. So people like Patrick are left having to argue against particular governments or even clusters of governments. Thus Patrick says

Argentina is a questionable government

but ignores the fact that Argentina's position was announced jointly with Brazil-- are we to understand it is also "a questionable government", whatever that means?

For Patrick and his ilk, there is only one world government that matters:

Honduras follows the U.S. through thick and thin.

As a US citizen who has spent my life working on Honduran issues and conducting research in Honduras, the relative truth of this statement is almost the saddest thing about Patrick's comments. The Honduran scholars and activists I so admire are and have been engaged in trying to establish a way for Honduras to follow its own path, and not simply be drawn along in the wake of the US ship of state. Honduras should have its own foreign policy; its own economic policies; its own cultural policy; and its own constitution. Otherwise, what we have is the perpetuation of a neocolonial order that disappoints the best aspirations of the United States as much as those of Honduras.

But this is just almost the saddest part of Patrick's comments.

The truly saddest thing I read is the following statement, which suggests that Patrick cannot imagine a Honduras where free speech is allowed without danger of the imposition of curfews and free assembly is possible without prior registration with the police; where a political disagreement among branches of government could be settled in the courts and with due process, not by the Armed Forces in avowed violation of the constitution; and that Patrick doesn't have any idea what it would mean to have a free press, accountable political parties, and true representative democracy:

Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy.

Brazil and Argentina will not recognize elections

A report carried by Xinhua news, datelined today in Brasilia, quotes a joint statement by Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and Argentine president Cristina Kirchner.

They called for the immediate restoral of President Zelaya, with Lula quoted as saying that "the common position of all Latin American and Caribbean countries" agrees with the position he articulated for himself and President Kirchner:

We demand the immediate restitution of president Manuel Zelaya. On the contrary, the elections to be held on Nov. 29 will not be recognized and a very dangerous precedent will be set.

In light of the restatement today of the unchanged US position, this statement draws a very clear distinction between Brazil, which will emerge from this crisis with enhanced regional standing, and the US, which will emerge... well, not so much.

President Zelaya to President Obama: Walk the Talk

Office of the President of the Republic

From the Desk of the President

Tegucigalpa, 14 November, 2009

His Excellency

Barack Obama

President of the United States

Washington D.C.

Dear President Obama:

When we met for the first time the 8th of July with the Secretary of State Cinton after the Coup d'Etat there was made clear to me and to the world the position of the Obama administration of condemning the Coup d'Etat, not recognizing its authorities and demanding the return to the state of law with the restitution to the office of President elected by the people. The official position of your government and its representatives that sponsored and signed the resolutions of the UN, OAS. In which the third point demanded my immediate and secure restitution.

Beginning the 28th of June of 2009 my kidnapping by the military and expatriation to Costa Rica. The Congress of the Republic issued an illegal decree where it ordered "To separate the citizen José Manuel Zelaya Rosales from the office of Constitutional President of the Republic" without constitutional abilities to do so, and without due process without any legal ruling being cited.

From the first meeting with Secretary Hillary Clinton mediation by the president of Costa Rica Oscar Arias was proposed to me, despite the fact that I consider that it is counterproductive to engage in dialogue with persons that have a gun in their hands, I accepted considering the auspices of the US and the international community.

In a communiqué dated the 4th of September of the present year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed the following: "The positive conclusion of the process initiated by Arias will be the suitable basis to proceed with a legitimate election".

It is known by everyone that the de facto regime, without the visit to Honduras of the Subsecretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Thomas Shannon, Daniel Restrepo and Craig Kelly, would not have signed the Accord. Everyone knows why they broke the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. The same president Oscar Arias for the sake of the truth declared that "Micheletti never had the will to collaborate and that on the contrary he was mocking the international community and only sought to extend the time to never turn over the power that he has".

Ex-president Ricardo Lagos, prominent member of the international Verification Commission in his declarations confirms this, by stating "Sr. Micheletti broke it", "Micheletti did things that he should not have done such as to say I will form a government of unity without Zelaya" which made this negotiated accord fail.

The same day that the Verification Commission of the accord was installed in Tegucigalpa, they were caught unaware by declarations of functionaries of the State Department where they modified their position and interpreted the accord unilaterally with the following declarations: "the elections will be recognized by the US with or without restitution"; the de facto regime celebrated this change and used these declarations for their objectives, and immediately ended by default and violation of the Accord. For the before expounded we declare in the following manner:

That the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord remains worthless and without effect for the unilateral default of the de facto government. This was conceived to be implemented in an integrated and simultaneous form; since it cannot be treated as twelve separate accords, it was one single accord with twelve points which had one sole goal, to restore the democratic order and social peace, and with this the coup d'etat would be reverted, which implies the certain return of the President of the Republic elected legitimately by popular vote. And with that, to bring about a climate of national reconciliation and a constitutional electoral process to follow, fair, with guarantees of equal participation and free for all the citizens of Honduras. That the upcoming elections should be developed in a framework of legality and international backing, especially by the OAS and UN and there would be the political conditions and conditions of minimum civil rights to guarantee a result that holds to liberty and transparency.

In this, I want to note that the new position of the functionaries of the Government of the US skirts the initial objective of the San Jose dialogue, relegating an accord with the legitimately recognized Government to a second place, and trying to move this accord toward a new electoral process without concern for the conditions in which it would be carried out. Among others, with public resources that are being authorized by public functionaries not legally recognized and attributed to a Budget document that has not been authorized by the legitimately recognized President.

In these conditions, this process, and therefore its results, will be subject to challenge and non-recognition; which will put in grave risk the future stability of relations between Honduras and the rest of the nations that might recognize its results.

As the Secretary General of the OAS José Miguel Insulza has pointed out, there does not exist a political environment for elections, as has been observed and pointed out by the North American Congress member [Jan Schakowsky] in her visit to Honduras, observing a veritable environment of violation of human rights in Honduras.

This past November 6, we communicated our refusal to continue with a false dialogue, and therefore on the expiration of the due date the text constitutes a dead letter that loses its validity, because an accord is fulfilled in time and form, the violation of this by the de facto regime is for us the condition that determines that the accord stopped existing. Undoubtedly precious time was lost in this unsuccessful attempt.

The presidential election is now scheduled for the last week of November. In this case, as Constitutional President of Honduras, and as citizen who represents and was elected by the democratic vote of the people of Honduras, I see myself obligated to state that under these conditions we cannot back it and we will proceed to challenge it legally in the name of thousands of Hondurans and hundreds of candidates that feel that this contest is unequal and does not present the conditions of free participation.

In Honduras due to the repression that the Honduran people today is subjected to, where there is no respect even for the highest authority of the President of the Republic, where they have not considered that in three years I achieved the best economic indicators and the greatest reduction of poverty in the 28 years of democratic life, where I was removed by force of arms, never was submitted to a trial nor to due process and today have 24 accusations and orders for arrest for drug trafficking, corruption, and terrorism, among others, and where the major part of the Ministers of my cabinet are the object of political persecution and are to be found fleeing the regime in different parts of the Americas.

3500 people detained in 100 days, more than 600 people wounded and beaten in hospitals, more than 100 assassinations and an unknown number of people subjected to tortures committed against citizens that dared to oppose and demonstrate for their ideas, for liberty, and for justice, in peaceful demonstrations, all that converts the elections of November into an anti-democratic exercise by an illegitimate state, due to the uncertainty and military intimidation, for large sectors of the people.

To carry out elections, in which the President elected by the people of Honduras, who is recognized by your Government and the international community, is prisoner, surrounded by military in the diplomatic mission of Brazil, and a de facto president, who imposes the military, surrounded by the powerful in the palace of government, would be a historic shame for Honduras and an infamy for the democratic peoples of the Americas.

This electoral process is illegal because it covers up the military coup d'etat, and the de facto state that Honduras lives with does not furnish guarantees of equality and liberty of citizen participation, for all the Hondurans, it is an antidemocratic electoral maneuver repudiated by large sectors of the people to cloak the material and intellectual authors of the Coup d'Etat.

The elections are a process, not just a day when you go to vote, they are a debate, they are the exposition of ideas, they are equality of opportunities.

In my status as President elected by the Honduran people, I reaffirm my decision that from this date on, whatever will happen, I WILL NOT ACCEPT any accord of returning to the presidency, to cloak the coup d'etat, that we know has a direct impact through military repression on the human rights of the inhabitants of our country.

Mr. President, in the Summit of Countries of the American Continent celebrated in Trinidad and Tobago at the beginning of this year, where I was present, you said

"That we should stop accusing the US for what it did in the past in the continent and that we should look toward the future". The future that today shows us the alteration of your position in the case of Honduras and thus favors abusive intervention by military groups in the civic life of our State (historical cause of the backwardness and stagnation of our countries in the 20th century). It is nothing more than the sunset of liberty and a deprecation of human dignity, it is a new war against the process of social and democratic reform that are so necessary in Honduras.

President Obama, each time that a legitimate elected Government is overturned in the Americas violence and terrorism win a battle and Democracy suffers a defeat.

We still refuse to believe that this military coup d'etat executed in Honduras, is now the new state terrorism of the 21st century. And that it will be the future for Latin America that you spoke to us about in Trinidad and Tobago.

We are firmly resolved to battle for our democracy without hiding the truth and when a people decide to peacefully fight for its ideas, there is no weapon, no army nor maneuver that is capable of stopping it.

In the expectation of your prompt response, I repeat my highest regards.

JOSE MANUEL ZELAYA ROSALES

President of Honduras

For the Spanish original, see the posting by Adrienne Pine.

Could There Have Been a Different Outcome?

While the US may still have hopes of reviving the corpse, the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord seems to be quite dead. The Frente de Resistencia has declared a boycott of the national elections scheduled for November 29, even if somehow President Zelaya were restored in the next 18 days, and in truth, it is hard to see how anyone can claim elections under the current conditions will be free, fair, and transparent-- the conditions the US originally set for recognition, although with recent statements it is clear that the only US "condition" for recognition is that a semblance of elections be carried out.

So the question occurs to us: was this inevitable? leave aside the criticism of the waffling, muddied messages, and speaking silences of the US State Department that always came just when it seemed the de facto regime was getting clear on what was necessary for the international community to be satisfied. Was there ever any solution to this crisis, once the coup architects started on their Plan A without any Plan B?

In retrospect, we think that a key mistake was ever negotiating with Roberto Micheletti. Not that anyone could have quite realized at the time how intransigent he would be personally: that kind of unpredictable personality is a risk in any negotiation. But because doing so not only gave him and the regime that he consolidated undue legitimacy, elevating them to the equivalent of the constitutional President and his cabinet; it also allowed Micheletti to consolidate executive power within Honduras.

Am I suggesting the international community should simply have given Honduras an immediate cold shoulder? hardly. But if we ask ourselves, on June 29, who in the Honduran government still exercised power with a constitutional mandate, then we can identify the Congress and yes, even the corrupt and unjust Supreme Court as branches of the government with which the international community could have initiated more productive dialogue, as these bodies have something to lose, while Roberto Micheletti, once he cast his lot with the coup architects, could not reverse course.

At the time, of course, international representatives did refuse to talk to the de facto regime's new head. This was one of the things the Micheletti regime complained about. But instead of continuing to isolate the illegally installed executive officers; instead of opening and sustaining a dialogue with the Congress, which we now know includes a substantial group against the coup, and a majority we suspect wishes the coup never happened; the US pushed for a mediated dialogue directly between Micheletti and Zelaya.

Remember that the original San Jose dialogue forced the legally elected President to accept negotiating directly with an unconstitutional usurper? It was that moment that gave Micheletti authority. Not the military intervention on June 28, that was by all accounts initiated by a cabal of business interests spear-headed by political masters not currently holding elected office.

The ringleaders of the coup, people like Carlos Flores Facussé, former president and current business leader, are by definition pragmatists. If, at the beginning of the international intervention, Micheletti-- who we have seen reveal himself as an honest ideologue (however misguided we find his ideological positions to be)-- had been isolated, discussions had taken place with Congress, and back-channel communication with the pragmatists in the cabal was carried out, no legitimacy would have been conferred on the usurping executive officers, and a wider array of interests could have been encouraged to consider what they stood to lose.

Once Micheletti was treated as Zelaya's equal, the course of negotiations was almost certainly headed for deadlock. Worse: the first draft of the San Jose Accord gave the Micheletti executive branch too much credence. Inserted in that document, which emerged as the basis for the Tegucigalpa Accord, were items that presumed the guilt of President Zelaya in matters that were (still are in fact) live subjects of legal proceedings in Honduras. So the spin given the San Jose Accord, even in its unsigned state, in Honduras was that Oscar Arias recognized that Zelaya was trying to change the constitution to stay in power.

What if, instead, negotiations had taken place with the Honduran Congress? it was Congress, after all, that made Micheletti de facto executive; it was Congress that accepted a forged resignation letter; it was Congress that issued a Decree removing Zelaya from office without citing any constitutional basis for that action. Congress, as an institution, has lost more from the coup than the presidency, as an institution. And all of the members of Congress were duly elected by the Honduran people; they represent a significant variety of positions; and they have something lasting to lose if the elections of 2009 are not recognized.

Micheletti, having achieved his long-term goal of exercising executive authority (although he will never have the title "President" legally), cannot run for President in the future, under the Constitution he claims to be defending. He of course can return to Congress and run and, given the nature of Honduran politics, count on staying in Congress as long as he wants; but he probably won't find enthusiastic welcome from other politicians there who will not want to be tainted by association. (Think of the way Elvin Santos, the presidential candidate from Micheletti's own Liberal Party, has tried to distance himself; now multiply it by 64.)

So Micheletti literally has everything to lose in negotiating, and nothing to gain; and thus rhetorically has nothing to lose by, as he has, continually perverting, subverting, or simply rejecting any negotiated settlement.

Honduras needs a Constitutional Assembly: Edmundo Orellana

On September 26, the normally pro-coup newspaper La Tribuna of Honduras published a profile of Edmundo Orellana, who readers of this blog know had resigned his post as Secretary of Defense in the Zelaya cabinet shortly before the coup, then, from his restored position as a member of Congress, immediately denounced the coup and has since been the author of extremely important legal commentary on the claims of the de facto regime.

In the interview that forms the bulk of the published profile, which is far too long to translate and present here in full, Orellana argues that the situation in Honduras dramatically illustrates the need for constitutional reform, and reiterates his previously expressed view that only a Constitutional Assembly can address the damage done by the coup. In fact, in the interview he notes that

My speech in the electoral campaign [for Congress] always was that we needed a Constituyente to change the Constitution, because now it doesn't respond to the political and economic reality that the country is experiencing. My thesis is that in a new millennium with a Constitution that was badly copied from that of 1957 and that of 1965, it doesn't answer to the questions that the globalized world poses. Thus it is necessary to revise the Constitution, I have always maintained this as candidate for deputy and columnist of La Tribuna.

He was then asked why it should be changed-- beyond his basic statement that the Constitution, based on those of earlier decades, simply doesn't work in the 21st century. His reply-- as a distinguished law scholar and member of multiple Honduran administrations, one we should give special weight-- is that the Constitution makes it impossible to respond to unforeseen circumstances of the future:

It is the Constitution that has bound the country with the set-in-stone articles. It makes the entire Constitution petrified: you cannot change the system of politics and government. Not even to accommodate what is the actual territory of Honduras, which was changed by Hurricane Mitch, when it diverted the course of the river that is the dividing line with Nicaragua. Our territory is in the hands of other countries and we have not fought it because of the Constitution.

When asked about specific reforms, Orellana did begin with the office of the presidency-- but not with term limits:

There is an article that is the most reformed [in the Constitution]: it refers to who cannot be candidates for the Presidency. From there have been removed designates, they inserted the vice presidents, that the president of Congress and of the Supreme Court cannot be candidates. They modified it to be able to insert the Attorney General, the adjutant Attorney General to the General Commission on Human Rights, the Attorney of the Environment and all the new organizations after 1982...

Today they call for the necessity that the conduct of a president is reviewed, but according to the set-in-stone article 374, it is established that one of the set-in-stone matters is the presidential term, so that you should not reduce the presidential term.

The interviewer follows up the implication: the coup of June 28 violated Article 374?

Exactly. If you reduce it it is admitting that you have violated a set-in-stone article, then it is equitable that we revise our Constitution and we can adjust it to our reality.

I am not in agreement with re-election, because in this country the people get excited in power and could use it to assure themselves triumph in the re-election.

Perhaps there should pass four terms until they can launch themselves again, if they are still alive and not repeat the history of Somoza who put in puppets.

Orellana is here arguing that while he doesn't want to encourage monopolization of the presidential office, he thinks there should be some mechanism for a former president to return to campaign for the office again. He is illustrating why there needs to be a debate about the constitution and the form of government: debate about proposals like his would help define a form of democratic government that might work better for Honduras.

After some fascinating exchanges about his experience the week before the coup, and a clear rejection of the claims of the flawed report of the Law Library of the Library of Congress, the interviewer turns to the question, what legal outcome is there to the crisis?

As a lawyer I would say that the only thing that fits is that they restore the situation to that before June 28.

Orellana points out that support for a Constitutional assembly is not limited to the government of Zelaya, citing not only his own campaign history, but that of Pepe Lobo, candidate for President from the National Party, because

this is giving some hope. This is capturing the call of society.

Orellana was not optimistic about elections even in September, saying that if the hatred between people persisted

these elections have no future. How could you offer elections, when the police and the Armed Forces are in the streets repressing some and guarding others? How could we accept that there was an environment propitious for the elections if you have curfews, that aren't even advertised?

So what can Hondurans hope for? in a word: Constituyente:

here the problems that the Coup d'Etat has made emerge are so deep and profound. Today the poor hate the rich. The people that are out in the streets, demanding the restitution of Mel, because they see the injustice that was committed, that what they are doing now is inhumane and also that they are exposing us before the world that is coming to see a barbarity. Here the people are thinking of a Constitutional Assembly and no one can avoid that, because it is the only thing that can staunch the wounds.

Too late for fair elections

With three weeks to go as of today to the scheduled date of elections, I think it is time to say clearly: elections held under the current conditions will not solve anything.

Campaigning has not been possible. People's attention is directed exclusively to the political crisis. Militarization of the country has created an atmosphere of repression that, while highest for those dissenting from the current governmental system, also must affect others who might not have as strong a position on constitutional reform, but may be discouraged from participating freely in elections.

And what would these Honduran citizens be expecting of any government they elect? Remember that the balloting goes from the level of municipal jurisdiction up to that of the presidency. It is important not to reduce the November balloting to simply a contest between 5 or 6 presidential candidates.

That seems to us to be what the US State Department logic is based on. Only if you think the "solution" is getting someone, anyone, into the presidential office who did not seize power illegally through the actions of the military could you possibly say, as Hugo Llorens is quoted as saying on Radio America today,

The elections will be part of the actuality and will return Honduras to a road to democracy.

Las elecciones serán parte de la realidad y devolverán a Honduras a un camino a la democracia.

Although Llorens, who has been the best voice of the State Department throughout this whole crisis, in terms of understanding the Honduran issues and being clear (clearer than Washington) about what is at stake and what has to happen, does state that this election is about everything from the level of mayor to president, as a diplomat, he is engaging in wishful thinking if he truly believes at this late date that the elections can be held in a way that will be understood by the Honduran people as free, transparent, and fair.

Saying the elections are definitely going to occur, Llorens continued

the Honduran people have the right to elect their president, a new Congress and mayors... and it would be a historic error of grand proportion to deny this right.

el pueblo hondureño tiene derecho de elegir a su presidente, un nuevo Congreso y alcaldes (...), y sería un error histórico y de grandes proporciones negar ese derecho.

Well, yes. But that historic error already happened when, on June 28, the right of the Honduran people to elect their President in 2005 was denied in a military coup, leading to a de facto regime which now pretends that holding polling under its supervision will correct things.

Two wrongs do not make a right.

Inadvertent truth? When generals merge with politicians...

A BBC report on the interpretive aftermath of the signing of the Tegucigalpa (Guaymuras) Accord rehearses the main points of disagreement between the two sides.

The Zelaya administration insisting that the Congressional vote on return of the Executive Power to its state prior to June 28 logically has to precede establishing a reconciliation government (or else we face the bizarre prospect of Zelaya, as a supposed "private citizen", negotiating half the cabinet posts based on-- what?).

The Micheletti group, meanwhile, continue to ignore the fact that what is at issue is timing of the Congressional vote-- not the outcome-- in favor of emphasizing that Zelaya has accepted whatever outcome comes from this vote-- which they will not commit to having before the supposed reconciliation government takes form.

And then there are those rumors of behind the scenes deals between Pepe Lobo and the US State Department, to ensure that if the Congress ever convenes, the vote will be for reinstatement of Zelaya.

But what is most interesting to me about this brief article is something else: the concluding sentences that read

In these last few precarious hours, many politicians are reluctant to declare themselves. And some, like Gen Romeo Vasquez have taken refuge in absolute silence.

As a reminder: General Vasquez and his Armed Forces are supposed to be apolitical and non-deliberative. He cannot even vote in the election, according the the Constitution. He isn't supposed to be a politician.

But this is one of the enduring legacies of the coup d'etat, come what may: the military has emerged from behind the scenes, newly empowered to make and break governments.

That should worry us all.

Convening Congress: the details

So, we think it is worth reviewing the entire Constitutional section dealing with what it takes to convene Congress.

On the one hand, it seems pretty clear that Micheletti was counting on further delay due to having already dismissed Congress (a fact noted by Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle in one of his editorials, translated by Adrienne Pine, but otherwise missing from the commentary we have seen). So we have seen the leadership in Congress saying nothing can happen, including picking up the mail (!) until Tuesday and then maybe there cannot be a meeting because everyone is out campaigning.

On the other hand, the proposal made by a Liberal Diputado from Yoro, Javier Francisco Hall (reported by TITO in a comment on a previous blog post) to convene an extraordinary session represents a direct challenge to the power to block forward progress. And it appears to be quite legal, indeed, Constitutional, under provisions carried over into the guidelines of the Congress itself.

So here is the relevant Constitutional language, in translation with commentary, followed by the original Spanish. These are the first articles in Titulo V, Capitulo I, which establishes the nature of the Congress:

Article 189: The Legislative Power is exercised by a Congress of Diputados, that will be elected by direct suffrage. It will meet in ordinary sessions in the capital of the Republic the 25th of January of each year, without necessity of being convened, and will close its sessions the 31 of October of the same year.

Sessions can be adjourned for the time that should be necessary by resolution of Congress, at the initiative of one or more of its members, or at the request of the Executive Power.

Article 190: The National Congress will meet in extraordinary sessions:

1. When the Executive Power requests it
2. When it shall be convened by its Permanent Commission; and
3. When half plus one of its members agree.

In those cases, it will only treat the business that motivated the respective Decree of convening.

Article 191: A number of five diputados can extraordinarily convene the National Congress to meet in any place in the Republic, when the Executive, another authority, force majeure or fortuitous event, shall impede its installation or the celebration of its sessions.

Article 192: For the installation of the National Congress and the celebration of its sessions half plus one of its members will be sufficient.

Article 193: Neither Congress itself, nor any other authority of State or private party, shall impede the installation of the Congress, the celebration of its sessions or decree its dissolution.

The contravention of this precept constitutes a crime against the Powers of State.

(There is an additional Article (197) that says diputados are obligated to attend all sessions, but it is not clear if that includes extraordinary sessions)

So, what does all the foregoing mean?

(1) Congress should have still been in session Friday, October 30. It was dismissed by the de facto regime in advance of its scheduled end date. This is allowed, but it is curious that it happened and set up the present situation.

(2) If just half (plus one) of the members of Congress agree, there can be a special session. Notice that the head of Congress need not be the person calling this session. Nor does it seem there needs to be a delay while the mail is slowly walked over to his office.

(3) Five deputies can convene Congress, anywhere in the country, if its convocation is impeded, no matter who or what is responsible for that impediment. So the promise (or threat, depending on your point of view) of the delegates in favor of a rapid resolution has teeth; and they do not even have to have access to the house of Congress to meet. And even Congress itself cannot impede the convening of the body; to do so is a crime.

(4) However, while as few as ten diputados can convene Congress, it still takes half (plus one) to hold a session.

That bar, while higher than the one set for issuing a call for an extraordinary session, is still relatively low; and most important, the "leadership" of Congress is irrelevant; this is a surprisingly grass-roots set of provisions in the much-maligned Honduran Constitution.

************

ARTICULO 189.- El Poder Legislativo se ejerce por un Congreso de Diputados, que serán elegidos por sufragio directo. Se reunirá en sesiones ordinarias en la capital de la República el veinticinco de enero de cada año, sin necesidad de convocatoria, y clausurará sus sesiones el treinta y uno de octubre del mismo año.

Las sesiones podrán prorrogarse por el tiempo que fuere necesario por resolución del Congreso, a iniciativa de uno o más de sus miembros, o a solicitud del Poder Ejecutivo.

Los recesos serán establecidos en el Reglamento Interior.

ARTICULO 190.- El Congreso Nacional se reunirá en sesiones extraordinarias:

1. Cuando lo solicite el Poder Ejecutivo;

2. Cuando sea convocado por su Comisión Permanente; y

3. Cuando así lo acuerde la mitad más uno de sus miembros.

En estos casos sólo tratará los asuntos que motivaron el respectivo Decreto de convocatoria.

ARTICULO 191.- Un número de cinco diputados podrá convocar extraordinariamente al Congreso Nacional para sesionar en cualquier lugar de la República, cuando el Ejecutivo, otra autoridad, fuerza mayor o caso fortuito, impidan su instalación o la celebración de sus sesiones.

ARTICULO 192.- Para la instalación del Congreso Nacional y la celebración de sus sesiones será suficiente la mitad más uno de sus miembros.

ARTICULO 193.- Ni el mismo Congreso, ni otra autoridad del Estado o particulares, podrá impedir la instalación del Congreso, la celebración de las sesiones o decretar su disolución.

La contravención de este precepto constituye delito contra los Poderes del Estado.

Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord: A translation

Preamble

We, Honduran citizens, men and women convinced of the necessity to strengthen the state of law, to aid our constitution and the laws of our Republic, deepen democracy and assure a climate of peace and tranquility for our people, have carried out a frank and intense process of political dialogue to seek a negotiated and peaceful exit to the crisis in which our country has been submerged in recent months.

As fruit of this dialogue in which has predominated the wisdom, tolerance, and patriotic spirit of all the participants, we have drafted a political accord that will permit the reestablishment of civic harmony and assure a proper climate for democratic governability in our country. This accord, we are sure, will define the road to peace, reconciliation, and democracy, urgent demands of Honduran society.

The agreement on this accord demonstrates yet again, that Honduran men and women are capable of successfully carrying out dialogue and thanks to that and by means of it, reach the high goals that society demands and the country requires.

In virtue of the forgoing, we have agreed on the following accords:

1. ON THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND UNITY

To achieve reconciliation and strengthen democracy, we will form a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation made up of representatives of the various political parties and social organizations, recognized for their capabilities, honesty, aptness, and willingness to dialogue, who will occupy the distinct secretariates and subsecretariates, as well as other dependencies of State, in conformity with article 246 and following of the constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

In light of the fact that before the 28 of June, the Executive Power had not submitted a General Budget of Income and Expenses for consideration to the National Congress, in conformity with that established in article 205, number 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, this government of unity and national reconciliation will respect and function on the basis of the general budget, recently approved by the National Congress for fiscal year 2009.

2. ON RENOUNCING THE CONVOCATION OF A NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OR REFORMING THE UNREFORMABLE ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we reiterate our respect for the Constitution and the laws of our country, abstaining from making calls for the convening of a National Constituent Assembly, in direct or indirect manner and renouncing also promoting or aiding any popular poll with the goal of reforming the Constitution in order to permit presidential re-election, modify the form of government or contravene any of the irreformable articles of our Magna Carta.

In particular, we will not make public declarations nor exercise any type of influence inconsistent with articles 5; 373 and 373 [sic: 374?] of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, and we reject energetically every manifestation contrary to the spirit of said articles and of the special law that regulates the referendum and the plebiscite.

3. ON THE GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we reiterate that, in conformity with the articles 44 and 51 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, the vote is universal, obligatory, egalitarion, direct, free and secret, and it corresponds to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, with full autonomy and independence, to supervise and execute everything related to the electoral acts and processes.

At the same time, we make a call to the Honduran people to peacefully participate in the next general elections and to avoid all kinds of demonstrations that would oppose the elections or their results, or promote insurrection, antijuridical conduct, civil disobedience or other acts that could produce violent confrontations or transgressions of the law.

With the goal of demonstrating the transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process, we ask urgently that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that it authorize and accredit the presence of international missions from now until the declaration of the results of the general elections, as well as the transfer of powers that will take place, in conformity with Article 237 of the Constitution of the Republic, the 27 of January of 2010.

4. ON THE ARMED FORCES AND NATIONAL POLICE

To reach reconciliation and fortify democracy, we affirm our will to comply in all its measures with article 272 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, according to which the Armed Forces remain at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal from one month before the general elections, for the purpose of guaranteeing the free exercise of suffrage, the custody, transparency, and guarding of the electoral materials and all the other aspects of security of the process. We reaffirm the professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative character of the Honduran Armed Forces. In the same way, we agree that the national police should be strictly subject to that prescribed in its special legislation.

5. ON EXECUTIVE POWER

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, in the spirit of the themes of the proposed San Jose Accord, both negotiating commissions have decided, respectfully, that the National Congress, as an institutional expression of popular sovereignty, in the use of its powers, in consultation with the points that the Supreme Court of Justice should consider pertinent and in conformity with the law, should resolve in that proceeding in respect to "return the incumbency of Executive Power to its state previous to the 28 of June until the conclusion of the present governmental period, the 27 of January of 2010". The decision that the National Congress shall accept should lay the foundations to achieve social peace, political tranquility and governability that society demands and the country needs".

6. ON THE VERIFICATION COMMISSION AND THE TRUTH COMMISSION

To achieve reconciliation and fortify democracy, we are disposed to the creation of a Commission of Verification of the promises assumed in this Accord, and of those that shall derive from it, coordinated by the Organization of American States (OAS). Said commission will be made up of two members of the international community and two members of the national community, these last will be sought one by each of the parties.

The Verification Commission will be charged with giving witness of the strict completion of all of the points of this Accord, and will receive for this the full cooperation of Honduran public institutions.
Incompletion of any of the commitments contained in this Accord, proven and declared by the Verification Commission, will produce the activation of measures that the Commisssion will establish against the transgressor or transgressors.

With the goal of clarifying the deeds that occurred before and after the 28 of June of 2009, there will also be created a Truth Commission that will identify the acts that led to the present situation, and provide to the Honduran people elements to avoid that those deeds will be repeated in the future.
This Commission of Dialogue recommends that the next Government, in the framework of a national consensus, constitutes the said Truth Commission in the first half of the year 2010.

7. ON THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

On committing ourselves to faithfully comply with the promises assumed in the present Accord, we respectfully ask the immediate revocation of those measures and sanctions adopted at a bilateral or multilateral level, that in any manner would affect the reinsertion and full participation of the Republic of Honduras in the international community and its access to all forms of cooperation.

We make a call to the international community that it should reactivate as soon as possible the projects of cooperation in effect with the Republic of Honduras and continue with the negotiation of future ones. In particular, we ask urgently that, on the request of competent authorities the international cooperation be made effective that might be necessary and opportune for the Verification Commission and the future Truth Commission to assure the faithful completion and follow-through of the commitments acquired in this Accord.

8. FINAL DISPOSITIONS

Any difference in interpretation or application of the present Accord will be submitted to the Verification Commission, which will determine, in keeping with that disposed in the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and in the legislation in effect and through an authentic interpretation of the present Accord, the solution that corresponds.

Taking into account that the present Accord is a product of the understanding and fraternity among Honduran men and women, we ask vehemently that the international community respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Honduras, and fully observe the time-honored principle in the Charter of the United Nations of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

9. CALENDAR OF COMPLETION OF THE ACCORDS

Given the immediate entrance into effect of this accord from the date of its signing, and with the goal of clarifying the timetable for completion and follow-through of the commitments acquired to reach national reconciliation, we agree on the following calendar of completion:

*30 of October of 2009
1. Signing and entry into effect of the accord.
2. Formal delivery of the accords to Congress for the effects of point 5, of "Executive Power".

*2 of November of 2009
1. Appointment of the Verification Commission

*Beginning with the signing of the present Accord and no later than the 5 of November
1. Appointment and installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation

*27 of January of 2010
1. Celebrate the transfer of government

*First half of 2010
1. Formation of the Truth Commission

10. FINAL DECLARATION

In the name of reconciliation and the patriotic spirit that has convened us at the table of dialogue, we commit to complete in good faith the present Accord and that which derives from it.

The world is witness to that demonstration of unity and peace, to which we commit our civic conscience, and patriotic devotation. Together, we shall know to demonstrate our valor and determination to fortify the State of Law and construct a tolerant, pluralistic, and democratic society.

We sign the present Accord in the city of Tegucigalpa, Honduras, the 30th of October of 2009.

11. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We take advantage of the occasion to thank the accompaniment of the good offices of the international community, in particular the OAS, and its Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza, the Missions of Chancellors of the Hemisphere; the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias Sanchez; the ultimate government of the United States, its president Barack Obama; and its Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

12. ON THE ENTRY INTO EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE ACCORD

For internal effects, the Accord has full effectiveness from its signature.

For effects of protocol and ceremony, there will be carried out a public act of signing on the 2nd of November of 2009.

Tegucigalpa, Municipio del Distrito Central, 30 of October of 2009

(Spanish language source here. Another translation by cadejo4 here.)