Responses to the Coup d'etat in Honduras on Sunday June 28, with special emphasis on producing English-language versions of commentaries by Honduran scholars and editorial writers and addressing the confusion encouraged by lack of basic knowledge about Honduras.

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

Who Really Rejected the Arias Plan

Here in the real world of Costa Rica, I watched, live, as the Micheletti negotiating team in Tegucigalpa obfuscated what the final proposed "San Jose Accord" was, and misrepresented what parts of it meant.

How do I know they were lying? because earlier, I had watched the Zelaya team's statement as well as that of Arias.

What I heard the Micheletti team say was that President Zelaya could not return to office under any proposal, clearly a rejection of a non-negotiable element of the plan.

So why does the LA Times headline their article "Zelaya rejects mediator's new Honduras proposal"?

This is the position the Micheletti team wanted to place President Zelaya in. It is what their press conference claimed had happened, and the LA Times article is datelined Tegucigalpa. So, effectively, the LA Times is doing propaganda work for the de facto regime.

In a discussion among a group of Central American scholars, the consensus was that the Arias mediation was flawed from the outset. First, they note that Arias was compromised by being tapped by Hillary Clinton, thus was not an independent agent. Second, as also noted in editorials by Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, treating Micheletti as if he had an equal right to bargain gave him a degree of legitimacy he did not merit. Tonight, in the press conference by the Micheletti group, that decision came home to roost as they cited various proposed points in Arias' plan, and argued that these points proved that Oscar Arias agreed with their views of Zelaya's actions before the coup.

Meanwhile, the Micheletti negotiators at the last moment stated that they had no authority to agree to anything, and while not giving a clear yes or no, stated they would go back to Honduras and consult virtually every branch of the de facto government about individual points. This is a transparent delaying tactic, especially since they simultaneously reiterated that there was no way they could agree to Zelaya's returning as president, because, they claim, he left the country already as a private citizen. So to let him return as president would, the Micheletti crowd argued, be installing a president who was not elected.

These are not the positions of anyone who actually was negotiating anything. What these negotiations have been about, transparently, is holding on in the belief that eventually the world community would lose interest and perhaps, if the de facto regime makes it to election day, they can pass off a president elected in a country where basic civil liberties have been suspended as legitimate.

The scholars I spent the evening with noted that Arias also made the mistake of getting involved in "negotiating" issues that are strictly internal-- such as including a requirement that the budget passed by the de facto regime would be left stand for the remainder of Zelaya's presidency. This was a red herring thrown in by the Micheletti crowd, and adding it to the plan simply showed them that Arias would include anything they wanted. And then they held a press conference and used him rhetorically as a prop.

As Rixi Moncada, spokesperson for the Zelaya government, actually said: the Arias mediation has failed. It was, she said, a fracaso-- which can politely be translated as failure.

But I prefer the more colorful "flop".

And so was the LA Times coverage.

Monday, July 20, 2009

"To investigate and disseminate history is not a crime": Nathalie Roque

The following email was circulated Friday July 17 by Nathalie Roque, Director of the Hemeroteca Nacional of Honduras (the archive of newspapers), described by the Minister of Culture, Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle as "a brilliant young historian who has played a great role there, digitizing the institution and bringing out digitized reports".

She identifies herself as the source of critical historical information about Roberto Micheletti's participation in 1985 in an actual attempt to violate the constitution by extending the term of the then-sitting president. Her email is testimony to the persecution of Hondurans for exercising not only their rights of free speech, but of academic freedom, as well as reinforcing troubling reports of the fomenting of repression based on national origin, strictly forbidden by the Honduran Constitution:

Re: MICHELIN REPRESSION AGAINST NATHALIE ROQUE FOR HER HISTORICAL-INFORMATIONAL WORK

Thanks, friends, for your solidarity!

Those that I know, say that I have carried out my work at the Hemeroteca Nacional with great care, and that thanks to the determined support of Rebeca Becerra (unjustly fired and persecuted) and the Minister Pastor Fasquelle (now in exile in Mexico), we have succeeded in carrying out a total process of modernization, restoration, training of personnel, as well as the implementation of new projects tending to protect the documentary patrimony of the nation and generate historical consciousness/memory in the population through electronic bulletins, exhibitions, conversations and cultural events, and publication of books, among many others.

Today I was informed that inquiries are being performed against me and that it was likely that they would summon me to the Public Prosecutor for my offenses: during my free time I decided to investigate the past of the participants in the coup, and because this is public information from newspapers, I decided to share with friends and people of the resistance; in addition, I did not fold for the coup authority and demonstrated personally my position of repudiating the coup d'etat that they have carried out on taking over the Secretariat of Culture, Arts, and Sports.

Apparently, they have weighty evidence against me:

--I have removed and brought to light the past (they forget that I am an historian and that I have been trained in that way)

--I have entered the Hemeroteca outside work hours (I've never had hours, I work Saturdays and Sundays, until midnight, etc.)

--I have published confidential information of the Ministry (newspapers and public orders, of high levels of circulation nationally)

--I have participated in anti-coup demonstrations (it was with work permits and my weekends are my own!!)

--I am of the left (I have never denied it)

--I was born in Russia and was raised in Nicaragua (What a crime!!! To have been politically persecuted from before birth)

I am an honest person and I have not committed any misdeed; to investigate and disseminate history is not a crime and as far as I know to think differently isn't EITHER!

Best wishes from the resistance!

Natalie Roque
Citizen in Resistance

Sunday, July 19, 2009

Cracks in the Micheletti Faction: Carlos Flores to Oscar Arias

A Honduran colleague sends the following news, also being published in other Spanish-language news media. I translate the entire note I received, including the explanations of who's who by my trusted correspondent.

Felix Molina is a correspondent of the Jesuit radio station, Radio Progreso. Yesterday he made known the fax that the ex-president, Carlos Flores, sent to Arias. Flores has been singled out as the ideologue behind the coup and represents the interests of the oligarchy. He, since the editorial in
La Tribuna last week, has been unbinding himself from and denying any participation in the coup. President Arias made known that Flores sent this fax.

The counter-proposal of Micheletti is being interpreted by some as the posture of a wing of the Nacionalist Party that participated in the coup and that has two negotiators of recognized Nationalist affiliation, the spurious Chancellor Lopez Contreras, and Vilma Morales. Corrales also is close to the Nationalists, although he belongs to the Christian Democrat party. The analysis of Molina this afternoon is that the posture of the Nationalists is weighing more in the negotiations.




From: Felix Molina



The proposal of Flores to Arias



Last night the Liberal ex-president Carlos Flores sent to Oscar Arias the following text, as suggestions for the final declaration from San Jose, in contradiction of the negative of the Micheletti delegation, which rejected the return of Zelaya to power.
SUGGESTIONS

Both parties commit to guaranteeing the physical safety of the other in any scenario.

Both parties commit, for a term of six months, to a moratorium in taking any legal action against the other for actions carried out before the 1st of July, 2009.

Both parties commit to retake their oaths to the Constitution and Laws of Honduras, as well as to submit to the authority granted to governmental institutions by the Constitution.

Both parties express their remorse for the loss of confidence of the people of Honduras in the Constitution and the Government occasioned by the recent events and swear that they will exert themselves in reconstructing this confidence through transparency.

Both parties commit to the trustworthy fulfillment of the present calendar for the general elections of this November and swear to permit the preparations to proceed free of any interference or manipulation.

Both parties commit to not incur any attempt to suspend, alter, or carry out any consultation at a national level in reference to the Constitution of the Republic for a term of one year.

Both parties welcome the OAS for the formation of a temporary commission that will provide technical consulting about the implementation of this accord and the preparations for the general elections.

Both parties agree to establish a Truth Commission with well-defined goals, whose members will be chosen and accepted by all the interested parties.

Under these solemn conditions, both parties commit to the restoration in a peaceful manner of President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales for the period of the remainder of his term.

Both parties, together, will formally meet, as soon as possible, with the National Congress and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Honduras to review, explain, and gain consensus of the Legislative Power and the Judicial Power to the agreed upon conditions.

Both parties agree to jointly order the Armed Forces and the National Police (the security forces) to desist and avoid arbitrary arrests, and any violation of the liberty of the person, the liberty of expression, the liberty of movement, and any other democratic liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic.

The Armed Forces and Police obligated to fulfill their constitutional functions and pass to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The present authorities guarantee stability in their commands.

Both parties will abstain from promoting or encouraging demonstrations against the electoral process or that promote insurrection, civil disobedience, illegal conduct or anything that would lead to violence or violation of the Law.

Respect the budget approved in Congress.

Verification of the accords with wide representation.

The Micheletti "counter-proposal": A rant

Micheletti's negotiators today rejected the Arias plan, despite the fact that it addressed the supposed reasons for the constitutional and military coup d'etat, despite the fact that President Zelaya agreed to Arias' terms, which many commentators supportive of the constitutional government feel demanded too much and placed Zelaya in the position of repudiating his supporters. At the same time, the Micheletti group offered their own counter-proposal, which can be downloaded in PDF from El Heraldo, one of the pro-Micheletti Honduran newspapers.

What do these "negotiators" with no legal right to negotiate, and only the raw exercise of repressive power and world-wide reluctance to increase the suffering of the Honduran people propping them up, have to offer as an alternative?

Presented as a letter to Oscar Arias, the main body of their proposal can be translated as follows, with my notes after:
We recognize that the return to Honduras of the citizen petitioner José Manuel Zelaya Rosales with all constitutional and international guarantees is an important point of a global accord that would determine the situations that would need to be addressed for the effectiveness of our Constitution and the Democracy in the framework of a State of law.

Our position is inspired by the figure of one single Republic and not in the image of a divided State and society.

First, the return to Honduras of the petitioner Sr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales with the necessary guarantees so that he can exercise his right to due process before the competent legal bodies of the Judicial Power.

Second, the entrenchment of democratic order and respect for the separation of Powers, for which a Government of unity and reconciliation would be formed, composed of members of the political parties and social sectors, in accordance with the requirements of capacity, merit, suitability and ethics that will defend national sovereignty and combat drug trafficking.

Third, the guarantee of the effective validity of the State of Law and the rejection of corruption and of impunity, assuring equally respect for the professionalism of the National Police, whose rotation should be subject strictly to that which its special legislation prescribes.

Consistent with the preceding, the integrity of public funds should be preserved and those that have been abstracted and used illegally should be returned.

With this same aim the budget recently approved by the National Congress should be respected.

Fourth, the constitution of a truth commission so that the Honduran people and the international community can identify all the actions, deeds that are evident and notorious that led to the present situation, in the period before the 28th of June, on that date, and after the same.

Fifth, the possibility of moving up the national elections already convened, in accordance with that which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ordains and in consultation with the presidential candidates.

Sixth, the placement of the Armed Forces and the National Police under the command of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal four months before the elections, with the effects of guaranteeing transparency, liberty, and normalcy of the electoral process which is a high priority of national security, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and the Law of Elections and Political Organizations.

The professionalism and functions of the Armed Forces should be respected and assured that they conform to what the Constitution of the Republic expressly sets out, and any rotation should stick strictly to the fulfillment of what is established in the Constitutive Law of the Armed Forces.

Seventh, the integration of a commission of verification composed of distinguished Hondurans that will watch over the fulfillment of these accords and report periodically on them to the Honduran people and the international community.

The agreements that we arrive at will constitutionally require being submitted for the consideration of the Judicial Power, Legislative Power, Supreme Electoral Tribunal and other competent public entities.

All parties will promise to respect the accords and avoid submitting the same to public commentaries.

Luckily, I am not a party to these accords, so I can and will submit them to public commentary:

The only news here is that they admit they made a mistake by denying President Zelaya his right to remain in Honduras. However, by describing him repeatedly as "citizen petitioner" they refuse to acknowledge he remains the consitutional president of the country. This requires them to replace Arias Item 1 with something else, and what a something it is! President Zelaya can return to be tried in Honduran courts, and there is no mention of any amnesty of any kind.

The second paragraph of their preamble may seem like a non-sequitur, in a document full of non-sequiturs, but it exemplifies the real problem here: they insist there is a single Honduran State and society, denying to the world the evidence that many Hondurans do not approve of the events of June 28 and that the de facto regime has created and is worsening divides within the country, notably between poor and rich; indigenous, african-descendant, and other parts of Honduran society; people whose Honduranness is being questioned and who are being subjected to persecution for their descent or presumed identity as Nicaraguans; people with political opinions at different points on a spectrum from right to left.

The second of their numbered points-- after returning President Zelaya to probable arrest and trial-- takes the proposal for a unity and reconciliation government and turns it inside out, adding a series of empty requirements that no doubt would be used to veto many of those who should be restored to their offices in any such government, such as the cabinet ministers of the Zelaya government whose last months of work were interrupted. But the truly amazing thing is proposing to write into the accord a pledge to "combat drug trafficking". What that phrase, along with the preceding "defend national sovereignty" clause, is about is advancing a claim that President Zelaya is complicit in drug trafficking with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, most openly and famously advanced by the Micheletti regime's Enrique Ortez in interviews with the AP on June 30.

(That's the same Enrique Ortez who eventually apologized for racist remarks about US President Barack Obama, remarks never accurately translated by English-language media, which used the term "little black man" for what should have been glossed as "n----r" and more specifically, in one of Ortez' many quotes belittling Obama, "sugar-plantation n----r".)

(And yes, I really cannot bring myself to type the N-word: if you have to see it spelled out check www.quotha.com.)

In other words, this document is not a counter-proposal for Arias: it is a propaganda piece aimed at the already over-propagandized Honduran public.

Item three of this proposal makes this abundantly clear, as none of the things mentioned would mean a thing outside Honduras; inside, they are the points for which a drumbeat of propaganda has existed for the past year: insinuations that the Zelaya government is corrupt, that the increase in the number of National Police under the Zelaya government-- which on the one hand can be seen as an employment initiative, and on the other, as addressing Zelaya's campaign pledge to try to bring crime under control-- was political, that public funds were being used to pay people to demonstrate or organize for Zelaya's initiatives. And of course, if the budget Congress just passed (while the de facto regime held power) could not be revisited, then nothing but the will of the de facto regime would be done; and as a showdown with then-head of Congress Micheletti was a large part of the reason there was no budget yet for the fiscal year that began in October 2008, this is a major gain for the Micheletti regime's and its clients.

(Item three of the Micheletti proposal, remember, replaces the call for amnesty for political offenses in the Arias proposal.)

Need I go on? Yes, I must. This incoherent document simply begs for analysis and, I am afraid, incites me to ridicule.

In item four, Arias' requirement that President Zelaya renounce the ballot question concerning constitutional reform disappears. Apparently, despite previous claims, that doesn't matter anymore. In its place: a "truth commission" to explore events that led to the present situation, before the June 28 coup. This congeals one of the whinier claims of the Micheletti faction: the world is being unfair, because they are fixated on a tiny little military intervention in constitutional succession, when the bad meany President Zelaya spent months resisting the attempts of Congress to stop him from talking to the people... Well, let me be fair here. (Can I be fair here? Do I want to be fair here? I think not but still, can I be less snotty...) The coup participants seem shocked that the world doesn't want to hear "their side", why they think they were justified in a military intervention in a consitutional democracy. They think if they have a hearing, world opinion will shift; if only the pesky Armed Forces hadn't expatriated Zelaya and gotten the world all riled up, they say, we could have explained that Zelaya was fomenting "mob rule". Surely politicians everywhere will support the right of the power elite not to ask the opinions of the people or have them demonstrate outside Congress and make us uncomfortable. (Watch for more signs of irritation from the Armed Forces, who do not appear to appreciate being thrown under the bus and already are clearly leaking documents like the June 26 letter from Micheletti scheduling the Armed Forces action for June 28.)

Well, there. Turns out I cannot be un-snotty on this one. Sorry for all those I just offended and know that I am not news media and yes, these are my opinions and no, they are not Fox News "fair and balanced".

Item five of this delusional document suggests agreement with Arias, but look what happened: everywhere else too much specificity, laughable specificity, is added to a broader framework: here, specificity is subtracted. Move the elections up to when? Moving the elections will favor the big parties and the current power elite. So the sooner the better for the Micheletti regime, for whom being in office is less important than having the right folks in office. And oh, by the way, while Micheletti presumably cannot try yet-again to achieve his dream of election to the Presidency, in which he has failed every time electorally, he can run again for Congress and regain his power there.

Item six blows the cover of the concealed issue of timing of moved-up elections: put the Armed Forces under TSE power four months in advance of elections. Which are now in late November. Which means: put the Armed Forces under the control of the TSE now, covering moved-up elections held as soon as possible, with as little time as possible for opposition party campaigning.

And why add the National Police to the Arias proposal? the National Police have no constitutional role in elections, and notice how this proposal separates the citation of constitutional role, limiting comment to the Armed Forces. Vaguely gesturing to security needs covers up the real agenda here: the regime doesn't trust that the National Police will remain loyal to them. It fears the Police, it thinks the expansion of the Police was a step to create a private army. I must admit it: until now, I could not believe the authoritarian regime really believed its propaganda about Zelaya. But these guys are seriously afraid that Zelaya and the Police Force-- which remains tiny in comparison with the Armed Forces-- will take the country over by force. Presumably, aided by the "mob", that offensive term used for the people organizing and demonstrating their political will. And Nicaraguans fighting in Honduras for Hugo Chavez. And Cuban doctors and teachers-- oh wait, they expelled them. Never mind.

Almost done: Item seven: the verification commission, without any international participation whatsoever, and certainly, without acknowledging the right of the OAS to monitor compliance with hemispheric accords. Take that, international community. Who needs you?

This isn't a counter-proposal; it is literally a sign of the degree of delusion and separation from international opinion on the loose in Tegucigalpa. God help Honduras.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

The Seven Points of the Arias Plan: A translation with commentary

Based on the Spanish version published today in El Heraldo of Honduras (original text repeated at end of my translation):

1. The legitimate restitution of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales as President of the Republic, an office in which he will remain until the end of the constitutional period for which he was elected, and that concludes the 27th of January of next year, the date on which he will transfer power to the candidate designated freely and democratically by the people, in elections supervised and recognized by the international community.

2. The formation of a government of unity and national reconciliation, composed of representatives of the principal political parties.

3. The declaration of a general amnesty exclusively for all those political crimes committed in the event of this conflict, before and after the past 28th of June.

4. The express renunciation by President Zelaya, and his government, of the intention of placing a "fourth ballot-box" in the next elections, or to carry out any popular poll not expressly authorized by the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

5. Moving up the national elections of the 29th of November to the last Sunday in October, and moving up the electoral campaign from the first days of September to the first days of August.

6. The transfer of the command of the Armed Forces from the Executive Power to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, one month before the elections, to guarantee transparency and normality of suffrage, in conformity with the terms of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

7. The integration of a commission of verification composed by distinguished Hondurans and members of international organizations, in particular, by representations of the OAS, that will oversee the fulfillment of these accords and supervise the correct return to constitutional order.

Notes: Item 2 calls for the unity government to be composed of representatives of the principal parties. This is odd, because this conflict was not inter-party, but intra-Liberal party. Left undefined: which of the parties are "principle"? "Partidos politicos" can have no other meaning, and does not imply integration of the de facto regime per se.

Item 3 extends amnesty only for political crimes. Does this leave in place the trumped-up charges being manufactured against Zelaya and his cabinet ministers, for example, for drug-running?

Item 5: moving up the campaign will require legislative action, but probably is seen as a way to assure the people that the Zelaya government is a caretaker and to shift attention to the policies that a new government will undertake. Nonetheless, minority parties note that the acceleration of the calendar works against them and in favor of parties with more resources for publicity.

Item 6: by consitution, the Armed Forces guarantee freedom of the polls. This was the center of conflict between President Zelaya and the command of the Armed Forces when he fired the chief of the Armed Forces for refusing to play that role for the public poll June 28. The Supreme Tribunal of Elections, which is not the same as the Supreme Court, oversees the outcome of elections; so this is intended to ensure that the people believe the ballots are not tampered with (one of the corrosive rumors of the anti-cuarta urna campaign) and that President Zelaya cannot insert a fourth ballot somehow.

Item 7: the nod to the OAS in essence is a reprimand to the de facto regime for its vote to leave OAS. The call for distinguished Hondurans to be part of the oversight commission is heartening, if any remain who have not been drawn into, and thus tainted by, the current crisis.



Propuesta del presidente de Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, para solución a crisis de Honduras

1.- La legítima restitución de José Manuel Zelaya Rosales en la Presidencia de la República, cargo en que permanecerá hasta el fin del período constitucional por el cual fue electo, y que concluye el 27 de enero del próximo año, fecha en que entregará el poder al candidato designado libre y democráticamente por el pueblo, en elecciones supervisadas y reconocidas por la comunidad internacional.

2.- La conformación de un gobierno de unidad y reconciliación nacional, compuesto por representantes de los principales partidos políticos.

3.- La declaración de una amnistía general exclusivamente para todos los delitos políticos cometidos con ocasión de este conflicto, antes y después del 28 de junio pasado.

4.- La renuncia expresa del presidente Zelaya, y de su gobierno, de la pretensión de colocar una “cuarta urna” en las próximas elecciones, o realizar cualquier consulta popular no autorizada expresamente por la Constitución de la República de Honduras

5.- El adelantamiento de las elecciones nacionales del 29 de noviembre al último domingo de octubre, y el adelantamiento de la campaña electoral de los primeros días de septiembre a los primeros días de agosto.

6.- El traslado del comando de las fuerzas armadas del poder ejecutivo al Tribunal Supremo Electoral, un mes antes de las elecciones, para efectos de garantizar la transparencia y normalidad del sufragio, conforme con los términos de la Constitución de la República de Honduras.

7.- La integración de una comisión de verificación compuesta por hondureños notables y miembros de organismos internacionales, en especial por representantes de la Organización de Estados Americanos, que vigile el cumplimiento de estos acuerdos y supervise el correcto retorno al orden constitucional.


Support for the Integrity of Honduran Historical Resources

A statement posted today on the website of the Instituto Hondureño de Antropología e Historia provides insight into the continued efforts of scholars in institutions of this sort to carry on their efforts to protect the sources of historical knowledge that have begun to be appreciated and developed since the beginning of the Zelaya administration. It responds to reports circulating on the internet of a serious proposed breach of international conventions on the protection of cultural properties in the event of armed conflicts, as well as of Honduran law protecting such public goods.

As the looting of the Iraqi and Afghan museums during the respective conflicts in those countries, and the loss of Iraqi historical sites in particular due to military actions, makes plain, the world community needs to support the efforts of those who may be working alone to deflect contemporary conflicts from extending their reach to endanger such irreplaceable materials.

In Honduras, this threat comes at a time when public policy and efforts of public intellectuals has begun to expand knowledge of history and participation in its production far beyond those who traditionally have had the leading role in such explorations, including Honduran elites and international scholars. It is thus a promising sign that in the midst of such upheaval, the dedicated scholars of the Institute of Anthropology and History are determined to carry out their national and international legal mandates.


PUBLIC CLARIFICATION

In the City of Tegucigalpa, Capital of Honduras, on the 18th of July, 2009, the director of the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History (Instituto Hondureño de Antropología e Historia or IHAH in its Spanish acronym) (www.ihah.hn), to the public in general CLARIFIES:

In the face of information that is circulating on the internet about the possible presence of military reservists that would occupy the building of the Antigua Casa Presidencial (Former Presidential House), located in the Historic Center of Tegucigalpa, the following is reported:

FIRST: The building of the Antigua Casa Presidencial, where the Honduran Documentary Center for Historical Research (Documental de Investigaciones Históricas de Honduras or CDIHH in its Spanish acronym,) is located (which shelters the National Archive of Honduras, the Ethnohistoric Archive of Honduras, and the Library of the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History), is Cultural Patrimony of Honduras and is ruled/governed/controlled by the Law for the Protection of the Cultural Patrimony of the Nation (Decree 220-97).

SECOND: According to the aformentioned Law, the authority that is officially charged with caring for and administering the building of the Antigua Casa Presidencial, as with every National Monument, is the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History (IHAH) through its Director and legal representative.

THIRD: The Director of the IHAH has not received official communication (in writing) on the part of any State authority with respect to the role of this National Monument, or any other, in any case of emergency or in a state of normality of the nation.

FOURTH: Even in the case of a situation of national emergency or a legally declared State of War, this National Monument, or any other National Monument inventoried as Cultural Patrimony of Honduras, is under the protection of the Convention of the Hague of 1954, "Convention for the Protection of Cultural Properties in case of Armed Conflict". Honduras forms part of this Convention.

It is worthwhile, in this respect, to highlight three articles of the aforementioned Convention:

Article 1) In which is established the definition of Cultural Patrimony and Cultural Patrimony Properties that are protected by this Convention.

Article 4) Which merits the respect that cultural properties should receive in case of armed conflict, and literally says:

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property.

Article 8) sub-section b, among others.

Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History

No "Terms Reached": Oscar Arias Just Hopes for a "Reconciliation Government"

An article published July 16 in the New York Times illustrates why people need to be cautious in relying on the English-language media in this crisis. Headlined "Some Terms Reached in Honduras Dispute", it seemed to indicate a major breakthrough. But as at least one blogger seriously following the conflict notes, this seems to contradict the implications of news reports of President Zelaya's intentions and actions. What gives?

Follow back to the original source, and you find a broadcast on Costa Rica's Radio Monumental reported in an article in the Costa Rican newspaper, La Nacion. That article says Oscar Arias will propose a reconciliation government, not that the proposal has been accepted. Why the difference?

In the Spanish original, the verbs are in the subjunctive mode, a grammatical tense English-speakers find notoriously difficult to master. It looks like in the process of translation, Arias' statements of proposals and hopes became certainties. More realistic coverage notes that the two sides remain entrenched, stating that both Zelaya and Micheletti already rejected the "reconciliation cabinet" proposal.

Here is my translation of the original key paragraph (and the actual text for those who want to second guess me). The most important declarative statement from Arias is actually at the end, when he suggests the positions of the two sides have been softening. At first glance that seems a hard point to defend, given that both sides have pre-emptively and publicly rejected Arias' proposal; but at least they are still sending someone to San Jose to talk. Maybe "softening" has to be redefined here.

Arias will propose to the delegations of Zelaya and Micheletti, the integration of a "unity cabinet" with members of both parties in key ministries.

He will also place under discussion the concession of "political amnesty" to people on both sides of the conflict.

To provide follow-through to these accords or verify their accomplishment, Arias will suggest that the OAS serves as guarantor, or failing that, a commission of distinguished Hondurans would be named.

According to Arias, the initial positions "have been softening" so that he hopes to encounter more flexibility for an agreement.



Arias les propondrá a las delegaciones de Zelaya y Micheletti, la integración de un “gabinete de unidad” con miembros de ambas partes en ministerios claves.

También pondrá en discusión conceder “amnistía política” a personas de ambos lados del conflicto.

Para darle seguimiento a estos acuerdos o verificar su cumplimiento, Arias sugirió que la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) sirva de garante, o en defecto, se nombre una comisión de notables hondureños.

Según Arias, las posiciones iniciales “se han ido ablandando” por lo que espera encontrar más flexibilidad para un arreglo.