"No chance Zelaya will be allowed to return": Ortez Colindres

Micheletti's notorious former Foreign Minister, Enrique Ortez Colindres, told BBC Mundo today that Micheletti's request to Arias for someone such as Enrique Iglesias to come and talk to all social sectors in Honduras is not meant to lead to an acceptance of the San Jose Accord.

Ortez Colindres said that the purpose of these conversations is only for Iglesias to hear from many distinct groups (presumably, he hopes, voicing a single pro-coup message):

It isn't the conversations that will provide an exit for the people, rather, the elections in November

(No son las conversaciones que las van a darle una salida al pueblo, sino las elecciones de noviembre)

Instead, he says, the purpose of calling for the dialog is to get the de facto regime's point of view listened to by "prestigious people" (personas de prestigio).

According to Ortez Colindres:

There is not even a minimal chance that Zelaya will come back to Honduras, there is no possibility for an arrangement of this type

(No hay la más minima posibilidad de que Zelaya regrese a Honduras, no hay ninguna posibilidad de arreglo en este sentido)

Military in Distress: Statement of Honduran Officers

The Honduran blog Mimalapalabra posted a statement today, of necessity anonymous and thus no doubt open to dismissal and suspicion. But if the authors are, as they claim, members of the Armed Forces, what they have to say would be an important indication of dissent within the military. Almost every commentator, even a woman like me who is almost allergic to the idea of military having such importance, sees the Honduran Armed Forces as critical for any prospects of resolution of the constitutional crisis they helped create.

So, here is a translation of this statement:

Group of Senior and Subaltern Officers denounces politicization of the Armed Forces of Honduras



STATEMENT



We, a group of senior and subaltern officers (we do not give names for obvious reasons, and not due to cowardice) in the face of the situation in which the politicians in collusion with the joint command involved the Armed Forces, and that has eroded the good image that we had before the Honduran people, state and denounce the following:

• The Head of the Joint Chiefs, General Vásquez, politicized the institution, contravening the constitutional mandate to be apolitical.

• General Vásquez committed the Armed Forces in the beginning to aid Sr. Mel Zelaya and afterward changed political scope, in place of retiring his troops to their respective barracks and maintaining them on the periphery of the politicians who are only using them.

• It is mentioned that a group of businessmen collected 30 million Lempiras and doled it out to the group of commanders, something that goes against the decorum and values of the military, and we declare that the Armed Forces are not gendarmes of any elite economic group, rather we are with the people because the majority of its members, both officers as well as troops come from the entrails of the people, we are not a thoroughbred army.

• General Vásquez should have stepped down two years ago, but Sr. Mel Zelaya left him, infringing the laws in force, on that occasion he said "understood I accept Sr. President"; and now because he did not say again "understood", infringing the Law as he did two years ago, he sold to the highest bidder. A lack of principles as a person, there is something of betrayal in his actions, he has prejudiced two promotions in the succession of of command.

• Two years ago when Sr. Zelaya re-elected him; some weeks before various commanders were removed who were not in agreement with the continuity and when Don Mel brought together all the Military Commanders in the Casa Presidencial, the General sent some officers that if present were going to question the decision with Sr. Mel Zelaya on a mission outside of Tegucigalpa.

• General Vásquez has denaturalized the rank of General, raising to this rank officers that have had a black path in military life, but have been his admirers, without any operational capacity.

Example:

Promoting a friend, Retired General Gerónimo Pérez, an officer who in a state of inebriation wrecked two military cars and did not have responsibilities removed, made pregnant a student ensign in the Military Academy and influenced it so that they graduated her, now General Vásquez has him working on contract in the Defense College earning 30,000 Lempiras monthly.



General Fuentes Gonzales is a kleptomaniac officer that on one occasion, there being Commanders of the North American Military battalion, carrying out a civic action in the west of the country, left construction materials and some wood, and when they returned to get it he had already sold it, the North Americans recommended a dishonorable discharge and now he is a brand-new General.



General Cuéllar, an excellent person but as an officer never knew a frontier battalion, doesn't know what it is to patrol a frontier, has only been an invisible clerical worker, but is completely a general and hasn't sweated fatigued.



General Padget, a problem officer since he was a junior officer, graduated in Mexico and left a bad record there, with his failures of decorum (better you investigate).



General Cervantes, Prince, and counter-admiral Rodriguez, without negative commentaries about their private and military life, but they have not had the character as military to clarify things with the Head of the Joint Chiefs.

Sr. General Vásquez, when you said to Sr. Mel Zelaya that you would not carry out the order of the "cuarta" [urna], you should have presented your resignation, not changed your political camp, as if the Armed Forces existed to serve political groups. Better to resign, it is time, remember that in 1993 you also knew the cells of the P. C.

More from Micheletti: Playing out the clock?

Spain's El Economista is out ahead of the Micheletti-Arias story, and their reporting suggests we should view this latest move as perhaps a new way to slow things down, remain in power, and appear to be addressing international concerns.

Their story says Micheletti asked Oscar Arias

to send a commission to undertake an internal dialogue of reconciliation.

The story cites a press release, unsigned but attributed to the Executive branch, as saying

This dialogue, this actual communication, should include all the parties of civil society: churches, trade societies, student groups, business associations, media, labor unions, universities.

While such broad participation would be nice-- and ironically, precisely this kind of participatory democracy is what the Zelaya government was doing that got people in Micheletti's cabal so worried-- it is also a daunting order to imagine such a dialogue being accomplished before Zelaya is restored.

Micheletti is quoted as "explaining" in the press release that

the results of the San Jose dialogue will be articulated and promulgated by all those elements of civil society, so that they should be encouraged and inspired to initiate this dialogue today, immediately.

Wonder why all these civil sectors now have to pick up after the de facto regime that was so anxious to keep their opinions about government from being recorded?

While saying that the San Jose framework is "the best route to achieve consensus in Honduras" Micheletti reportedly added

Our citizens need to endorse and widen the dialogue of San Jose with a dialogue in Honduras, that is to say, a dialogue among our own people.

This from the man who suspended rights of free speech and freedom of assembly.

Not to say that the Spanish newspaper accepted this press release without some degree of due skepticism. They note that Micheletti actually rejected the San Jose accord when he denied the central point calling for the restoral of President Zelaya. But, they continue, he agreed to "analyze" the rest of the aspects of the San Jose Accord. Which is how the Micheletti regime has been able to claim, on the one hand, that it is Zelaya's team that has broken off negotiations, while actually failing to consider the one, unalterable fact of any internationally-recognized solution: President Zelaya must be restored to his office.

Finally, as the article notes, having claimed he could not speak for the other branches of government, Micheletti is now stuck with the outcomes of deliberations by those other bodies. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has rejected the call to move the November elections forward to October, because-- as I long have noted-- this is unconstitutional.

And the Congress has apparently limited its discussion to the question of amnesty for political crimes, forming a commission that reportedly has written a report, which has yet to be shared openly, but that all news coverage suggests will reject this as well, congress members having been encouraged to believe that political payback against the Zelaya government was now completely assured.

So, maybe Micheletti has actually accepted the San Jose Accords, including restoral of Zelaya as President. But it looks like it doesn't matter one bit if he does-- and cynically, one could argue that all he is doing is playing out the clock in a different way.

Micheletti Accepts the San Jose Accords??!!

So reports Ginger Thompson of the New York Times 36 minutes ago

But the kicker is, he says he is not the source of the intransigence, and he needs help convincing others in the Honduran regime to accept the fact that they have to back down. So Micheletti called Arias to ask for help, seeking others to convince those holding out, he says.

Do we believe this? for me, it underlines a problem with trying to mediate between a real elected government (Zelaya) and a regime that seized power extra-constitutionally. It has never been clear who could commit the Micheletti regime. Now, it would appear, one part of the answer is: not Micheletti, who reportedly

asked Mr. Arias to consider sending a prominent international political figure to help him stem the fierce opposition.

One of those mentioned as a possible envoy was Enrique V. Iglesias, the former head of the Inter-American Development Bank and current secretary general of the Ibero-American Cooperation Secretariat, which was created in 2005 to increase cooperation between Spain, Portugal and Latin America.

“Today is an important day,” said one of the officials who spoke about Mr. Micheletti’s call to Mr. Arias. “President Arias essentially has Mr. Micheletti calling to say he thinks the San José Accord is a good framework, but that to make the accord work, he needs help building political support inside the country.”

Second point: why does Micheletti think it is a good accord? well, perhaps because the accord accepts as beginning postulates all the accusations made against President Zelaya. And perhaps because, instead of restoring the Zelaya government, it allows a negotiation in which those who seized power maintain toeholds for the next several months. Knowing the havoc being wreaked in at least one ministry by the ill-qualified person allowed to pretend to run it, this latter point makes any agreement under the San Jose Accord seem like a Pyrrhic victory.

US State Department Won't "Hug" President Zelaya...

But boy, do they love Oscar Arias. I enjoy reading the transcripts of press briefings because what they reveal is the real ambiguity of the US position on Honduras. It would be funny if it were not for the fact that it is US ambiguity that supports the delusion by the Micheletti regime that they can hold on, and that once the November elections are held, the world will shrug off the violent overthrow of constitutional order.

But here's the lighter side of yesterday's State Department press briefing; notice that the impression left is that it is Oscar Arias who the US government is pledged to support, presumably against the shocking experience of not being effective as a mediator; when the reporter presses the briefer on why they are not reaching out to Zelaya, things get very very weird. (If you are impatient, just look for the sections set in bold below):

QUESTION: Can you just quickly say what you’re doing to help support
the efforts of Arias, though? I mean, I know you say that you’re
reaching out to Zelaya and his people, but there are – just to
clarify, there are absolutely no discussions with any officials in
the de facto government?


MR. KELLY: I don’t – I wouldn’t say that categorically. I know that
we’re talking quite a bit to the Honduran congress. And as I said
before, we’re urging them to support this – the Arias process and the
San Jose accords. I can’t give you a blow-by-blow of who exactly
we’ve contacted in the government.


[...]


QUESTION: Do you think it will be useful for [President Zelaya] to come to
Washington, or do you think not?


MR. KELLY: Well, as I said before, our focus is on what President  
Arias is doing. Our energies are focused on that, on supporting him  
and helping him and his negotiation efforts. If there is a role that  
he thinks that we can play vis-à-vis Mr. Zelaya, of course, we’re  
ready to do it.


QUESTION: But I’m unclear, though, because you say that you support –  
you recognize President Zelaya as the president. You support his return.


MR. KELLY: Mm-hmm.


QUESTION: But you have no opinion as to whether he should come to the  
United States or not? I mean, shouldn’t you be – if he wants to come,  
shouldn’t you be giving him like a big, warm hug to show that you  
support him?


MR. KELLY: It’s up to him. I mean, what we’ve said is that we would  
discourage him from doing anything that would somehow undermine  
President Arias. We’ve – the President – I mean, Secretary Clinton
has urged him not to do anything precipitous regarding going into
Honduras absent a political solution. And again, if we can help by
sitting down and talking with Manuel Zelaya, with President Zelaya,
we’re happy to do it. But it’s up to President Zelaya to determine
when he wants to come back here.


QUESTION: It sounds like you don’t support what happened to him and
you support some kind of reversal of what happened, but you don’t
necessarily support him as a political leader.


MR. KELLY: I don’t know why you’re drawing that conclusion.


QUESTION: Well, I mean, you’re not – you’re saying that you support –
you recognize him as president, but at every turn, I mean, you’re not --


MR. KELLY: We have never – we’ve never turned down any requests for a
meeting or a telephone conversation or anything with President Zelaya.


QUESTION: But you’ve made no comment about – like, you know, you’ve  
said that he should be returned because you call it part of this kind  
of constitutional order and rule of law, but you don’t seem to be  
making any strong support for him as an individual.


MR. KELLY: Our support right now is for President Arias, for that  
whole process to play out.


QUESTION: But he’s the one that was ousted, though.


MR. KELLY: Sorry?


QUESTION: But Zelaya was the one who --


MR. KELLY: I don’t know – I mean, I think that we have given him – I  
don’t know what else we can do to support President Zelaya. We –  
every day we call for his return --


QUESTION: Really?


MR. KELLY: -- to Honduras and the restoration of the democratic and
constitutional order.


QUESTION: But when he says he wants to come here, you’re not like,
okay, great --


MR. KELLY: I just said if – we’re happy to --


QUESTION: -- you’ll meet with the Secretary of State.


MR. KELLY: -- we’re happy to see him.


QUESTION: He has asked for sanctions to be imposed on specific
people. So this is – are you moving in that direction with the
revocation of the visas?


MR. KELLY: I’m not aware exactly what he said. He’s asking for?


QUESTION: He wrote a letter to President Obama saying that he would
like to see sanctions imposed.


MR. KELLY: Yeah. I haven’t seen that letter. But I mean, as I said
before, the revocation of visas is consistent with our policy.


QUESTION: Is this a first step towards more punitive measures?


MR. KELLY: Well, again, we’re still putting our full weight behind  
President Arias, and that process has not played out yet.

Well. Glad we got that clarified: the US unambiguously supports a beleaguered Central American President whose democratic credentials have been questioned due to his efforts to change the constitution, eliminate term limits, and return to power.

Just, unfortunately, not the one currently waiting on the Nicaragua border for some sign of actual support, or maybe even that big, warm hug.

The Honduran Supreme Court: In its own words

As word comes today that among those whose US visas have been cancelled is the Supreme Court Justice responsible for ordering the military raid on President Zelaya's house, Jose Tomas Arita Valle, it seems an opportune time to review what actually was, and was not, ruled on by that body.

If we look in the 86 pages of the Supreme Court's own posted PDF for actual rulings where a final decision was reached, we find very, very little said by the Supreme Court itself. Despite the claim that the Supreme Court had made final rulings, only eight statements by the Supreme Court itself are included. And of those, only one is a final ruling, and it does not cover the misdeeds for which President Zelaya was purportedly removed.

The first Supreme Court filing, and the only final ruling, is documented on page 29. Titled "Certification of the Act dated June 25, 2009", it is the finding that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez was improperly dismissed, and should be reinstated. It first cites constitutional article 280, reformed September 19, 1998, by Decree 245-98, which says

The Secretary of National Defense will be named or removed freely by the President of the Republic; in equal form will be the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, who will be selected by the President of the Republic from among the members that make up the Joint Chiefs, in conformity with that which is established by promotion list of officers, prescribed in the Constitutive Law of the Armed Forces.

Seems pretty clear that constitutionally, Zelaya could dismiss the Head of the Joint Chiefs. But wait, there's more: "Not withstanding the preceding, article 40 of the Constitutive Law of the Armed Forces, contained in Decree 39-2001, dated April 30, 2001, that is the Specialized Law and applicable in this case…" as are, the court says, everything from other parts of the Constitution to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Zelaya apparently could fire the general, but he did it the wrong way.

The second document issued by the Supreme Court starts on page 48. Dated June 25, 2009, it reads in full:

Having received the prosecutorial request that precedes this with the accompanying documents, entered by the Public Prosecutor for the Attorney General of the Republic, Attorney Luis Alberto Rubi, against the citizen Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, supposing him to be responsible in the style of author of offenses against the form of government, treason against the homeland, abuse of authority and usurpation of functions, in prejudice of public administration and the State of Honduras. In order to transact the present case in the preparatory and intermediate steps, Magistrate Jose Tomas Arita Valle is designated as Judge, in fulfillment of that ordered in Articles 313 number 2 reforming the Constitution of the Republic; articles 414 and 416 reformed of the Code of Penal Processes and the resolution by this Tribunal in Point No. 2 of Act No. 34 of the session celebrated on 25 June 2009.

Immediately following is a document, unlike the others not on letterhead, dated Friday June 26. It records the acceptance of a prosecutorial complaint and supporting documents, repeats the crimes of which President Zelaya is accused, then notes

Finding sufficient merits according to the commission of deeds, issue and order of capture for the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces of Honduras so that the will please place under the order of Judicial Authority Mr. Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, and once having done so, take the statement of the accused. In view of the fact that the crimes that are claimed are sanctioned with very high punishment and existing a danger of flight, a raid on the house of the citizen before mentioned in the Colonia Tres caminos, fourth avenue, second house, left side, without number, is decreed, which can be carried out between six in the morning and six in the afternoon of the day that is deemed relevant and for that effect is named as Judge Executor: the citizen, Rene Antonio Hepburn Bueso…

The signature is illegible, and no typed name appears, but it presumably is Jose Tomas Arita Valle.

The next Supreme Court document starts on page 51, is dated the same day, and signed by the same Judge. Addressed to the Head of the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces, Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, it is the order to raid President Zelaya's house, the closest thing there is to an arrest warrant. What it literally says is

By order of this Tribunal of Justice of the Republic of Honduras, for conduct of the undersigned unanimously named Judge by the full Court, avail yourself through the authority delegated to you to capture the citizen President of the Republic of Honduras: Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, who is supposed responsible for the crimes of: Against the form of government, treason against the homeland, abuse of authority and usurpation of functions in prejudice of Public Administration and the State of Honduras, the preceding based on a prosecutorial request presented to this Court on the part of the Public Prosecutor.

The authorization is repeated and expanded on the next page, now addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Rene Antonio Hepburn Bueso, another member of the Joint Chiefs. It reads

By order of this Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Honduras, for conduct of the undersigned unanimously named Judge by the full Court, please proceed at the relevant moment to raid the residence of the citizen President of the Republic of Honduras: Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, located in the colonia Tres caminos, fourth Avenue, second house on the left, with number of this city, between six in the morning and six in the afternoon, and place him under the command of the corresponding authority for supposedly being responsible for the commission of the criminal deeds: against the form of government, treason against the homeland, abuse of authority and usurpation of functions in prejudice to the Public Administration and the State of Honduras, the preceding on the basis of a prosecutorial request presented to this Court by the Public Prosecutor.

Why the two different orders to two different military officers, only one of whom was named in the apparent original Supreme Court ruling? What does the change from "capture" to "place him under the command of the corresponding authority" actually mean? Is either accurately characterized as an arrest warrant? What happened to the original request that he be informed of the charges against him and his statement taken? Can an order issued by one member of the Supreme Court be treated as a final sentence, or does there need to be a final ruling by the entire court? Remember that Arita Valle was designated to undertake "preparatory and intermediate steps"; not to make a final ruling.

On page 58 the court reproduces a letter it sent, also dated Friday, June 26, to the heads of the Supreme Courts of other nations in the region. This letter they characterize as intended to inform these peers of the actions they are undertaking, due to President Zelaya not accepting earlier rulings about the legality of his proposed poll.

The specific offense they cite is his attempted firing of General Vasquez Velasquez, saying his action violated constitutional rights and failed to follow the procedures required by the Law of the Armed Forces. Based on these actions, the judges say, they have accepted claims of assistance, and they were sending along a certification of a resolution issued by the court "as the final and definitive interpreter of the Constitution of the Republic".

What is this resolution? Presumably, not one of the orders for the capture or raid of the President's house. The one thing labeled a "Certification" is the document starting on page 29, dated June 25, concerning the dismissal of General Vasquez Velasquez.

On page 79, the Supreme Court includes its own receipt, dated June 26, for documents submitted concerning the rulings of a lower court of administrative disputes.

Finally, on page 80, we get something that seems like a ruling by the full Supreme Court. But it is dated June 29-- after the coup d'etat. Its purpose is in fact to refer the legal case against Zelaya, now by their opinion a private citizen, back down to a lower court, since the Supreme Court is no longer the appropriate venue for action for someone who is not a high government official.

What is clear, then, is that the Supreme Court never issued a ruling about the crimes imputed to Zelaya. It issued the orders requested by the Public Prosecutor, who in the summation of his filing starting on page 47, specifically requested

that an order of capture be issued and migration alerts against the accused Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, that a raid on the residence of the now accused be ordered, that he be given to understand the deeds of which he is accused, that his declaration as accused be received and consequently, judicial detention be decreed in virtue of the gravity of the penalty to be imposed; that the secrecy of the transcript be decreed.

But none of the three different versions of orders for June 28 actually called for "judicial detention", a euphemism for arrest.

And of course, no arrest was carried out-- instead, the Armed Forces solved the problem, as they saw it, by sending Zelaya out of the country.

What these documents suggest is that one reason the military took that action might have been some degree of unease about the actual legality of the entire proceeding. And of course, left unaddressed in any of the Supreme Court rulings is the reason for the Armed Forces being given a task constitutionally that of the National Police, because as the Public Prosecutor wrote

since, in conformity with Article 33 of the Law of Public Administration the Cabinet Ministers are collaborators of the President of the Republic, in consequence and given that the Secretary of State for Security has, by means of the National Police, the legal capacity to carry out orders of capture issued by competent authority, but owing to the conflict of interests and the well-founded fear that the Public Prosecutor has that the will not fulfill the Judicial order, for this reason asks that once the corresponding orders of capture are issued the Armed Forces of Honduras will be instructed, through their Head of the Joint Chiefs, who have the capacity to make him comply with the mandates of the Constitution, the laws, that impose on the Armed Forces, they shall proceed to carry out the order for the capture of the now-accused.

Honduran Congressional Opinion

Two Weeks Notice points out that the Honduran Congress' proposal to engage in study of the San Jose Accords is yet another way the de facto regime is slowing things down, playing out the game. His reference for their plans, an article in Honduras' La Prensa, cheerleader for the coup, gives a very interesting glimpse of either the intransigence of Congress itself (not solely the Micheletti regime) or-- and this is to me the more interesting possibility-- the Honduran Congress' distance from reality. We know that the tight control of media has led to massive disinformation in Honduras. The question is, do the representatives in Congress not know how inaccurate their own media are?

The article notes the formation of a special commission to look into the question of amnesty for "the ex-president Manual Zelaya", and whether it is "prudent" to move up the elections from November to October. (I continue to question this proposal in the San Jose Accord, as it simply would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election due to the inherent advantages an early campaign gives to the larger parties.) Notice that considering an amnesty for someone characterized as "ex-president" has nothing to do with restoring Zelaya as President. On this the Congress is mute.

Congress member Rigoberto Chang Castillo is quoted as saying eight days is too short a time to give a reply, since he says the San Jose Accord contains "a series of contradictions that the Honduran government should make the mediator, Oscar Arias, see." The paragraph that immediately follows is not in quotes nor attributed to anyone in particular; one might assume it was the reporting of La Prensa itself, editorializing heavily as it tends to do, but it could be continuing the interpretation offered by Chang Castillo: "The impossibility of the time frame comes because one of the parties that represents the ex-president Zelaya left the negotiation table and said its participation in this event was over, consequently, there only remain the representatives of the [de facto regime] and the idea is to continue in the conversations because the dialogue has a goal." Read that twice, slowly: someone (La Prensa? Chang Castillo?) is suggesting that Micheletti's team is still at the negotiating table.

Remarkably, more than once the article repeats this false claim that the Zelaya side withdrew from negotiation. This was the spin advanced last Thursday in a press conference by the Micheletti team on their return from Costa Rica, after Rixxi Moncada declared the negotiations a "fracaso". It is the propaganda promoted by the LA Times in their partisan coverage of the end of last week's negotiation. But it is not what the Zelaya team has said; they support even the appalling framework of the final San Jose Accord. As they noted, it is the Micheletti side that has refused to accept the central principal of restoration of the constitutionally elected President.

The article quotes the leader of the National party constituency in Congress, Rodolfo Irias Navas, saying "we don't know if it is worth the trouble to give an opinion about comething that gives the impression of not having any follow-through", referring to the claim that the Zelaya group had broken off the Arias-mediated process. The paper says he added that if Zelaya doesn't want amnesty, why approve it? "…They clearly showed that they had no interest and if that is the case it is not worth the time or giving false expectations to the Honduran people...." The spokesperson for the Liberal Party, Celín Discua Elvir, agrees that there is no "political will" among "the congress members that we have consulted" because "one of the interested parties, that of ex-president Zelaya, declared the mediation a failure."

On the face of it, it is hard to see what the Congress has to "debate", since the article reports a majority is opposed to any amnesty. Representative Rolando Dubón Bueso is quoted as saying "the special commission will deliver a report to the chamber, we are open to analyzing the case, what from the outset we are not in agreement with is to declare an amnesty where impunity will come out gaining due to acts of corruption committed, we are not in agreement in giving amnesty for those." In other words: the Congress wants to continue to press its hyped-up cases with manufactured evidence claiming "corruption". Even waiting six months would be too long.

Nonetheless, buried in even this weird alternate-universe article are some interesting hints at backtracking and repositioning. Nationalist party member Change Castillo is said to have "made clear" that since an amnesty only needs a simple majority of 65 votes, which the Liberal party and its allies easily have, "the interest of the National Party is more to contribute to the return of calm and tranquility". Since the Micheletti regime-- led by the Liberal party-- continues to claim all is calm, this is an extraordinary expression of internal political positioning: the National Party is not responsible for this mess, at least.

Wenceslao Lara, another National Party congress member, is cited as being utterly against any amnesty, declaring that the crisis is already past, and what needs to be demonstrated to the world "is that we are in a government that was elected democratically in the National Congress under a constitutional succession, that's what is left". Move along here, nothing to see.

Less extreme but still interesting was the response of a spokesperson for the PINU party, one of several smaller parties. Ana Rosa Andino described the amnesty proposed as "the only exit to overcome the crisis" (again, just interesting that some members of Congress are admitting there is a crisis). Her concerns are with who is subject to amnesty, and for what offenses: "It is desirable to give an amnesty to ex president Zelaya and not to other persons". Presumably, she does not mean not to the participants in the coup, but rather, wants to exclude other members of the Zelaya government so that the Congress can continue politically-motivated persecution (no typo there).

Finally, Doris Gutiérrez, a member of the minority Democratic Unification party who broke away from her party's support of Zelaya, acknowledges that constitutionally Congress can grant the required amnesty, but says the crimes with which Zelaya is charged are not well defined. She argues that the key articles in the San Jose accord are others, and for those points "Congress has no input, since those who have to decide are those in the Executive branch".

Mr. Micheletti, ball's in your court.