Low Voter Turnout in US

La Tribuna carried a report on Supreme Electoral Tribunal's reported voting numbers for the United States, and the numbers are low. Voting was first permitted in the US in the 2001 election. Here's what La Tribuna reported yesterday:

Poririo Lobo Sosa		1881
Elvin Santos		820
Others		28
Total		2729

However, the La Tribuna article says the TSE reported 2841 total votes from the United States. That leaves 112 votes unaccounted for, likely spoiled and null. The TSE says there are nearly 19,000 registered voters in the US, according to the article, giving an 84% abstention rate.

So how does this compare with previous presidential elections where voting has been allowed in the US? The TSE website confirms that in the 2005 election, there were 464 votes in the US out of 11, 510 registered voters (95% abstention). In contrast, in 2001, the first year voting was allowed in the US, there were 4,541 votes cast out of an electoral role of 10,826 ( 55% abstention). Remember the 1.2 million voters the TSE wanted to eliminate from the electoral rolls to increase the apparent turnout, the voters who were largely supposed to be in the US? Apparently they never managed to get re-registered to vote in the US for this election.

Spain Gives Lobo An Ultimatum

EFE reported this morning that Spain has adopted a hard line concerning the formation of Poririo Lobo Sosa's administration. Spokesmen for the Zapatero government said yesterday that if Micheletti is still in power, or if there are other leaders who supported the overthrow of Zelaya in power, the Spanish government will not recognize the government of Porfirio Lobo Sosa.

The spokesperson expressed the Zapatero government's confidence that when Lobo Sosa takes power on January 27, Micheletti will have retired, and will not pass power to Lobo Sosa. The spokesperson added that recognition would come because "they will erase all the traces of the golpistas, because they will form a government of reconciliation, and they will look for a dignified exit for Zelaya," whom Spain continues to recognize as the constitutional president of Honduras. The Spanish ambassador's return to Honduras depends on what happens on January 27.

This creates a significant problem for Lobo Sosa. Among Lobo's supporters are many considered responsible for backing the coup, like Camilo Atala Faraj, owner of the Grupo Ficohsa, through which much golpista government cash has flowed out into private hands, and ex president Ricardo Maduro, and National Party President, and Mayor of Tegucigalapa, Ricardo Alvarez. Camilo Atala, through his membership in CEAL, is said to have coordinated the contracts by Honduran businessmen with lobbyists in the United States to lobby about the "consolidation of the democratic transition" in Honduras.

One of Lobo Sosa's many gatherings before Christmas was with a group of these advisors, including Camilo Atala. Look for Lobo Sosa to let these "advisors" move into the background, and place their lesser known supporters in Lobo's inner circle and cabinet.

Lobo's solution to inaugural illegitimacy...

is to deny that either Roberto Micheletti or President Zelaya has any role in the process.

As a story in Tiempo, published December 23, puts it:

The President elect, Porfirio Lobo Sosa, affirmed yesterday that the person who should hand over the presidencial sash next January 27, the day on which he will assume power, should be the president of the National Congress.

[El presidente electo, Porfirio Lobo Sosa, afirmó ayer que quien deberá entregarle la banda presidencial el próximo 27 de enero, día en que asumirá el poder, debería ser el presidente del Congreso Nacional.]

Most interesting is his rationale: he says that passing on the power of the presidency is legally the business of the legislature.

This is historically, technically accurate: see the surreal photo in the story in the Nuevo Diario, published January 27, 2006, showing then-congressional head Roberto Micheletti investing President Zelaya with the presidential sash.

But that isn't the whole story, of course. As coverage at the time emphasized, the acts of inauguration mark the passage of power from the previous president to the newly elected one.

Lobo still has this difficulty to solve: while he can duck being given the regalia of power by Micheletti, he still has to be deemed to be receiving power from the previous president.

So who is that? All of the world-- including those few governments that have declared the November elections legitimate-- recognize José Manuel Zelaya Rosales as the legal, constitutional president of Honduras. The Honduran Congress, whose president will place the sash of office on him, twice voted otherwise, asserting that Roberto Micheletti is now the constitutional president. Lobo himself may wish this would go away as a problem-- but it is hard to see how.

And in Honduras, the previous president is expected to give his support to the transfer of power, attending the inauguration. In 2006, the mere rumor that the departing president, Ricardo Maduro, would not attend the inauguration was newsworthy, so much so that the official coverage remarked on his presence:

The exiting Honduran president, Ricardo Maduro, who initially called into question his attendance at the investiture of Zelaya in response to rumors that he would be received with boos, finally confirmed his presence and assured that he would do it "with his head held high".

[El presidente hondureño saliente, Ricardo Maduro, quien en un inicio puso en duda su asistencia a la investidura de Zelaya ante los rumores de que sería recibido con silbidos, confirmó finalmente su presencia y aseguró que lo hará "con la frente muy en alto".]

What we have here is an attempt to argue that the symbolic investiture is the important thing. But pragmatically, practically, the transfer of power is what the symbols are supposed to represent. Power-- which we should remember requires control, authority, and legitimacy-- is what is at issue here, and where the next president's power comes from is going to remain a problem.

As an anthropologist, I know that symbols matter, so having Micheletti out of the picture frame is important. But politically, Lobo remains trapped with no acceptable answer to the question, whose power is he going to receive on January 27?

[Thanks to chela for the heads' up on this story that I might otherwise have overlooked in a comment on a previous post].

PS: The little trip down memory lane to find a photo of the investiture of President Zelaya in 2006 also produced this interesting tidbit:

Thousands of Hondurans filled the National Stadium in Tegucigalpa, with a capacity of some 40,000 persons, to witness the passage of command from the exiting government official, Ricardo Maduro, of the National Party, to Manuel Zelaya, of the Liberal Party, both conservatives.

Miles de hondureños llenan el Estadio Nacional de Tegucigalpa, con aforo para unas 40.000 personas, para presenciar el traspaso de mando del gobernante saliente, Ricardo Maduro, del Partido Nacional, a Manuel Zelaya, del Partido Liberal, ambos conservadores.

A useful reality check in the face of over a year of propaganda, leading up to, facilitating, and then justifying the coup d'etat.

It's official: Lobo elected, turnout under 50%

AFP reports in Spanish from an hour ago that the official winner of the November Honduran presidential vote is Porfirio Lobo Sosa, credited with 56% of the vote (1.2 million votes).

As the article notes, Lobo's election is largely unrecognized, although of course, US recognition is probably the most important to him. More important, as AFP notes, some countries will condition their recognition on what happens before Lobo's inauguration: if he takes power from the de facto regime, he may still face a lack of recognition:

Up to now, only the US, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru have recognized the elections, although other countries, such as Chile, are analyzing whether to take that step after January 27, depending on how the transfer of power goes.

[hasta ahora sólo Estados Unidos, Costa Rica, Panamá y Perú han reconocido las elecciones, aunque otros países, como Chile, analizan dar ese paso luego del 27 de enero, dependiendo de cómo se dé el traspaso de poder]

Even the countries in Central America that have already said they will recognize the election are making demands that Lobo is not able to satisfy:

Costa Rica and Panama have asked Lobo to seek the resignation of the de facto president, Roberto Micheletti, as a way to achieve international recognition, but the latter has said that he does not plan to leave before the 27th of January.

[Costa Rica y Panamá han pedido a Lobo que busque la renuncia del presidente de facto Roberto Micheletti, como una forma de lograr reconocimiento internacional, pero éste ha dicho que no planea irse antes del 27 de enero.]

And of course, as we have documented in a previous post, and as reported by the AFP, the final turnout-- which does matter internationally as a measure of legitimacy-- was less the 50%.

So, enjoy your new status, President-elect Lobo...

Llorens Visits Zelaya

US ambassador Hugo Llorens paid a surprise visit to president Manuel Zelaya Rosales in the Brazilian embassy late yesterday. According to Rasel Tomé, a Zelaya spokesperson in the embassy, Llorens came to talk to Zelaya because Llorens is about to take a Christmas holiday, and to get Zelaya's official position on leaving the embassy. Tomé says that Zelaya made it clear that he was president until January 27, and that he would not leave the embassy under conditions that didn't acknowledge that (that is, the conditions proposed by the de facto government). Tomé added that "we continue working to bring about a dialogue in a neutral place and to resolve this crisis with dialogue."

100.07% And Still Counting

The Tribunal Supremo Electoral's website reporting results started off today reporting that 100.03 percent of the vote had been counted. Upon returning to it later in the day, it now reports results at 100.07 percent! They say they won't declare the results official until at least Tuesday, December 23 but we can make some points now, even if the vote totals change a little later.

The TSE has now counted 2,297,465 votes for president, for a 49.94% turnout. This is almost exactly the percentage vote projected on election day by NDI-Hagamos Democracia. So much for the exaggerated claims of 62% voting. And so much for CNN's December 5 proclamation that their analysis indicated a 56.6% turnout.

For the record, compare this with the 55% voter turnout for the 2005 presidential election of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales reported by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (The same source reported a level of 46% participation in Honduran congressional elections in 2005.)

There are 700,000 more voters on the official voting rolls today than in 2005, but only 107,000 more total votes were cast than in 2005. A variety of analysts have noted that the voter rolls probably include some names that should be purged, and have also pointed to limited opportunities for Hondurans abroad to vote. But even these effects would not justify claiming that the 2009 vote was "massive", the term used by the de facto regime and echoed in pro-election statements by other governments.

Spoiled and blank ballots each individually beat out any of the third party candidates by significant amounts. In the TSE final count, Porfirio Lobo is credited with 57%, Elvin Santos with 38%, and no other named candidate received more than 2%.

Spoiled and blank ballots constituted 155,584 of the total number of ballots this year. Some proportion of these are self-evidently votes of protest against the regime. For example, in the La Tribuna article noting the null/spoiled ballots, you'll see a picture of a spoiled ballot. Written across it are the words "Golpistas hijos de puta", definitely a protest vote. Carlos Romero, director of elections for the TSE lamented the large number of spoiled ballots since the TSE had invested 50 million lempiras ($2.6 million) in training the electoral officials and public education specifically to reduce the number of spoiled ballots.

Taking the spoiled and null ballots into account, there were just over 2.1 million valid votes counted, about what Boz expected if the downward trend in voting participation continued as it had over the last 5 elections.

This is far fewer valid votes than the 2.4 million Boz proposed would be needed for the golpistas to declare the election a solid endorsement of the coup. At the same time, it is far more than the 1.5 million valid votes that Boz argued would indicate the call to boycott elections had a major effect. Instead, the valid vote count falls in the middle ground between 1.7 and 2.3 million valid votes where Boz suggested both sides could claim victory, as indeed they have.

But by claiming "massive" voter turnout, now falsified by the TSE's own vote count; by trying to redefine the proportional turnout by arbitrarily deducting some number of voters they decided should not be counted; and by working so furiously to misrepresent the levels of participation; the de facto regime has shown that it felt it needed something far more definite than it got out of this election.

We would suggest that the relevant measure of whether this election met the expectations of the coup regime is somewhat different. Less than 50% of those listed as eligible voted in this election. Of that number, almost 7% turned in ballots that were blank or deliberately spoiled, meaning that the final presidential selection fell to about 43% of the electorate. The trend of alienation from governance that already existed in Honduras intensified with an election that was in no way free and fair.

The big difference this time: hundreds of thousands of people now count themselves as part of a resistance movement that will influence elections in the future. And that includes some large proportion of those who did not vote, or submitted spoiled or blank ballots, as well as those who stayed at home on election day. Porfirio Lobo has no mandate from the people, to add to his lack of influence in his own party and in Honduras' national government.

"Pragmatic" Human Rights

"A commitment to human rights starts with universal standards and holding everyone accountable to those standards." Hillary Clinton, Dec. 14, 2009.

In a Wilson Center event in Washington, D.C. on December 8, Craig Kelly reportedly said that "we [the State Department] spoke up very vocally about human rights abuses" [in Honduras], which Adrienne Pine called "a claim contradicted by reality" in her blog post about the event. It is worth delving into the details of actual US statements on human rights since the coup d'etat of June 28, especially now, as we watch the body count of resistance activists rise steadily.

First, we need to ask: what precisely is current US policy?

Speaking at Georgetown University on December 14, 2009, Hillary Clinton outlined the State Department's new Human Rights policy. I will only touch on the highlights and I urge the reader to go back and read all of Clinton's statements on pragmatic Human Rights.

The policy focuses on four key elements, Clinton tells us. The first element is stated in the quote that starts this post. In her speech Clinton outlined how the US is applying the standards to ourselves as well as others. This gives us moral authority, Clinton said, but the application of universal standards is variable. In some cases we will use them to publicly hold another government accountable, as (she said) in the case of the coup in Honduras, while in others we'll use it in "tough negotiations". Here she pointed to US dealings with China and Russia in particular. This element also involves getting foreign governments to put human rights into laws and embed them in government institutions.

"Second," she says, "we must be pragmatic and agile in pursuit of our human rights agenda - not compromising on our principles, but doing what is most likely to make them real." This includes using all the tools in the US arsenal, and when one approach doesn't work, coming up with others. Examples cited include cutting off Millennium Challenge Corp. grants to Madagascar. Here, Secretary Clinton quoted President Barack Obama, who said "We must try as best we can to balance isolation and engagement; pressure and incentives, so that human rights and dignity are advanced over time." This she calls "principled pragmatism."

The third element is that we will support change driven by citizens in their own communities, and the fourth element is that we will widen our focus.

So has the State Department been vocal in supporting human rights, and in denouncing human rights violations, in Honduras since the June 28 coup, as would be implied by the claim that the first element of "pragmatic" human rights, publicly holding another government accountable for universal principles, has been followed in US policy toward Honduras?

Not exactly. It appears instead, despite citing Honduras as the key example here, the record does not support the claim. At best, perhaps the US has chosen to use the quiet "tough negotiations" mode of the first element, cited in relation to China and Russia.

Here's what the statements on the State Department's own website show about their stance on human rights in Honduras since June 28.

On July 6, in the daily press briefing, Ian Kelly, in speaking about the OAS's action (which the US supported) to remove Honduras from participation in the OAS, said "[the suspension] does not relieve Honduras of its legal obligations to the organization, particularly full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." This was the day after Isis Murillo was shot to death by the military during a massive demonstration at Toncontin Airport in Tegucigalpa. Another 20 protest participants were treated for gunshot wounds at local hospitals.

On September 3, Phillip Crowley said "we remain concerned about human rights, intimidation by various- by the police, others, some episodes of violence." This statement was made while debate continued in public and in the State Department about whether to call the events of June 28 a military coup or not.

On September 28, Philip Crowley again shared the State Department's concern.

"Well, first of all, we are concerned about the issue of civil rights and human right in Honduras. It is having a significant impact on the Honduran people. But its also the reason why we have said clearly to the de facto regime that because of the environment on the ground, we will not recognize an electoral result as free and fair under the current circumstances."

This of course, was a statement made just after the de facto regime suspended constitutional guaranties, including the right of habeas corpus, for the 45 days leading up to the elections, and shut down opposition media. This is also one day before Lew Anselem suggested to the OAS, on our behalf, that we would recognize the results of the November 29 elections, regardless of what transpired in Honduras.

The State Department made no statement with respect to human rights in Honduras at all during the month of October.

On November 12, Ian Kelly professed not to know about the reports by the IACHR, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, on human rights abuses in Honduras and said he needed more information. This was in response to questions from the press in a discussion of Craig Kelly's return from a mission to Tegucigalpa in which he met with both Micheletti and Zelaya.

A week later, on November 19, in the daily press briefing, Kelly responded to a question asking if human rights was a concern in Honduras, given that he had just said it was central to US policy in the Hemisphere:

"It is. It has been and remains a concern. There have been a number of human rights violations since the coup, and we have consistently called on the regime to respect the rights of individual citizens. And we’ve been particularly concerned about some of the moves against the media. And the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is closely monitoring the situation. It has reported back to us about a number of allegations of arbitrary arrests, disproportionate use of force, and, in particular, restrictions on freedom of expression. So yeah, we are concerned about it."

This concern was reechoed in a statement by "a senior State Department Official", who briefed the press on November 20, saying:

"We have expressed concerns about human rights abuses under the de facto regime and will continue to do so. Those principles are very important.

Well, we’ve denounced several times the abuses that occur. There was a decree that the regime put in place which was lifted in part because of strong international protests. But there still are – we still do get reports. We have said repeatedly to the regime that they are to be held accountable for the actions that violate abuses. And I was in Honduras two days ago and I made a public statement calling on the regime to respect human rights, and also calling on all sides to refrain from provocation of violence. This is very important."

Finally, Arturo Valenzuela said, in a closed meeting of the OAS on November 23 that "we do view with concern reports of human rights violations and deliberate efforts to incite violence and confrontation on both sides of the political divide in Honduras that might taint the electoral process."

It is perhaps instructive to consider how the State Department has apparently used the newly articulated policy of four "elements" in Honduras with regards to human rights violations. While the State Department responded to direct questioning by reporters, it never actually issued an independent statement on human rights violations. We thus conclude that the State Department has chosen to employ the "quiet" mode on human rights in Honduras. It has not chosen to employ all of the options open to it under the second element, suspending only some of the aid it gave to Honduras, and doing so very late compared to other countries.

It is also possible to give at least a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the policy that has been newly articulated. If we judge by the evidence of continued violation of freedom of the press, and continued harassment of activists, the increasing number of assassinations, the quiet approach has failed. It has not stemmed a rising tide of human rights violations in Honduras.

Judged strictly on its own criteria, the State Department's new human rights policy, as outlined by Clinton, has been ineffective in Honduras. Human rights abuses have escalated in December. There has been no corresponding response from the State Department. It has not proved agile in either recognizing the failure of the current "quiet" strategy or agile in adopting a new strategy for holding the de facto regime accountable for the new round of human rights violations. What human rights principles does this policy profess? Clinton offered none.

Perhaps this is what is implied by having a "pragmatic" human rights policy. If so, it is hard to see how it constitutes any kind of advocacy for human rights.