(1) restore the constitutionally elected president
(2) remove from office all those who broke the law, including giving President Zelaya a fair trial on charges against him, and also against those institutions that acted illegally in fomenting and carrying out the coup and its aftermath
(3) agree to create a new Constitution that includes adequate mechanisms for its continuing reform
In her discussion of the role of the US, Saloman endorses the argument that the coup itself in some ways makes no sense, given that President Zelaya was almost out of office and that the Congress would have had to enact any call for a constitutional assembly:
What is odd about the case is that the constitutional president only had seven months of his term left, neither of the presidential candidates have leftist inclinationes, and furthermore there was not even a remote threat that the president would convene a national constituent assembly (the actions themselves invalidate this threat, but it is so laughable that it is almost impossible to believe: supporting (yes or no) the placement of a fourth ballot box in the general elections in November, to vote for the installation of a national constituent assembly to review and create a new Constitution of the Republic. Creating it would be under the authority of the National Congress and never of the President of the Republic because he does not have these duties).This continues to be one of the key questions: what was really so frightening to the power elites Saloman describes so well?