[NOTE: comments on this post from October asked us to try to find a way to keep it at the top of the blog. We found a somewhat odd way to achieve that goal. Let us know if this is too weird-- welcome to the future-- RAJ]
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Elections: reject, accept, or other?
In his usual thought-provoking way, boz offers a counter to the more widespread progressive position on the upcoming Honduran elections, outlining
Zelaya and his government have suggested one such alternative, which boz rejects. That would involved rescheduling the election, allowing the outcome of congressional consideration of reinstating the president to precede the election. The main legal problem with rescheduling the election for sometime between now and the mandated inaugural date in January is that it violates the constitution, but not a clause that is unchangeable. The main pragmatic problem with rescheduling the election for later is that it is expensive. But this is surely something the international community could help with.
But boz's concerns with this involve neither of these, but rather, a purely political issue: what happens if the congress does not vote to reinstate Zelaya?
Under the terms of the (now-repudiated) Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord, this was a risk President Zelaya accepted, so at that point, if he objected, it would be reasonable for the international community to change their position on the elections.
I think there should be no mystery about what would happen in this hypothetical scenario: the negotiation for the unity and national reconciliation government would have one fewer option for who should head the government, being forced to choose between Micheletti or a third party.
(This is, for me, one of the main reasons proceeding with forming that government before the decision about Zelaya is made makes no sense. If we accept that a unity government is negotiated between the parties, not imposed by one on the other, then one of the things up for negotiation is who would head it? a decision on Zelaya was therefore critical since without that, how would negotiators know if he would be accepted as head? for that matter: how do you ask prospective cabinet ministers to serve in a government whose head they do not know?)
Now, as I said, the call for postponing elections is one alternative to recognizing the November 29 exercise or rejecting it. The constitutional issues are open to solution by passing a congressional amendment to allow a delay in this year's election. But let's accept that getting Congress to do this is even more unlikely than getting them to vote on restoring Zelaya in advance of the election (which I personally think they are reluctant to do not because Zelaya could disrupt the election, but because voting on the record could be used against them in the campaign).
I still have problems with boz's suggestion that we accept an imperfect election and the will of the (slim) majority of the Honduran people, and get on with an election so new leadership can be put in place; and accept the (counter-factual) assertion that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Micheletti government; and acknowledge that the candidates running were all selected prior to the coup (ignoring the barriers placed in the way of many candidates by the imposed restraints on civil liberties) and that there are local and congressional elections at stake as well as the presidency.
I do not see that what follows is that accepting the November 29 elections under the de facto regime will actually accomplish what he hopes they will:
I think there is a fundamental contradiction in the utopian hope boz expresses that
Elections held under an illegal government taint the outcome for a considerable proportion of the population: and yes, the number who do not want elections is a minority, but it is a large minority.
Democracies are at their best concerned with ensuring that even minorities believe that the process that brought political opponents to office was fair. And I think there is no doubt that for those who oppose the de facto regime and want to see the president who was elected in 2005 restored to complete his term in office, the very notion of democracy has been damaged in ways that a recognizably more-imperfect-than-normal election will not heal.
So here's another option to add to the either/or of recognizing/rejecting the November 29 elections: if we agree that international observers will make little difference on the ground; and accepting that the de facto regime will play out this election no matter what; and acknowledging that the TSE will validate election results that a large number of Honduras will think resulted from fraud, no matter what else happens; there is still a kernel of truth to this one sentence in boz's post:
Recognizing the elections of November legitimates the de facto regime and whitewashes the coup d'etat of June 28.
This would weaken, not strengthen, any claim to democratic representation that might be made by the president-elect.
Meanwhile, it does absolutely no harm to that future Honduran government-- and much potential good-- if they remain unrecognized between November and January. The international community could use that time to discuss what conditions would need to be met by the (now safely elected) government of 2010-2014 to ensure that Honduras merits re-admission to the OAS, and acceptance as a legitimate state. And the lack of recognition of the de facto regime could allow the next government to move away from the authors of the coup in a clearer way. Think of the rhetorical power that might come if the person declared the winner of the November election condemned the coup d'etat that cast doubt on his election.
Among the issues I would like to see on the table in such a scenario would be acknowledging that the coup d'etat was extra-legal; dismissal of the politically motivated prosecutions of opposition government officials that has ramped up under the de facto regime from an already unacceptable level; and repudiation of the militarization of society that has led to deaths, beatings, and intimidation for thousands of Hondurans-- a minority, yes, but a minority that deserves protection under the law, and a minority that disproportionately represents sectors such as social activists, gender rights activists and people of alternative sexual status, indigenous leaders, and union activists.
As long as we are engaging in hypothetical arguments about possible routes to democracy, I prefer one that does not include ever giving Roberto Micheletti and those propping him up, including the military, the imprimatur of the international community.
the case for not rejecting elections in Honduras (note the double negative is on purpose), even if elections are not an ideal solution.His argument has the following points (and I urge others to read them before reading the rest of my post; go ahead, I can wait): moving on; new leadership; beyond the presidency; don't prejudge; most Hondurans want elections; imperfect elections recognized all the time; and, for my purposes, the money paragraph:
Better than the alternative. Canceling or postponing elections is a serious action. If they're canceled, and the de facto government refuses to reinstitute Zelaya, then what? Micheletti remains as president? New president is named by Congress? Assuming the coup government won't let Zelaya return, the options other than elections are worse than holding an imperfect election. Those options definitely lead away democracy, while elections at least open the possibility for reestablishing democracy.I want to suggest that whatever the merits of the other points, this one misses another possibility: maybe there are more than two alternatives; more than the two bad choices of recognizing an election conducted under extreme repression and violation of the rule of law, or rejecting it and with it the possibility of a future resolution for the innocent millions.
Zelaya and his government have suggested one such alternative, which boz rejects. That would involved rescheduling the election, allowing the outcome of congressional consideration of reinstating the president to precede the election. The main legal problem with rescheduling the election for sometime between now and the mandated inaugural date in January is that it violates the constitution, but not a clause that is unchangeable. The main pragmatic problem with rescheduling the election for later is that it is expensive. But this is surely something the international community could help with.
But boz's concerns with this involve neither of these, but rather, a purely political issue: what happens if the congress does not vote to reinstate Zelaya?
Under the terms of the (now-repudiated) Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord, this was a risk President Zelaya accepted, so at that point, if he objected, it would be reasonable for the international community to change their position on the elections.
I think there should be no mystery about what would happen in this hypothetical scenario: the negotiation for the unity and national reconciliation government would have one fewer option for who should head the government, being forced to choose between Micheletti or a third party.
(This is, for me, one of the main reasons proceeding with forming that government before the decision about Zelaya is made makes no sense. If we accept that a unity government is negotiated between the parties, not imposed by one on the other, then one of the things up for negotiation is who would head it? a decision on Zelaya was therefore critical since without that, how would negotiators know if he would be accepted as head? for that matter: how do you ask prospective cabinet ministers to serve in a government whose head they do not know?)
Now, as I said, the call for postponing elections is one alternative to recognizing the November 29 exercise or rejecting it. The constitutional issues are open to solution by passing a congressional amendment to allow a delay in this year's election. But let's accept that getting Congress to do this is even more unlikely than getting them to vote on restoring Zelaya in advance of the election (which I personally think they are reluctant to do not because Zelaya could disrupt the election, but because voting on the record could be used against them in the campaign).
I still have problems with boz's suggestion that we accept an imperfect election and the will of the (slim) majority of the Honduran people, and get on with an election so new leadership can be put in place; and accept the (counter-factual) assertion that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Micheletti government; and acknowledge that the candidates running were all selected prior to the coup (ignoring the barriers placed in the way of many candidates by the imposed restraints on civil liberties) and that there are local and congressional elections at stake as well as the presidency.
I do not see that what follows is that accepting the November 29 elections under the de facto regime will actually accomplish what he hopes they will:
New people make it more likely we can move past the ugly politics of the last five months.Unfortunately, the two major candidates still in the race are by no means "new people". Each is closely tied to the coup, and either will suffer from the legacy of his participation in government before and after June 28. The coup will remain a spectral presence in Honduras long past January 2010, just as previous coups continue to shape the attitudes of the people.
I think there is a fundamental contradiction in the utopian hope boz expresses that
elections at least open the possibility for reestablishing democracy.Depends what we mean by "democracy": and it is this very thing that has been at issue in the Zelaya administration's attempt to move from a rigged representational democracy to a democracy with broader popular participation.
Elections held under an illegal government taint the outcome for a considerable proportion of the population: and yes, the number who do not want elections is a minority, but it is a large minority.
Democracies are at their best concerned with ensuring that even minorities believe that the process that brought political opponents to office was fair. And I think there is no doubt that for those who oppose the de facto regime and want to see the president who was elected in 2005 restored to complete his term in office, the very notion of democracy has been damaged in ways that a recognizably more-imperfect-than-normal election will not heal.
So here's another option to add to the either/or of recognizing/rejecting the November 29 elections: if we agree that international observers will make little difference on the ground; and accepting that the de facto regime will play out this election no matter what; and acknowledging that the TSE will validate election results that a large number of Honduras will think resulted from fraud, no matter what else happens; there is still a kernel of truth to this one sentence in boz's post:
I think dealing with Lobo or Santos once they have been elected by a majority of Hondurans will be easier than dealing with Micheletti.Yes. So why not wait until whoever is "elected" in November is inaugurated in January before making any moves to recognize the government?
Recognizing the elections of November legitimates the de facto regime and whitewashes the coup d'etat of June 28.
This would weaken, not strengthen, any claim to democratic representation that might be made by the president-elect.
Meanwhile, it does absolutely no harm to that future Honduran government-- and much potential good-- if they remain unrecognized between November and January. The international community could use that time to discuss what conditions would need to be met by the (now safely elected) government of 2010-2014 to ensure that Honduras merits re-admission to the OAS, and acceptance as a legitimate state. And the lack of recognition of the de facto regime could allow the next government to move away from the authors of the coup in a clearer way. Think of the rhetorical power that might come if the person declared the winner of the November election condemned the coup d'etat that cast doubt on his election.
Among the issues I would like to see on the table in such a scenario would be acknowledging that the coup d'etat was extra-legal; dismissal of the politically motivated prosecutions of opposition government officials that has ramped up under the de facto regime from an already unacceptable level; and repudiation of the militarization of society that has led to deaths, beatings, and intimidation for thousands of Hondurans-- a minority, yes, but a minority that deserves protection under the law, and a minority that disproportionately represents sectors such as social activists, gender rights activists and people of alternative sexual status, indigenous leaders, and union activists.
As long as we are engaging in hypothetical arguments about possible routes to democracy, I prefer one that does not include ever giving Roberto Micheletti and those propping him up, including the military, the imprimatur of the international community.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Guatemala will not recognize elections; El Heraldo complains
Even pro-coup media like El Heraldo have to report the news when it is this clear; Guatemala will not recognize the elections.
So, how did this pro-coup outlet spin the clear and principled stand of Guatemala-- which I defy any of our commentators to dismiss as merely a leftist dupe (while recognizing they likely will reject it as a country of no importance, continuing to exhibit their "pragmatism" which in fact is an embrace of a specific global political order)?
Simple: Guatemala's declaration described the decision as in agreement with the OAS position. The Heraldo report then goes on to say
More: this noxious little story goes on to spread the big lie that everyone in Honduras is firmly committed to going to the polls:
The surrealism of the pro-coup spin continues with one sad line:
So, how did this pro-coup outlet spin the clear and principled stand of Guatemala-- which I defy any of our commentators to dismiss as merely a leftist dupe (while recognizing they likely will reject it as a country of no importance, continuing to exhibit their "pragmatism" which in fact is an embrace of a specific global political order)?
Simple: Guatemala's declaration described the decision as in agreement with the OAS position. The Heraldo report then goes on to say
It is worth pointing out that the secretary general of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, aserted on numerous occasions that he would endorse the elections if the Hondurans achieved an accord, which they did, to resolve the political crisis.In other words: OAS is going back on its promise to recognize elections as long as there was an accord; because the official story in Honduras is that Zelaya was the one who broke faith with the accord. While the international community, including OAS and members of the verification commission, say otherwise, don't expect the pro-coup media to cover that.
The accord was signed but Manuel Zelaya, on understanding that it was unfavorable, decided not to send the list of candidates to make up the Cabinet of Unity and National Reconciliation.
More: this noxious little story goes on to spread the big lie that everyone in Honduras is firmly committed to going to the polls:
In Honduras, all the political, economic, and social sectors maintain firm their position to go to the polls the 29th of November, in the way that the Constitution of the Republic ordains.Now, outside Honduras, we know that isn't true, because we have seen the letter from 300+ candidates withdrawing from congressional and local races, and the statement of the Frente de Resistencia about not participating. But of course, these do not constitute part of the "political and social sectors" recognized by the editors of the pro-coup newspapers. But surely, some of their readers will put two and two together and wonder, if this is true, why are there those reports of the police putting together lists of people to be picked up for advocating election boycotts?
The surrealism of the pro-coup spin continues with one sad line:
The US maintains firm its position to recognize the process.
Yes indeed. Notice what has been lost in translation and left along the side of the long road down for US policy: apparently, we will recognize the elections no matter what; fraud or no fraud; violence of no violence. Of course, we have been honing our ability to recognize new governments that result from fraudulent elections while trying simultaneously to take the high moral ground recently, so maybe State will manage the miracle of recognition without approval that seems to be the new normal here.
And we cannot leave out the next piece of the Heraldo's attempt to minimize the statement of the government of Guatemala that it will not recognize the elections:
On Guatemala's part, the elections will be observed by members of the Committee of Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations.
So there, official government: we don't need you, we have your businessmen and bankers. New world order, anyone?
Friday, November 20, 2009
Channel 36 Off Air Again
Channel 36, Cholusat Sur, has been kicked off the air by "interference" with its signal, technology the de facto government sought to purchase in El Salvador right after the coup. Basically what's going on is that the de facto government has brought up a transmitter on the same frequency as that of Cholusat Sur, blocking its signal. The rogue transmitter is broadcasting cowboy movies and pornography according to station owner Esdras Amado López.
Lopez filed a complaint today with CONATEL.
This, by the way, is why "access by candidates to the media" is a good criterion, but not a very complete criteria to use to judge the freeness and transparency of the elections.
Lopez filed a complaint today with CONATEL.
This, by the way, is why "access by candidates to the media" is a good criterion, but not a very complete criteria to use to judge the freeness and transparency of the elections.
Micheletti Fools State Department
RAJ and I wondered last night as we drove home, who the intended audience for Micheletti's rather empty gesture was. To refresh your memory, what Roberto Micheletti offered to consider doing was step out of the public spotlight for a week, but first, he would have to consult with everyone. Its a hollow offer because its only an offer to step out of the public spotlight, not to step aside from office. As his Minister of the presidency, Rafael Pineda noted, "he will only absent himself from public functions, not necessarily from the responsibilities to administer the interests of state."
We couldn't see an internal audience for Micheletti's statement, so assumed an international audience was intended. Indeed, because of the way the statement was crafted, using subjunctives, we wondered who would be suckered into thinking he was actually leaving the presidency for 8 days?
Manuel Zelaya called it a "maneuver for misleading fools." The Brazilian Chancellor, Celso Amorim, said of Micheletti's proposal "from a legal point of view, he never should have been in the government." But the US State Department took the bait. Robert Wood, a State Department spokesman, said today, "We welcome that he is going to take a leave of absence and expect its prompt implementation. This will allow some breathing space for the process in Honduras to go forward." Sigh.
Update 3:00 PM PDT: Apparently I'm right. The State Department was fooled by Micheletti's statement into thinking he was abdicating control of the government while he was "absent". Here's the exchange from today's daily press briefing that provides the damning evidence of their ignorance:
QUESTION: And who runs the country while Mr. Micheletti is on vacation?
MR. WOOD: That’s a good question. I don’t really know the answer to that. I’m sure there is one and I’ll try and get one.
The answer Mr. Wood, is that Roberto Micheletti runs the country while he's on this so called "vacation". I refer you to the statements of his Minister of the Presidency, quoted above.
We couldn't see an internal audience for Micheletti's statement, so assumed an international audience was intended. Indeed, because of the way the statement was crafted, using subjunctives, we wondered who would be suckered into thinking he was actually leaving the presidency for 8 days?
Manuel Zelaya called it a "maneuver for misleading fools." The Brazilian Chancellor, Celso Amorim, said of Micheletti's proposal "from a legal point of view, he never should have been in the government." But the US State Department took the bait. Robert Wood, a State Department spokesman, said today, "We welcome that he is going to take a leave of absence and expect its prompt implementation. This will allow some breathing space for the process in Honduras to go forward." Sigh.
Update 3:00 PM PDT: Apparently I'm right. The State Department was fooled by Micheletti's statement into thinking he was abdicating control of the government while he was "absent". Here's the exchange from today's daily press briefing that provides the damning evidence of their ignorance:
QUESTION: And who runs the country while Mr. Micheletti is on vacation?
MR. WOOD: That’s a good question. I don’t really know the answer to that. I’m sure there is one and I’ll try and get one.
The answer Mr. Wood, is that Roberto Micheletti runs the country while he's on this so called "vacation". I refer you to the statements of his Minister of the Presidency, quoted above.
Thursday, November 19, 2009
State Department Discovers Human Rights Concerns
On November 13, State Department spokesperson Ian Kelly was asked for US reaction to the Human Rights conditions in Honduras since the coup. He professed total ignorance of the reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and even the IACHR. Here's the exchange from the October 13 daily press briefing:
QUESTION: A follow-up on Honduras. What does the U.S. think about the human rights situation there right now? There have been mass arrests, curfews, an emergency decree, and a ban on protests and media closures for three weeks during the presidential campaign. Does that undermine the electoral process, in the view of the U.S.?
MR. KELLY: Regarding the – well, first of all, our real priority here is to see this accord implemented step by step. We’ve only gotten through step one, and we need step two and step three to be implemented.
Regarding the – these reports, I’m actually not aware of these reports of any actions to – you say ban rallies and – no, I’m not just aware of those reports. I think that we would need to have more details about it for us to really comment on it.
Just to remind you, the Minister of Security issued an administrative rule on October 21 that prohibited all public gatherings, be they birthday parties or political rallies, without prior notification and permission of the National Police. Executive decree 124-2009, published on October 5, enjoined the military to monitor radio and television broadcasts and to denounce those of "general abhorrence" to CONATEL so that their broadcast licenses can be revoked.
Today the State Department suddenly expressed Human Rights concerns about the situation in Honduras since the coup, and claimed they've always had these concerns.
It all started with a question about a Human Rights Watch report on conditions in Cuba. Kelly replied that "human rights is at the center of our Cuban policy." He went on to elaborate that "So this is a real priority for the United States, and it will continue to be so." The questioner, seeking clarity asked, "Is that - human rights in the hemisphere?" to which Kelly replied, "Sure." Then the questioner reminded Kelly of his being asked about Human Rights in Honduras last week.
QUESTION: I believe last week, or maybe a little bit before then, you were asked about human rights abuses in Honduras, and reports from the same organization that Dave just mentioned as well as Amnesty International and local human rights groups who have catalogued 4,234 violations since the coup, including 21 murders, or executions as they call them.
There are growing calls from trade union movement here for the U.S. not to recognize the elections unless these things are corrected. Is this something of concern to you guys?
MR. KELLY: It is. It has been and remains a concern. There have been a number of human rights violations since the coup, and we have consistently called on the regime to respect the rights of individual citizens. And we’ve been particularly concerned about some of the moves against the media. And the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is closely monitoring the situation. It has reported back to us about a number of allegations of arbitrary arrests, disproportionate use of force, and, in particular, restrictions on freedom of expression. So yeah, we are concerned about it.
So somewhere between last week and this week, the State Department discovered to its surprise that Human Rights violations were going on in Honduras, that "it has and remains a concern."
However, in response to the question of what they're doing about it, if it's a concern, the reply was "we're monitoring very very closely." Makes you warm and fuzzy all over.
When asked if the media restrictions and human rights violations have any bearing on recognition of the elections, Kelly at first allowed as how "The lack of freedom of media, of course, is an important – would be an important indicator of this", the "this" being the freedom and transparency of the Honduran elections. He took it all back a few minutes later when he said "we’ll look at restrictions on the media, particularly restrictions of access to candidates in the campaign before the elections themselves."
Sure, one important thing is access by the candidates to media. So its good to hear that the US State Department cares about that.
But the bigger issue is more fundamental: restrictions on what the media can say, with the threat of losing their license hanging over them everyone freedom of speech.
QUESTION: A follow-up on Honduras. What does the U.S. think about the human rights situation there right now? There have been mass arrests, curfews, an emergency decree, and a ban on protests and media closures for three weeks during the presidential campaign. Does that undermine the electoral process, in the view of the U.S.?
MR. KELLY: Regarding the – well, first of all, our real priority here is to see this accord implemented step by step. We’ve only gotten through step one, and we need step two and step three to be implemented.
Regarding the – these reports, I’m actually not aware of these reports of any actions to – you say ban rallies and – no, I’m not just aware of those reports. I think that we would need to have more details about it for us to really comment on it.
Just to remind you, the Minister of Security issued an administrative rule on October 21 that prohibited all public gatherings, be they birthday parties or political rallies, without prior notification and permission of the National Police. Executive decree 124-2009, published on October 5, enjoined the military to monitor radio and television broadcasts and to denounce those of "general abhorrence" to CONATEL so that their broadcast licenses can be revoked.
Today the State Department suddenly expressed Human Rights concerns about the situation in Honduras since the coup, and claimed they've always had these concerns.
It all started with a question about a Human Rights Watch report on conditions in Cuba. Kelly replied that "human rights is at the center of our Cuban policy." He went on to elaborate that "So this is a real priority for the United States, and it will continue to be so." The questioner, seeking clarity asked, "Is that - human rights in the hemisphere?" to which Kelly replied, "Sure." Then the questioner reminded Kelly of his being asked about Human Rights in Honduras last week.
QUESTION: I believe last week, or maybe a little bit before then, you were asked about human rights abuses in Honduras, and reports from the same organization that Dave just mentioned as well as Amnesty International and local human rights groups who have catalogued 4,234 violations since the coup, including 21 murders, or executions as they call them.
There are growing calls from trade union movement here for the U.S. not to recognize the elections unless these things are corrected. Is this something of concern to you guys?
MR. KELLY: It is. It has been and remains a concern. There have been a number of human rights violations since the coup, and we have consistently called on the regime to respect the rights of individual citizens. And we’ve been particularly concerned about some of the moves against the media. And the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is closely monitoring the situation. It has reported back to us about a number of allegations of arbitrary arrests, disproportionate use of force, and, in particular, restrictions on freedom of expression. So yeah, we are concerned about it.
So somewhere between last week and this week, the State Department discovered to its surprise that Human Rights violations were going on in Honduras, that "it has and remains a concern."
However, in response to the question of what they're doing about it, if it's a concern, the reply was "we're monitoring very very closely." Makes you warm and fuzzy all over.
When asked if the media restrictions and human rights violations have any bearing on recognition of the elections, Kelly at first allowed as how "The lack of freedom of media, of course, is an important – would be an important indicator of this", the "this" being the freedom and transparency of the Honduran elections. He took it all back a few minutes later when he said "we’ll look at restrictions on the media, particularly restrictions of access to candidates in the campaign before the elections themselves."
Sure, one important thing is access by the candidates to media. So its good to hear that the US State Department cares about that.
But the bigger issue is more fundamental: restrictions on what the media can say, with the threat of losing their license hanging over them everyone freedom of speech.
MIsguided readers speak...
and sometimes, the comments they make require a more formal response. This is one of those times.
Someone calling himself "Patrick" has taken the time today, between 2:53 and 5:17 PM, to comment on three recent posts: One reflecting the incredulity of reporters in an Ian Kelly press conference; one on the continuing saga of the report not yet received from the Honduran Supreme Court; and one on the positions of Brazil and Argentina on elections. We assume he is catching up on his reading; and he did not like what he read.
Here's what he had to say, with increasing terseness and we think it is fair to intuit, emotion, first about our pointing out that reporters found Ian Kelly's press briefing unsatisfactory:
But then there are comments by people like Patrick, who appears to be speaking as a Honduran ("Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy") but as one of the Hondurans who suffer the consequences of the drumbeat of negative press coverage that spread outright lies and vague insinuations about the president for more than a year before the coup ("Zelaya spent more taxpayer money on his horse than he did on any needy person").
Patrick is, in our view, more likely to be misinformed than to actually be a committed supporter of the destruction of the rule of law and constitutional order, and while we suspect it is very unlikely that he is willing to listen to more context than the Honduran press has served up, we continue to try to respond to him, and others like him.
But it is very hard because wrapped into comments like these are a world of assumptions that normally cannot be unraveled in the length of a responding comment. And responding to one comment after another, submitted in reply to a variety of posts, but in fact not dealing with their real content-- simply spreading out over that space an aggrieved narrative-- hardly gets to the heart of things.
Patrick is angry with us because we are not accepting the pro-coup propaganda. He wants us, and people like us, to simply accept his counter-to-reality claims and leave Honduras alone. He is echoing in tone, if not directly in words, the frightening declarations that Roberto Micheletti made when the OAS voted to suspend Honduras' membership, that rejected the world community and suggested Honduras forge on alone-- out of touch with the present, out of touch with reality.
But we want Patrick, and people like him, to pay attention to the actual facts. So, here for the record is a deconstruction and fact-checking of his comments:
The Tegucigalpa Accord is, as President Zelaya noted in his eloquent letter to President Obama, a single accord, with twelve points. So there can be no partial completion of that Accord. International recognition of elections is thus dependent on the good-faith completion of the other points of the Accord. This is the error that Thomas Shannon committed, in my view: he ssumed that the de facto regime would follow through on the requirement for there to be a vote in the Congress on the restoral of President Zelaya. While, as he said at the time, President Zelaya took the risk that the Congress would vote against him, a vote before the elections, ideally before the deadline to form the government of unity and reconciliation, would have kept the accord as a whole on target. Why did that not happen? well, Patrick has another point to make here:
Thus when Partrick says
Micheletti's unilateral attempt to establish a reconciliation and unity government was criticized and rejected by the OAS, the government of Spain, by Oscar Arias, and by Ricardo Lagos of the Verification Commission, to name just a few. This, along with the failure of the de facto regime to persuade the Congress to act, or (more forthrightly) to convene Congress in a special session, is what "broke the accord". Of course, if Patrick does not read the one paper in Honduras with more balanced coverage (Tiempo), or listen to the free radio stations, he cannot be blamed for thinking the opposite is true: the coup-supporting press echoed Roberto Micheletti's claim that Zelaya was obligated to provide Micheletti names for a "unity" cabinet that Micheletti would then get to select, for a government he would head himself. But this interpretation of what the Accord called for has been rejected by the verification commission and the international community. Even the US has not endorsed it.
Based on his certainty that what the biased media have told him is right, Patrick, and misguided people like him, also believe that President Zelaya is unpopular and that few Hondurans support him and the positions he represents:
Earlier in October, polling by Consultants in Investigation of Markets and Public Opinion found 52% of Hondurans disapproved of the coup d'etat. 51% wanted President Zelaya restored (versus 33% opposed). President Zelaya and First Lady Xiomara Castro de Zelaya were ranked the two most favorably judged political figures in the country.
CID Gallup poll data from shortly after the coup also indicated that more people disapproved of the coup than supported it; and that President Zelaya enjoyed more support than Roberto Micheletti.
So really, no: it is not just a handful of people who are opposed to the coup, who want the elected government restored, and who actually approve of President Zelaya's actions in office.
Patrick offers some strange arguments against the need to restore the elected President before the November 29 elections that again are based on propaganda positions of the de facto regime:
This comment suggests that the reason for restoring the President has something to do with campaigning. This confusion seems actually to be shared, at times, by Ian Kelly of the US State Department, so again, who can blame poor Patrick? So note well: President Zelaya is not on the ballot, and never would have been; Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party is running, and always was, away from the President who he served as Vice President.
While President Zelaya has not been reported, in any medium I have seen, to have "left his liberal party", he has called for its reformation, and that call is supported by a number of Liberal Party congress members. As for "the party that supports him": presumably a reference to the UD, this ignores the fact that reform-minded congress members and local politicians from Liberal and PINU parties join the non-partisan Frente de Resistencia in rejecting the legitimacy of the present electoral process because the constitutional order has not been restored. How big a constituency is this? that is the great unknown that might become more knowable if alternative means to estimate the number boycotting the election are feasible.
Meanwhile, for Patrick, as for other commentators who want the whole thing to be over by holding an election (apparently including the US Department of State) it is an inconvenient fact that more world governments have announced that they absolutely will not recognize the election than have announced categorically that they will. So people like Patrick are left having to argue against particular governments or even clusters of governments. Thus Patrick says
For Patrick and his ilk, there is only one world government that matters:
But this is just almost the saddest part of Patrick's comments.
The truly saddest thing I read is the following statement, which suggests that Patrick cannot imagine a Honduras where free speech is allowed without danger of the imposition of curfews and free assembly is possible without prior registration with the police; where a political disagreement among branches of government could be settled in the courts and with due process, not by the Armed Forces in avowed violation of the constitution; and that Patrick doesn't have any idea what it would mean to have a free press, accountable political parties, and true representative democracy:
Someone calling himself "Patrick" has taken the time today, between 2:53 and 5:17 PM, to comment on three recent posts: One reflecting the incredulity of reporters in an Ian Kelly press conference; one on the continuing saga of the report not yet received from the Honduran Supreme Court; and one on the positions of Brazil and Argentina on elections. We assume he is catching up on his reading; and he did not like what he read.
Here's what he had to say, with increasing terseness and we think it is fair to intuit, emotion, first about our pointing out that reporters found Ian Kelly's press briefing unsatisfactory:
I listened to Shannon in Spanish and it was very clear that the elections and the restoration of Zelaya are two different issues per the accord that the Zelaya camp signed. How can you call this incredulous when only a handful of Hondurans want Zelaya back in office. What does Zelaya bring to the elections? He left his liberal party and the party that supports him is lucky to get 2% of the vote. Zelaya broke the accord, just as he has broken every previous agreement from when he was in office. Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy. Zelaya spent more taxpayer money on his horse than he did on any needy person.Next, he commented on our first Supreme Court post of the day:
Why should the courts rush, Congress is not in session as is normal before an election. Zelaya is in a state of limbo due to his ill planned entry into Honduras. He tried to make it to the United Nations building and when he saw the police there to arrest him he knocked on the Brazilian embassy door and became an uninvited guest. Now he is going to spend the next twenty years there being president.Finally, Patrick provides his response to the announcement that Brazil and Argentina will not recognize the November 29 elections:
Honduras follows the U.S. through thick and thin. Argentina is a questionable government.We adopted moderation of comments from the beginning to avoid the common internet disease of violent discourse. We routinely reject the comments that froth at the mouth and accuse Zelaya (and often, us) of being communists spreading dictatorship around the world. Those are clearly adding nothing to debate.
But then there are comments by people like Patrick, who appears to be speaking as a Honduran ("Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy") but as one of the Hondurans who suffer the consequences of the drumbeat of negative press coverage that spread outright lies and vague insinuations about the president for more than a year before the coup ("Zelaya spent more taxpayer money on his horse than he did on any needy person").
Patrick is, in our view, more likely to be misinformed than to actually be a committed supporter of the destruction of the rule of law and constitutional order, and while we suspect it is very unlikely that he is willing to listen to more context than the Honduran press has served up, we continue to try to respond to him, and others like him.
But it is very hard because wrapped into comments like these are a world of assumptions that normally cannot be unraveled in the length of a responding comment. And responding to one comment after another, submitted in reply to a variety of posts, but in fact not dealing with their real content-- simply spreading out over that space an aggrieved narrative-- hardly gets to the heart of things.
Patrick is angry with us because we are not accepting the pro-coup propaganda. He wants us, and people like us, to simply accept his counter-to-reality claims and leave Honduras alone. He is echoing in tone, if not directly in words, the frightening declarations that Roberto Micheletti made when the OAS voted to suspend Honduras' membership, that rejected the world community and suggested Honduras forge on alone-- out of touch with the present, out of touch with reality.
But we want Patrick, and people like him, to pay attention to the actual facts. So, here for the record is a deconstruction and fact-checking of his comments:
I listened to Shannon in Spanish and it was very clear that the elections and the restoration of Zelaya are two different issues per the accord that the Zelaya camp signed.First remember that this is a comment on our blog posting about Ian Kelly's press briefing. Not about Thomas Shannon's unfortunate Spanish-language interview, in which he gave the de facto regime new hope by stating prematurely that now that the Tegucigalpa Accord was signed, the US would recognize the Honduran elections no matter what.
The Tegucigalpa Accord is, as President Zelaya noted in his eloquent letter to President Obama, a single accord, with twelve points. So there can be no partial completion of that Accord. International recognition of elections is thus dependent on the good-faith completion of the other points of the Accord. This is the error that Thomas Shannon committed, in my view: he ssumed that the de facto regime would follow through on the requirement for there to be a vote in the Congress on the restoral of President Zelaya. While, as he said at the time, President Zelaya took the risk that the Congress would vote against him, a vote before the elections, ideally before the deadline to form the government of unity and reconciliation, would have kept the accord as a whole on target. Why did that not happen? well, Patrick has another point to make here:
Why should the courts rush, Congress is not in session as is normal before an electionThe Honduran Congress was not in session on October 30, the deadline for the Tegucigalpa Accord to be delivered for its consideration. But that was because Roberto Micheletti had dismissed it before the normal end of the session. More important: the head of the executive branch has the authority to call Congress for an extraordinary session, so Roberto Micheletti could have convened Congress for that purpose. His refusal to do so blocked the consideration of the Accord by the Congress.
Thus when Partrick says
Zelaya broke the accordthis is simply not true.
Micheletti's unilateral attempt to establish a reconciliation and unity government was criticized and rejected by the OAS, the government of Spain, by Oscar Arias, and by Ricardo Lagos of the Verification Commission, to name just a few. This, along with the failure of the de facto regime to persuade the Congress to act, or (more forthrightly) to convene Congress in a special session, is what "broke the accord". Of course, if Patrick does not read the one paper in Honduras with more balanced coverage (Tiempo), or listen to the free radio stations, he cannot be blamed for thinking the opposite is true: the coup-supporting press echoed Roberto Micheletti's claim that Zelaya was obligated to provide Micheletti names for a "unity" cabinet that Micheletti would then get to select, for a government he would head himself. But this interpretation of what the Accord called for has been rejected by the verification commission and the international community. Even the US has not endorsed it.
Based on his certainty that what the biased media have told him is right, Patrick, and misguided people like him, also believe that President Zelaya is unpopular and that few Hondurans support him and the positions he represents:
How can you call this incredulous when only a handful of Hondurans want Zelaya back in office.In reality, repeated polls have shown otherwise. Most recently, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner found that Hondurans disapproved of the removal of the President from office on June 28 by a margin of 60% to 38%. 67% of respondents rated the job performance of President Zelaya as excellent or good, as opposed to 31% rating his job performance bad or poor. In contrast, by a margin of 72% to 27%, respondents did not approve of Micheletti staying on as President.
Earlier in October, polling by Consultants in Investigation of Markets and Public Opinion found 52% of Hondurans disapproved of the coup d'etat. 51% wanted President Zelaya restored (versus 33% opposed). President Zelaya and First Lady Xiomara Castro de Zelaya were ranked the two most favorably judged political figures in the country.
CID Gallup poll data from shortly after the coup also indicated that more people disapproved of the coup than supported it; and that President Zelaya enjoyed more support than Roberto Micheletti.
So really, no: it is not just a handful of people who are opposed to the coup, who want the elected government restored, and who actually approve of President Zelaya's actions in office.
Patrick offers some strange arguments against the need to restore the elected President before the November 29 elections that again are based on propaganda positions of the de facto regime:
What does Zelaya bring to the elections? He left his liberal party and the party that supports him is lucky to get 2% of the vote.What restoral of the elected government, headed by President Zelaya, brings to the elections is simply legitimacy.
This comment suggests that the reason for restoring the President has something to do with campaigning. This confusion seems actually to be shared, at times, by Ian Kelly of the US State Department, so again, who can blame poor Patrick? So note well: President Zelaya is not on the ballot, and never would have been; Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party is running, and always was, away from the President who he served as Vice President.
While President Zelaya has not been reported, in any medium I have seen, to have "left his liberal party", he has called for its reformation, and that call is supported by a number of Liberal Party congress members. As for "the party that supports him": presumably a reference to the UD, this ignores the fact that reform-minded congress members and local politicians from Liberal and PINU parties join the non-partisan Frente de Resistencia in rejecting the legitimacy of the present electoral process because the constitutional order has not been restored. How big a constituency is this? that is the great unknown that might become more knowable if alternative means to estimate the number boycotting the election are feasible.
Meanwhile, for Patrick, as for other commentators who want the whole thing to be over by holding an election (apparently including the US Department of State) it is an inconvenient fact that more world governments have announced that they absolutely will not recognize the election than have announced categorically that they will. So people like Patrick are left having to argue against particular governments or even clusters of governments. Thus Patrick says
Argentina is a questionable governmentbut ignores the fact that Argentina's position was announced jointly with Brazil-- are we to understand it is also "a questionable government", whatever that means?
For Patrick and his ilk, there is only one world government that matters:
Honduras follows the U.S. through thick and thin.As a US citizen who has spent my life working on Honduran issues and conducting research in Honduras, the relative truth of this statement is almost the saddest thing about Patrick's comments. The Honduran scholars and activists I so admire are and have been engaged in trying to establish a way for Honduras to follow its own path, and not simply be drawn along in the wake of the US ship of state. Honduras should have its own foreign policy; its own economic policies; its own cultural policy; and its own constitution. Otherwise, what we have is the perpetuation of a neocolonial order that disappoints the best aspirations of the United States as much as those of Honduras.
But this is just almost the saddest part of Patrick's comments.
The truly saddest thing I read is the following statement, which suggests that Patrick cannot imagine a Honduras where free speech is allowed without danger of the imposition of curfews and free assembly is possible without prior registration with the police; where a political disagreement among branches of government could be settled in the courts and with due process, not by the Armed Forces in avowed violation of the constitution; and that Patrick doesn't have any idea what it would mean to have a free press, accountable political parties, and true representative democracy:
Currently everything is working in Honduras as it should in a democracy.
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